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PREFACE 
This study is concerned with the influence of the Civil War on the 
Indian tribes residing in Indian Territory who chose to remain loyal to 
the United States government during the conflict. Emphasis is placed on 
the Cherokee, Cree~, Chickasaw, and Seminole Indians, but all tribes and 
portions of Indian Territory tribes loyal to the United States during 
the Civil War are included in the study. 
Confederate military control of Indian Territory early in the Civil 
War forced the Indians loyal to the United States to flee north from 
Indian Territory. Before the war had ended,·approximately 10,500 Feder-
al refugee Indians had scattered across Arkansas, Missouri, Kansas, 
Colorado, and :Mexico. The reasons why these Indians remained loyal to 
the United States, their exodus from Indian Territory, their exile, and 
their return to Indian Territory are documented and evaluated in this 
study. 
The suffering and death expe:i;ienced by these refugees are unique in 
Civil War history, and far surpassed the de.privation and sacrifices made 
by other civilian populations. Hundreds of non-combatants,. including 
women and children, died through hostile enemy action, starvation, or 
disease during the exodus and exile. 
Several people helped make p~ssible the research and writing of 
this study. Invaluable research assistance was provided by the staff of 
the Kansas State Histori~al Society, Topeka, Kansas, and especially 
Forrest Blackburn. Dr. Muriel H. Wrigh1: and Mrs. Rella Looney were 
iii 
unusually helpful in providing archival material at the Oklahoma His-
torical Society, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, Jack Haley, Assistant Curator 
of the Western History Collections at The University of Oklahoma, Nor-
man, Oklahoma, also gave freely of his time and knowledge in,providing 
archival materials • 
. I am especially indebted to the staff of the Oklahoma State Uni-
versity Library for their patience and generous assistance: Mrs. 
Heather McAlpine Lloyd, Reference Librarian, spent hours ordering and 
returning National Archives microfilm and obtaining other researchma-
terial through· interlibrary loan; the late Mrs. Marguerite Howland, 
Documents Librarian, helped locate obscure and little used information; 
and Mrs. Betty Jo Jobes, Head Librarian on the Fifth,Floor, rendered 
invaluable assistance. 
A debt of gratitude·that can never be repaid is owed Dr. LeRoy H. 
Fischer, who shared his academic talents and professional research and 
writing skills freely. His guidance and criticism are indelibly printed 
on every page of this study, which probably would never have been com-
pleted without his encouragement, personal concern, and at times, prod-
ding. Appreciation is also extended to Dr. Norbert R. Mahnken and Dr. 
Odie B. Faulk for critically evaluating this study. 
My apologies and appreciation go to my wife,.Susan, and our chil-
dren, Derek, Lance, and Andrea, who at times found themselves for end-
less h0urs without a husband and father because of this stud\y. Heart-
felt thanks also go to my mother, who opened to me at an early age a 
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FEDERAL REFUGEE ORIGINS 
In the winter of 1861-1862, Opothleyahola must have suffered from 
bitter frustration and tragic disillusionment as he· reflected upon the 
pathetic condition of his Federal refugee band which had been driven 
from Indian Territory by Confederate forces in December of 1861. His 
moroseness was well~founded, for these 7,600 refugee Indians were 
scattered ove.r an area 200 miles in e.xtent on the bleak plains of south-
west Kansas betwe.en the Verd;i.gris and Fall rivers, Walnut Creek, and 
the Arkansas River. The winter was the most severe that had occurred 
in that part of the country for many years. 1 
These Federal refugees were obliged to feed upon their ponies and 
dogs, while their scanty clothing was reduced to threads, and in some 
cases to absolute nakedne.ss. Women and children suffered severely from 
frozen limbs, as did also the men, and this caused nearly 100 amputa-
tions during the winter of 1861-1862. Women gave birth to their off-
spring upon the snow, without shelter or coveringj and newborn infants 
died for want of clothing. The most common diseases, brought on by ex-
. d h . t · f · 2 posure, were pneumonia an ot er respira ory in ections. 
1coffin to Dole, October 15, 1862, Department of the Interior, An= 
nual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for 1862 (Washington: 
Government Printing Office~ 1863)., p. 136. 
2 Collamore to Dole 3 April 21, 1862, ibid., pp. 155-158; Collamore 
to Dole~ April 21, 1862, United States Department of War, War of~ 
1 
2 
The great majority of the refugees in these wretche.d camps were 
former members of the powerful and wealtti,y nations of the Five Civilized 
Tribe.s--the Cherokees, Creeks, Seminoles, Chickasaws, and the. Choctaws--
of Indian Territory. In their abject poverty and intense suffering 
these refugees must have often reflected on their .former prosperity and 
advanced culture glowingly a:ffirmed by a Te.xas delegation that had 
visited Indian Territory only a few months earlier. These Texans felt 
that the Five Civilized Tribes were 
••• in a rapid state of improvement..... They are pursuing 
with good success agriculture and stock raising. Their 
home.s are well built and comfortable, some of them costly 
•••• They are·well supplied with schools of learning, 
extensively patronized. They have many churches and a 
large membership •••• They have written constitutions, laws, 
etc., modeled after those of the Southern States. 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs: Daniel N. Cooley viewed the Five Civili-
zed Tribes similarly: ''They were rich in real and personal property, 
living in the enjoyment of everything needed for their comfort; and 
considerable weal th had accumulated in the hands of some of them ... so 
that they lived in a style of luxury."3 
In the brief time. span of the Civil War the semi-independent, in-
dustrious, powerful, wealthy, and proud Five Civilized Tribes were re-
duced to wards of the Federal government for all of their support. The 
Civil War forced these Indians for political and military re.asons to 
align themselves with either th~ United States or the Confederate 
States, destroyed the tribal unity of the Cherokees, Creeks, and 
Rebellion: !:, Compilation of the Official Records of .the Union and 
Confederate Armies (four series, 128 books, Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1880-1901), Ser •. ii, Vol. IV, pp. 11-13. 
3Harrison, Bourland, and Hamilten to Clark,.April 23, 1861, ibid., 
Ser. iv, Vol. I, pp. 322-325. 
3 
Seminoles, and blighted the bright future prophesied for the Indian 
nations. 
The adverse effects of the Civil War on the Five Civilized Tribes 
were most pronounced and best illustrated in the inhuman hardships 
suffered by the members of the tribes who remained loyal to the Federal 
government. Being a minority, most were forced to flee into pro-Union 
southeast Kansas and tRe others into southwest Missouri in 1861 and 
1862; there they resided until some were able to return to Indian Ter-
ritory near the end of the war. Even then their exile was not concluded 
because. most were forced to live in refugee camps surrounding Fort Gib-
son and Fort Smith, where military protection from Confederate raiders 
was provided. Most of the remaining refugees returned to Indian Terri-
tory at the close of the war. 
The. sectional loyalties which disastrously split the Cherokees, 
Cre.eks, and Seminoles on the eve of the Civil War and sent Opothleya= 
bola's band into Kansas and Chief John Ross' Cherokees into Missouri 
upon its outbreak, had their origins in the removal controversy. The 
·removal of the Five Civilized Tribes from their homes in the south= 
eastern United States to Indian Territory from 1820 through 1859 was a 
tragic event in the history of the Five Civilized Tribes. 4 The horrors 
of the "Trail of Tears," as their westward journeys were called, were. 
4The area west of the Mississippi Rive.r reserved in 1830 for the 
resettlement of Indian tribes was officially designated "Indian Terri-
tory" in 1834 and included most of present Oklahoma, Kansas, and Ne-
braska. The Kansas~Nebraska Act excluded those two states from Indian 
Territory in 1854. In this study Indian Territory will refer to its 
Civil War geographic dimensions, which included present Oklahoma, ex-
cept the panhandle. Joseph B. Thoburn and Muriel H. Wright, Oklahoma: 
f!!:. History of the State and Its People (4 vols., New York: Lewis Histori-
cal Publishing Co., Inc., 1929), Vol. I, p. 126, explains the inception 
and metamorphosis of Indian Territory. 
4 
·i! 
twofold. Nearly one-fourth of the Creek and Cherokee Indians died en-
route to Indian Territory or shortly after arrival. Subjugation, loss 
of property, and, in some instances, death were the immediate effects 
of removal. But the more far-reaching consequence was the division of 
the·full bloods and mixed bleods of the Cherokees, Creeks, and Seminoles 
into two antagonistic factions. The Choctaws and Chickasaws were for-
tunate enough to maintain a large degree·of tribal unity and escape its 
later consequences. 
From 1828 through 1838, pressure by the Federal and state govern-
ments on the Cherokees to move west had increased, and many Cherokees, 
realizing the futility of attempting to remain in their homeland, re-
s igne.d themselves to removal. Leaders of this group, referred to as 
the Treaty Party (also the Ridge Party or Removal Party), were Major 
Ridge, John Ridge, Stand Watie, Elias Boudinot, and Elias (E. C.) 
Boudinot. The Treaty Party, composed mostly of mixed bloods, was op-
posed by the full blood Ross Party, which was against removal. Chief 
John Ross, William P. Ross, and John Drew were the most influential 
Ross Party leaders. After attempting unsuccessfully to buy tribal land 
from the Ross Party, gove.rnment negotiators turned to the Treaty Party, 
and on December 29, 1835, formalized the Treaty of New Echota with 
Treaty Party leaders. Among the signers of this treaty were Majer 
Ridge, John Ridge, Elias Boudinot, and Stand Watie, but none of the 
Ross Party adherents attached their names to the document. Two thou-
sand Cherokees, mostly fr6m the Ridge Party, migrated peacefully to the 
West under the terms of this treaty, but the Ross Party remained ada-
mant. In 1838, Federal troops under Major General Winfield Scott and 
the Georgia militia forcibly rounded up the remaining Cherokees and 
began moving them west. The Cherokees then agreed to remove voluntar-
· ily, and by 1839 nearly all Cherokees were re.siding in Indian Terri-
5 tory. 
The·economic adjustment in their new home was much easier for the 
Cherokees than their social and political adaptations. Cherokee fac-
tional strife in Indian Territory and reconciliation was never com-
pletely effected before the Civil War. The Ross Party full bloods had 
been the·ruling party in the Cherokee Nation before removal because of 
their numerical superiority, and when they finally moved we.st they e.x-
pected to remain the ruling party with John Ross continuing as chief • 
. However, the Cherokees who had migrated west as early as 1820 combined 
with the Removal Party to dispute the claim of political ascendancy of 
the latecomers. 
Political rivalry reignited the smouldering fires of hatred be-
tween the Ross Party and the Treaty Party, and caused them to relive 
real and imagined injustices done them during removal. On June 22, 
5 
1839, Major Ridge, John Ridge, and Elias Boudinot, leaders of the Treaty 
Party, were simultaneously assassinated at three different locations by 
unidentified groups. Stand Watie was the only important leader of the 
mixed blood Treaty Party who escaped the assassins' grasp, even though 
his death had· also been planned. These bloody acts frightened the 
5Indian removal, which is necessary to the understanding of the 
development of factions among the. Five Civilized Tribes, is well covered 
in Thoburn and Wright, Oklah0ma: _&.History of the State and Its People, 
Vol. I:, pp. 163-176; and Grant Foreman, Indian Removal: The Immigration 
of the Five Civilized Tribes of Indians (Norman: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 1953), pp. 19-386. For Cherokee removal only, see Mor;ris L. 
Wardell, ~ Political History of the Cherokee Nation, 1838"".1907 (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press~ 1938), pp. 3-94, and Grace Steele Wood., 
ward, The Cherokees (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1963), pp. 
157-218. 
remaining Cherokees into cooperating with the Ross Party. A Cherokee 
national convention was held in September, 1839, at Tahlequah, and a 
constitution was adopted for the Cherokee Nation. This prefabricated 
unity was patched by. a treaty in 1846 between the leaders of the Ross 
,. I ' 
and Watie factions, and from 1846 until 1861 the hatre,d and bleody 
heritage of removal was submerged but net forgotten in the Cherokee 
Nation.6 
6 
Cre.ek removal ta the West followed a similar pattern. The Creeks, 
like the Cherokees, were laosely divided inte two groups~ the Up):')er 
Creeks, mostly full bloods, and the Lower Creeks, largely mixed 
7 bloods. The Lower Creeks, led by William Mcintash, chief ef the Creek 
Natien, came to the same. conclusian--the futility of trying to remain 
in the East--as did the Cherokee Removal Party. In 1825, William Mcin-
tosh, Roley Mcintosh, Chilly Mcintosh, and thirty-nine other Lower 
Creek chiefs and headmen signed the Treaty of Indian Springs, ceding 
"to the United States all the [Creek tribal] lands lying within the 
boundaries of the State of Georgia,'' after the Upper Creek chiefs had 
6Ibid., pp. 219-237; Wardell,~ Political History of the Cherokee 
Natien, ~-1907, pp. 12~75; Thoburn and Wright, Oklahoma: A History 
of the State and & Peeple, Vol. I, pp. 253-263. 
7The demographic divisian of the Creeks had its inception as early 
as the first half of the eighteenth century when Scottish immigrants of 
the Mcintosh clan began intermarr1ing in Georgia with Creek women. 
Differences in habit, thought, and dress developed. The mixed bleod or 
Mcintosh Creeks and their desce.ndants, under the leadership of Chief 
William Mcintosh, sided with the United States and General Andrew Jack-
son against the full bleod Creeks a,l!)t! the British in the Cree.k War of 
1813-1814. These. tribal difference,s were unresolved through the Civil 
War. For further information an the Mcintosh Creeks and history af 
Creek feuds, read John B. Meserve, ''The Mcintoshes," Chrenicles of 
Oklahom~. Vol.. X, No. 3 (September, 1932), pp. 310-325, and Thoburn and 
Wright. Oklahoma: ~ History of the State and lli Peep le, Vol. I, pp. 
234-236, and Vol. II, pp. 810-811. 
7 
walked out of the council. Enraged~ the Creek National Council, with 
only full bloods in attendance, passed a death sentence on Chief Mcin-
tosh, which was carried out April 29, 1825. 
The Treaty of Indian Springs was ratified by the Senate, but Presi-
dent John Quincy Adams. opposed to the circumstances surrounding the 
signing of the treaty, asked a Creek delegation to come to Washington. 
This dele.gation, which officially represented the Creek Nation and which 
was headed by Opothleyahola, spe.aker of the National Council. signed the 
Treaty of Washington of 1826, by which the Creeks sold all of their tri= 
bal land east of the Mississippi River.8 
Creek reassimilation in Indian Territory was less violent than that 
of the Cherokees, but removal animosities were still strong. When 
Opothle.yahola and 8,000 full blood Creeks arrived in Indian Territory 
in 1836, a tense, volatile atmosphere prevailed. The sons and relatives 
of the assassinated Creek Chief Mcintosh had vowed to kill Opothleya-
hola, a leader of the assassination plot. Indian agents and military 
officers were able to avert bloodshed, and the Upper Creeks settled 
9 apart from the older settlements of the Mcintosh Creeks. 
The Lower Creeks in 1836 occupied fifteen towns in the northeastern 
part of the new Creek Nation. These settlements extend from the Verdi= 
gris River to the Red Fork. a distance of about eighty miles in length 
8charles Kappler, ed., Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties (6 vols., 
Washington: Government Printing Office, 1904), Vol. II, pp. 214-217; 
Angie Debo, The Road to Disappearance (Norman: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 1941), pp. 88-106; Thoburn and Wright, Oklahoma:~ Histo£_y of 
the State and Its People, Vol. I, pp. 234-237. 
9Ibid., p. 235; Muriel H. Wright,~ Guide to the Indian Tribes of 
Okl~homa (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1951), pp. 136-137; 
Thoburn and Wrigbt, Oklahoma: ~ History of the State and Its People~ 
Vol. II, pp. 810-811. 
8 
and fifty miles in breadth. Th~ newly arrived Upper Creeks settled 
southwest of the older settlers on the opposite side of a forty mile 
wide prairie. Their ancient tribal towns were reestablished, "extending 
fr<:>m the bottoms of the Arkansas :1 south to those of the north fork of 
the Canadian, a distance of about forty miles; they extend from there 
westward, between the Deep fork, North fork, and Main Canadian to Little 
River, a distance of about eighty miles, and an ave.rage breadth of 
about sixty. 11 10 An 1840 pact provided for a formal union that con~ 
tained a national council composed of Upper and Lower Creeks and a dual 
executive with Lower Creek Chief Roley Mcintosh as the dominant of the 
two. In actuality, the feuding factions remained separate political 
entities, and the basic political and social institutions were the 
towns. 
The Seminoles in 1832, under the leadership of Principal Chief 
John Jumper, signed the Treaty of Payne's Landing, which obligated them 
to move to Indian Territory when a suitable home. was found. A group of 
seven Seminole chie.fs traveled to Indian Territory to select a new home, 
and in February, 1833, accepted a Creek offer to live in their nation 
and signed the Treaty of Fort Gibson. However, many Seminoles, led by 
Chief Osceola, refused to move west and killed Chief Emathla, a signer 
of the Treaty of Fort Gibson. Osceola and his followers then massacred 
several civilians and soldiers, including Major Francis Dode, setting 
off the Seminole War which lasted until 1842. Most Seminoles accepted 
the Treaty of Fort Gibson and moved west in 1836. In 1845~ the Creeks 
allowed the Seminofos to settle together on Little River and granted 
lOibid.~ Vol. I, pp. 235-236. 
them the right to enact their own laws; in 1856, a Seminole delegation 
headed by Principal Chief John Jumper, son of the former chieftain, 
negotiated a treaty in Washington which provided for a separate. and 
autonomous Seminole Nation, circumscribed by the North Fork River, the 
11 
Canadian River, and the ninety-seventh and one-hundredth meridians. 
Following the Third Seminole War, Billy Bowlegs and many of the 
Seminoles still hiding in the Florida swamps were persuaded to move to 
9 
the new Seminele Nation. These proud Seminoles arrived in Indian Terri~ 
tory in small bands from 1842 through 1859 with their fierce warrior 
chiefs, Billy Bowlegs, John Chupco (Long John), and Halleck (Halex) 
Tustenuggee. Having bee.n participants in the Florida Seminole wars, 
they arrived with a bitter hatred fer Southern whites and a distrust for 
Chief John Jumper and the other Seminoles whe passively submitted to re-
moval. This antagenism fereshadewed the factional cleavage of the 
Seminoles in the Civil War. 
The Choctaws and Chickasaws had similar removal experiences and 
hardships with ene notable exception; they both escaped the disunity 
and fratricide experienced by the ether three tribes. In 1820, Pushma-
taha and other Chectaw chiefs signed the Treaty of Doakus Stand, in 
which a portion of their tribal land was ceded to the United States in 
return for a vast holding in Indian Territory. Finally, in September, 
1830, in the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek, the. Choctaws ceded all 
their remaining land east of the Mississippi River and agreed to move. 
wesL 
11Edwin C. McReynelds, The Seminoles (Norman: University of Okla-
homa Press~ 1957), pp. 118-288; Kappler, ed., Indian Affairs: Laws and 
Treaties, Vol. II, pp. 344-345, 394-395~ 756-763. 
10 
The Chickasaw removal was the·most easily effected of all the Five 
Civilized Tribes. In October, 1832, Chickasaw tribal leaders signed 
the Treaty of Pontotoc which provided for the cession of all Chickasaw 
land east of the·Mississippi River as soon as an acceptable·home in 
Indian Territory was found. The Treaty of Doaksville in January, 1837, 
previded for removal to the western portion of the Chectaw Nation, and 
by 1840 nearly all the Chickasaws were relocated. 12 
The Choctaws and Chickasaws had few political problems in adjusting 
to their new homes. The ominous split, with its latent potential for 
self-destruction, that ensnared the Creeks, Cherokees, and Seminoles was 
avoided by the C~octaws and Chickasaws, and this accounts for the unan-
imity of these two tribes during the Civil War. The only thorny politi-
cal problem for the Choctaws was the Chickasaw question, which was 
solved by the Choctaw-Chickasaw Treaty of 1855. It was approved by the 
United States and met both of the Chickasaw demands for political 
autonomy and a separate tribal domain. 13 
By the middle of the nineteenth century, the proud and powerful 
Five Civilized Tr~bes had been forcefully uprooted and evicted from 
their homelands in the southeastern United States and deported to a 
wilderness. Tne fratricidal split among the tribes momentarily reunited 
in their overwhelming tasks of nation-building. Just as each tribe was 
12Angie Debo, The Rise~~ of the Choctaw Republic (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1934), pp. 49-79; Muriel H. Wright, "The 
Removal of the Chectaws to Indian Territory, 1830-1833," Chronicles .of 
Oklahoma., Vol. VI!! No •. 2 (June., 1928), pp. 103-128; Thoburn and Wright, 
Oklahoma: A History ef the State and Its People, Vol. I, pp. 219-234; 
Kappler, ed., Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties, Vol. II, pp. 191~195, 
310-319, 356-364, 486-488. 
13Ibid., PP• 706-714. 
11 
be.ginning to enjoy the prospect of internal peace, national prosperity, 
and semi-autonomy from political control, the Civil War crashed upon 
Indian Territory like a great tidal wave. Its fury hurled the pre-
cariously anchored Indian governments upon the rocks and dashed all 
hopes of factional cooperation and future prosperity. 
In 1861, the newly-formed Confederate States of America considered 
Indian Territory important enough for its Provisional Congress to pass a 
resolution requesting its Committee on Indian Affairs to negotiate 
treaties of alliance with the Indian Territory tribes; on March 5, 1861, 
Albert Pike of Arkansas was appointed special Indian commissioner to 
negotiate these treaties. Pike was greatly aided by the already agi-
tated condition of the Indians and by the Confederate state governments 
of Arkansas and Texas.14 
The Chickasaws and Choctaws, who lived just north of Texas across 
the Red River, were early subjected to secessionist propaganda, and they 
closely watched developments in that state. 15 On January 5, 1861, the 
Chickasaws passed an act calling for an intertribal conference to con-
sider the Indians 1 interest in the impending Civil War. It convened on 
14Annie H. Abel, The.American Indian as Slaveholder and Secession-
. ist (Cleveland: ArthurH. Clark C~., 1915'f:° pp. 127-130 .- . 
15The Texas secession convention in its first session passed an 
ordinance "to secure the ;friendship and cooperation of the Choctaw~ 
Cherokee, Chickasaw, Creek, and Seminole Indians," and conunissioned 
James E. Harrison, James Bourland, and Charles A. Hamilton to carry out 
that ordinance. The appointees traveled to Indian Territory, and in 
March, 1861, met with official representatives of all the Five Civilized 
Tribes. They were most influential among the Choctaws and Chickasaws 
and wrote to their superiors that the Choctaws and Chickasaws were "en-
tirely Southern ••• and determined to adhere to the.fortunes of the 
South," early prophesying their unanimity for the Southern cause. 
full report of the Texas commission is in Harrison, Bourland, and 






February 17 at the Creek Agency. By that time the Chickasaws and Choe-
taws had decided, independently, to align themselves with the South if 
it became necessary to take sides, and thus did not send delegates to 
the· council, pretending that high wate.r prevented their attendance. 
The council, attended by Creeks, Seminoles, and Cherokees and control-
led by full bloods, simply adopted a neutral position and reapproved 
existing United States-Indian treaties. 16 
A second attempt by the full blood Creeks and Cherokees to steer a 
neutral course, fellowing theintertribal council in February, 1861, 
was the Antelope Hills council in late June. and early July, which in-
valved all the tribes of Indian Territory. It was called by Chief Ross 
and Opothleyahola, who were struggling unceasingly for neutrality and 
adhe.rence to existing Indian-United States treaties. The meeting pro-
posed that all the tribes in Indian Territory align themselves in a 
neutral confederation. This council, the earlier intertribal cenference 
in February, and Ross' s neutrality proclamation issued on May 17, 1861,. 
were spasmodic attempts to forestall the inevitable decision of aligning 
with either the Union or the Confe.deracy. Confederate Indian Commis-
sioner Pike's untiring efforts frem May through October in 1861 fer Con-
federate treaty alliances with the Indians forced the unwilling neutrals 
to choose sides in the conflict. 
At the earliest opportunity, a new council of Choctaws, Chickasaws, 
Creeks, and Seminoles was convened at North Fork Town in the Creek 
16nean Trickett, "The Civil War in the Indian Territery, 1861," 
Chronicles ef Oklahoma, Vol. XVII, No. 3 (September, 1939), pp. 316-317; 
Wardell, ! Political History of.~ Cherokee Nation, 1838-1907, p. 124; 
Thoburn and Wright, Oklahoma: !:_ History of the State and Its Peeple, 
Vol. I, p. 307. 
13 
Nation, while·· most of the important full blood Creek and Seminole chiefs 
were at the Antelope Hills council. On July 1, this council wrote a 
constitution for a "United Nations of; the Indian Territory," which was 
an attempt to dignify its later treaty negotiations with an aura of; 
unanimity and legality. On June 10, the Choctaw Council had anticipated 
the arrival of a Confederate emissary and had appointed commissioners, 
with the power to sign alliance agreements, to meet with Confederate 
officials. On July 12)) 1861, these commissioners signed a treaty with 
Pike. The unanimity of the Choctaw and Chickasaw Indians in aligning 
themselves with the South prevented intratribal bloodshed among them-
selves during the Civil War. 17 
On August 1, Pike signed a treaty with Principal Chief John Jumper 
and minor officials of the Seminole Nation at the Seminole Council 
House. Federal Indian Agent E. H. Carruth later claimed that Jumper, 
working closely with four other friends, signed the treaty, but that 
this group did not represent the majority of sentiment among the Semi-
noles. This charge is partially substantiated by the fact that the 
Seminole Council had not authorized anyone to meet with Confede.rate 
commissioners or to sign any agreements)) and the Seminole Council never 
officially ratified the treaty. This display of action for the Confed-
erate cause was further supported on July 10, 1861, by a Creek-
Confederate treaty of alliance 1 which was then ratified by the Creek 
17confederate-Choctaw and Chickasaw Treaty, July 12, 1861, Official 
Records, Ser. iv, Vol. I)) pp. 445~466; Debo, The Rise and Fall of the 
Choctaw Republic, pp. 80-83. 
14 
Council on July 20. 18 
Pike exploited three developments in securing a treaty with the 
Cre.eks. First, was the. absence of pro-Union leaders, who were at the 
Antelope Hills council during the early part of negotiations; second, 
was the active support of the Lower Creeks for the Southern cause~ and 
third, was the bribing of Motey Canard (Kennard), principal chief of 
the Creeks, to sign the Confederate treaty. Chief Canard, Chilly 
Mcintosh, Daniel Mcintosh, Echo Harjo, Louis Mcintosh~ W. F. Mcintosh, 
James M. C. Smith~ George W. Stidham, Thomas C. Carr, John Smith~ 
Timothy Barnard (Barnett), George Brinton, Ok-Chun Harjo, Co-As-Sat-Ti 
Fixico, Joseph Cornells, George. W. Walker, and Samuel Checote, all 
wealthy and influential Lower Creeks, were the original signers of the 
Confederate-Creek Treaty of July 10, which was subseque.ntly approved by 
most of the other Lower Creek town chiefs. Conspicuously absent were 
the names of important Upper Creek chiefs. The Upper Creeks immediately 
realized that they were again being involved in the consequences of a 
treaty of which they had no part, and violent opposition to the treaty 
was aroused by Opothleyahola~ Tallise Fixico, Oktarharsars Harjo 
(Sands), and Micco Hutke. The latter three names were forged on the 
19 treaty. 
After Pike had se.cured treaties with the Choctaws, Chickasaws, and 
18confederate-Seminole Treaty, August 1, 1861, Official Records, 
Ser. iv, Vol. I, pp. 513-527; Thoburn and Wright, Oklahoma: ~ History 
of th~ State and Its People, Vol. I, p. 319; Confederate-Creek Treaty, 
July 10, 1861, Official Records, Ser. iv, Vol. I, pp. 426~443; Debo, 
The Road.!£ Disappearance, pp. 144-146. 
19 Confederate-Creek Treaty, July 10, 1861, Official Records, Ser. 
iv, Vol. I, pp. 439~440; Wright,~ Guide to the Indian Tribes of Okla-
homa, p. 138; Debo~ The Road!.£ Disappearance~ pp. 144ml45. 
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Creeks at North Fork and the Seminoles at their agency he left for the 
Leased District to negotiate with the smaller tribes residing around 
the Wichita Agency near Fort Cobb. 20 There he signed two treaties with 
portions of these tribes. One was with the Penateka band of Comanches, 
and the other was a joint treaty with the Wichita, Caddo, Delaware, Ab-
sentee Shawnee, Anadarko, Tonkawa" Tawakoni, Kichai (Keechi), Hainai 
(Ioni), Waco, and Penateka Comanche tribes. The real intent of these 
treaties was neutrality, not alliance; their purpose was to protect the 
Confederate portions of the Five Civilized Tribes and Texans from spe-
radic raids by these tribes. 21 
The slavery question in the Cherokee Nation and the impending Civil 
War again aroused disunity and factional hatred in the Cherokee Nation. 
The Old Settlers and the Ross Party, both almost exclusively full 
bloods, had merged by the eve of the Civil War. The old Treaty Party, 
20 The Choctaw~Chickasaw Treaty of 1855 created a new Chickasaw 
Nation and the Leased District from the western half of the pre-treaty 
Choctaw Nation. The Leased District, which lay west of the. Chickasaw 
Nation, was jointly owned by the Choctaws and Chickasaws but was leased 
to the Federal government for the resettlement of other Indian tribes. 
The origins and purpose of the Leased District as contained in the 1855 
treaty are in Kappler, ed., Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties, Vol. II, 
p. 706. In 1859 a.group of semi-civilized Indian tribes loosely re-
ferred to as the Texas Indians were moved from the Upper Reserve and 
the L6wer Re.serve along the Brazos River in Texas and were resettled in 
the Leased District near Fort Cobb to protect them from harassment, 
mistreatment, and genocide at the hands of unsympathetic Texas citizens. 
Excellent histories of these small trib-e.s are contained in Grant Fore-
man, The Last Trek.of the Indians (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1946), pp. 282-295; and Wright, A Guide to the Indian Tribes of Okla-
homa, pp. 31-34, 118-128, 145-156, 164-166, 240-260. 
21confederate-Penateka Comanche:1 Wichita, Caddo, Waco, Tawakoni, 
Anadarko, Tonkawa, Ioni, Keechi, Absentee Shawnee, and Delaware Treaty, 
August 12, 1861, Confederate~Penateka Comanche Treaty, August 12, 1861, 
Official Recqrds, Ser. iv, Vol. I, pp. 542-554; Abel, The American 
Indian as Slaveholder and Secessionist, pp. 51~57; Thoburn and Wright, 
Ok1ahom;;- A Histor_y of the State and Its People, Vol. I, p. 319. 
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which was nearly all mixed bloods with Stand Watie as its recognized 
leader, had vigorous proslavery and Southern proclivities and owned 
much land and many slaves. The Ross coalition provided recruits for 
the abolition cause. which was championed by Reverend Evan Jones and 
his son John, who had been Baptist missionaries among the Cherokees 
even be.fore removal. With the silent support of Chief Ross;, the Jonese.s 
in 1859 established a secret abolition society among the full bloods 
known as the Keetoowah Society or the Pin Indians. For Ross;, the se.cre.t 
order helped consolidate the politi\:!al power of his party; in 1860 it 
politically evolved into the Loyal League;, which advocated the continu= 
ance of Cherokee-United States treaties and withholding from power those 
t d £ . . t . 1. t. 22 suspec e o secessionis inc ina ions. 
The Knights of the Golden Circle was the proslavery organization 
formed to counter the Keetoowah Society;, and it politically became the 
Southern Rights Party in 1861. Its leadership consisted of Stand Watie, 
W. P. Adair, James M. Bell, and Elias C. Boudinot, son of Elias Boudinot 
who was assassinated during the removal controversy in 1839. Approxi= 
mately seven thousand of the eighteen thousand Cherokees were members 
of the Southern Rights Party, but they were a vocal, active minority; 
and Stand Watie, the most important leader in the party, recruited his 
own military organization and volunteered his services to the 
22wardell, A Political History of the Cherokee Nation. 1838~1907, 
pp. 120-123; Woodward, _The Cherokees~ pp. 258~259; Trickett;, "The Civil 
War in the Indian Territory;, 1861," Chronicles of Oklahoma~ Vol. XVII, 
pp. 323~325; Joseph B. Thoburn, "The Cherokee Question," Chronicles of 
Oklahoma~ Vol. II, No. 2 (June, 1924), pp. 141=242. 
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Confederacy. 23 External pressure on the Ross Cherokees to join the 
Confederacy came from citizens of Arkansas and their governor, Henry M. 
Rector. Rector, who was inaugurated in November, 1860, was a cousin 
and close personal friend of Elias Rector, then Superintendent of the 
Southern Superintendency, which included the Cherokees, and worked un-
ceasingly for the Confede.rate cause in Arkansas and Indian Territory. 
In a letter to Chief Ross dated January 29, 1861, Governor Rector asked 
the Cherokees to "co=operate with the South in defense of her institu= 
tions, her honor, and her firesides. 1124 The convention which passed the 
Arkansas Ordinance of Secession on May 6, 1861, also voted on May 10 to 
send a three-man delegation to Indian Territory to solicit the support 
of the Five Civilized Tribes; for the remainder of 1861 the. Che.rokees 
were inundated with letters, delegations, and Southern commissioners 
25 
urging them to align with the Confederate States. 
23wardell, ~ Political History of the Cherokee Nation, 1838~1907, 
pp. 122=123; Woodward, The Cherokees, p. 258; McCulloch to Drew, Septem-
ber 1, 1861, McCulloch to Walker, September 2, 1861, McCulloch to Price, 
October 22, 1861, Official Records, Ser. i, Vol. III, pp. 691-692, 721; 
LeRoy H. Fischer and Jerry Gill, "Confederate Indian Forces Outside. of 
Indian Territory," Chronicles of Oklahoma, Vol. XLVI, No. 3 (Autumn, 
1968)~ p. 251. 
24Rector to Ross, January 29, 1861, Thirty-Eighth Congress, First 
Session, House Executive Document Number l (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1864), VoL III, p. 345; Harry J. Lemley, "Letters of 
Henry M. Rector and J. R. Kannady to John Ross of the Cherokee Nation," 
Chronicles of Oklahoma, Vol. XLII, No. 3 (Autumn, 1964), pp. 320-329; 
Abel, The American Indian~ Slaveholder and Secessionist, pp. 112-113. 
25 
Bean, Welch, MacClure, Spencer, McCulloch, Lacy, Carnahan, and 
others to Ross, May 9, 1861, Kannady to Ross, May 15, 1861, McCulloch 
to Ross, June 12, 1861, O£ficial Records, Ser. i, Vol. XIII, pp. 492-
495; Burroughs to Harris, May 8, 1861, ibid., Ser. i, Vol. I, p. 691; 
Kannady to Ross, May 15, 1861, Thirty-Eighth Congress, First Sessionll 
House Executive Document Number l, Vol. III, p. 347; Abel, The American 
Indian as Slaveholder and Secessionist, pp. 111-112 n. 175, 120-121, 
125, 149-152; Lemley, "Letters of Henry M. Rector and J. R. Kannady to 
John Ross of the Cherokee Nation," Chronicles of Oklahoma, Vol. XLII, 
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Under these circumstances, Pike and McCulloch visited Chief Ross 
around June. 1, 1861, but were rebuffed in their efforts to negotiate a 
treaty of alliance. Pike, realizing there was little chance for a 
tre.aty, wanted to tre.at with the heads of the Southern Rights Party~ 
including Watie and others, indicating the easily recognizable fracture 
between the Cherokees. However, three months later the Cherokees unde.r 
the leadership of Ross signed a treaty with the Confederate States be-
cause the military and political situation in Indian Territory had 
altered drastically. The treaty, grudgingly accepted by the full bloods, 
was a desperate attempt by Ross to prevent a Cherokee civil war. He 
knew that the Southern Rights Party would sign a treaty with the Con-
federates independently if the Ross Party refused to align with the 
South; he already had the military might of Texas, Arkansas, and the 
other Five Civilized Tribes arrayed against him. Although he brought 
his nation undivided into the Civil War, Ross was unable to prevent long 
. 26 the inevitable rupture of the Cherokee Na ti.on. 
Pike included in his brilliant diplomatic feat three other treaties 
in October with the Great Osages residing in southeast Kansas, the 
pp.320-329; Harry J. Lemley, "Historic Letters of General Ben McCulloch 
and Chief John Ross in the Civil War," Chronicles of Oklahoma~ Vol. XL, 
No. 3 (Autumn, 1962), pp. 286-294. 
26confederate=Cherokee Treaty, October 7, 1861, Official Records, 
Se.r. iv, Vol. I, pp. 669-686; Thoburn, "The Cherokee Question," Chroni-
cles of Oklahoma, Vol. II, pp. 172-175; Kinneth McNeil, "Confederate 
Treaties with the Tribes of Indian Territory," Chronicles of Oklahoma, 
Vol. XI.II, No. 4 (Winter, 1964-1965), pp. 408-420; Edward E. Dale, "The 
Cherokees in the Confederacy, 11 Journal of Southern History, Vol. XIII, 
No. 2 (May, 1947), pp. 160-185; Abel, The American Indian~ Slaveholder 
and Secessionist, pp. 134-140; and Charles R. Francis, "Confederate As-
cendancy in Indian Territory, 1860-1861," (Unpublished Master of Arts 
Thesis, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma, 1963), pp. 42-
48. 
19 
Quapaws, and the mixed band of Senecas and Shawnees living in the north-
east corner of the Cherokee Nation. These were formal treaties of al-
liance, and thus differed from those signed by the Wichita Agency Indians 
in that they promised specific military aid. 27 
Treaties officially bound all five governments of the Civilized 
Tribes to the Confederacy, but the treaties did not bind the hearts and 
loyalties of a large minority of the Five Civilized Tribes to the South. 
When the Creek and Cherokee delegations, consisting of full blood chiefs 
and leading proponents of neutrality, returned to their respective na-
tions from the extended peace mission in western Indian Territory, they 
were shocked to find that the Creeks, Seminoles, Choctaws, and Chicka-
saws had signed treaties of alliance with Pike. The delegates had just 
spent two months visiting with other Indians~ urging a neutral stand in 
the pending crisis. They had left in May, 1861, and had conferred first 
with the Seminoles at their council house; next, they talked with the 
Delawares at old Camp Arbuckle and then they conversed with the Kicka-
poos at Council Grove on the Canadian River just west of present Oklahoma 
City. The pacifists next met with the Comanches on the Canadian River 
near Antelope Hills; and, finally~ other Comanche and Kiowa villages 
near the Salt Plains were visited by the neutral Indians. These smaller 
meetings occurred before and after the general council of all these 
27 These treaties and accounts of negotiations are in the 
Confederate-Osage Treaty, October 2, 1861, Confederate-Seneca and Shaw-
nee Treaty, October 4, 1861, and Confederate-Quapaw Treaty, October 4, 
1861, Official Records, Ser. iv, Vol. I, pp. 636=661, and Abel~ The 
American Indiftn ..§& Slaveholde.r and Secessionist, pp. 235=241. A history 
of these tribes and an account of their removal to Indian Territory are 
in Wright,~ Guide to the Indian Tribes of Oklahoma~ pp. 189~198, 218-
221~ 237-244~ Foreman~ The Last~ of the Indians, pp. 61-85. 166-168, 
266=277. 308=314~ and John J. Mathews, The Osages: Children of the Mid-
dle Wate~ (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1961), pp. 634=638. 
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tribes and others at Antelope Hills. 28 
The Creek delegate.a were indignant and immediately formed plans to 
arrest the disastrous train of events. Opothleyahola, the sagacious 
elder warrior of the Creeks, had earlier withdrawn from the Confederate 
treaty negotiations at North Fork Town to a camp near the junction of 
the North Fork and Deep Fork of the Canadian River, and was followed by 
many chiefs and most of the full bloods. Simultaneously, Presbyterian 
missionaries W. S. Robertson and Alice Robertson were ordered by Princi-
pal Chief Motey Canard to vacate their schools ~nd missionary buildings; 
thus the children attending the boarding schools became the first vic-
tims of dislocation, along with Opothleyahola's followers. 29 
On August 5, the loyal Creeks, consisting of Opothleyahola's sup-
porters and the.former Antelope Hills' delegates met at Opothleyahola's 
home on Brush Hill, declared the Confederate-Creek treaty illegal, and 
stated that Principal Chief Motey Canard and Echo Harjo, chief of the 
Lower Creeks, had forfeited their right to lead the Creek Nation because 
they had signed a treaty without approval by the Creek National Council. 
The loyal Creeks then filled the vacant office of principal chief by 
electing Sands as acting principal chief. The re.cent treaty was then 
repudiated and denounced in much the same manner as was the removal 
28Muriel H. Wright, "Colonel Cooper's Civil War Report on the Bat-
tle of Round Mountain," Chrenicles of Oklahoma, Vol. XXXIX, No. 4 
(Winter, 1961-1962), p. 383; Thoburn and Wright, Oklahoma: f! History of 
the State· and Its People, Vol. I, pp. 317-318; Abel, The American Indian 
as 'Slavehelder and Secessionist, p. 136, n. 228; Thoburn, "The Cherokee 
Question~" Chro~les of Oklahoma, Vol. II, pp. 174-175~ Debo, The Road 
to Disappearance, p. 144; Peoria to Colton, June 30, 1862, Commissioner 
of Indian Affairs Report for 1862, p. 173. 
29Ibid., pp. 146-147; John B.Meserve, "Chief Opothleyahola," 
Chronicles of Oklahoma, Vol. IX, No. 4 (December, 1931), p. 446. 
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treaty years before, and the full bloods' rejection of it was to have 
even more dire consequences. There existe.d after August 5, 1861, and 
continued throughout the Civil War, two separate Creek governments--one 
being recognized by the United States, and the other by the Confederacy. 
These antagonistic governments could not exist peacefully in Indian 
T . 30 erritory. 
The loyal Creeks, having separated themselves geographically and 
politically from the Confederate Creeks, began innnediately to seek 
recognition and aid from the Federal government. Although these loyal 
Indians had their own elected chiefs and headmen, actual responsibility 
31 for organization and leadership fell to Opothleyahola. An understand-
ing of Opothleyahola's motives and his subsequent actions in seeking 
United States government support before and during the exodus into 
Kansas can best be obtained by first reviewing correspondence and meet-
ings in 1861 between officers of the Office of Indian Affairs and the 
military on the one hand and the loyal Indians on the other. 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs William P. Dole, who had earlier 
vigorously protested the withdrawal of Federal troops from Indian 
30 Creek delegation to the Fort Smith Commission, Annual Report of 
the Commission of Indian Affairs for 1865 (Washington: Government Print= 
ing Office, 1866), pp. 328=329; Debo, The Road to Disappearance, p. 147; 
McReynolds, The Seminoles, pp. 292-293. 
31opothleyahola is often referred to by writers and historians as 
"Chief" or "Old Chief," but no known evidence supports this claim. That 
he was a great orator and statesman is certain. At one time, before re-
moval, he was the official Speaker of the Creek National Council for 
Little Chief, principal chief of the Creek Nation, and on at least one 
occasion he headed a Creek delegation to Washington which met with 
President John Quincy Adams. He was also a highly successful trader 
and businessman~ which accounted for his nickname, "Old Gouge," and on 
the eve of the Civil War he was reputed to be the wealthiest citizen of 
the Creek Nation. 
22 
Territory~ wrote to Secretary of the Interior Caleb B. Smith on May 30~ 
186lj that loyalty to the United States government "would be produced in 
the Indian Country ••• as they can have no inducement to unite with the 
enemies of the United States unless we fail as a nation to give them 
that protection guaranteed by our treaty stipulation.'' He 
urged that a strong military force be sent into Indian Territory. Dole 
dispatched letters to the chiefs and headmen of all the tribes in the 
Southern Superintendency informing them that they would be provided with 
11 competent and discreet' 1 agents who would observe all treaty obligations 
and would "promote a good understanding between the red and white 
32 
races. 11 
In his first report to Commissioner Dole~ Superintendent Coffin be-
moaned his inability to assist the Indians in Indian Territory under his 
charge because it was 11 unsafe ••• to visit them~ or for any person at all 
suspected of entertaining Union sentiments to remain among them.n In 
this same letter~ Coffin reiterated his desire for a council with dele= 
33 
gates from the Southern tribes at Humboldt~ Kansas. 
The plight of the officers assigned to the Southern Indians was 
amply demonstrated. All the Office of Indian Affairs could offer the 
factions of the Five Civilized Tribes remaining loyal to the Federal 
government was hollow=sounding words of encouragement and reassurance~ 
for the military was both unprepared and unwilling to reoccupy Indian 
32Dole to Smith 9 May 30 9 1861, Dole to Ross~ Harris~ Kennard (Can= 
ard) 9 Harjo~ and Hudson 9 May 11 9 1861 9 Thirty=Seventh Congress~ Second 
Session 9 Senate Executive Document Number 19 Vol. 1 9 pp. 651=752 9 750~ 
751, Abel 9 . The American India~!.§, Slaveholder and Secessionist 9 PPo 241= 
2420 
33Coffin to Dole 9 October 21 1861 9 ibid. 9 pp. 654=6550 
23 
Territory in 1861. Coffin's vague plans for a meeting between represen-
tatives of the Indian Office and the Five Civilized Tribes, together 
with his letters of encouragement sent to tribal leaders 1 were indica-
tive of the fact that the military power of the Federal government did 
not extend below the southern border of Kansas; these impLications did 
not go unheeded by the wavering Indians. 
The most successful attempt to connnunicate with Indians wishing to 
remain faithful to the United States government in Indian Territory was 
promulgated by a controversial Kansas figure 9 James M. Laneo In the 
sunnner of 1861 Lane was pursuing two careers--one political and the 
other military. He was a United States Senator from Kansas 9 which had 
recently been admitted to the Union 9 and he had been recently appointed 
1 . h f. K . 1, . 34 genera inc arge o ansas mi itia. While functioning in the latter 
capacity 9 Lane recruited enlisted men and officers for his Kansas bri= 
gade from all possible sources 1 and the possibility of the Indian as a 
recruit was not overlooked. Lane began to approach officers of the 
Indian Office and chiefs of the various tribes concerning the use of 
Indians as a home guard or auxili.ary force 9 and in the summer of 1861 
connnissioned Eo H. Carruth 9 who had served as an educator among the 
Cherokees 9 Creeks 9 and Seminoles 9 to write to the various tribes and to 
invite representatives of those loyal to the United States government to 
a conference with Lane at Fort Lincoln. However 9 before Carruth could 
write any letters and before Dole could arrange his Humboldt conference, 
341ane to Lincoln, October 9 October 9 1 1861 9 Official Records 9 Ser. 
i 9 Vol. 111 9 pp. 529=530. 
24 
the pro-Northern Indians initiated action themselves. 35 
Opothleyahola and other Creek and Seminole leaders realized that 
they would not be allowed to remain in their tribal nations and at the 
same time espouse neutrality; it became necessary for them to seek re~ 
fuge elsewhere. Opothleyahola, a skillful diplomat 9 knew that he must 
rely on two conditions for the successful completion of the migrationz 
continuing neutrality of the Cherokees 9 and active intervention on be-
half of the loyal Indians by the United States government. If Chief 
Ross continued to resist Cherokee=Confederate alignment, then the dis-
placed Union Indians could resettle in the Cherokee Outlet or at least 
have free access across Cherokee land into the Union state of Kansas un-
til Indian Territory was once again brought under United States govern-
ment control. The need for Federal government support was twofoldz the 
Indian refugees would need protection from the Confederate army being 
raised in Indian Territory; more importantly 9 the refugee families would 
have to be fed 9 at least through the winter 9 until they could raise 
enough crops to feed the hundreds of women and children. 36 
In August 9 1861 9 Opothleyahola was sure that Chief Ross would fol-
low a course of neutrality because of the Cherokee leadership in the 
February intertribal council and the Antelope Hills conference, both of 
35Abel~ The American Indian as Slaveholder and Secessionist, pp. 
242-243 9 n. 485, Coffin to Dole, September 26 9 1861, Letters Received 
by the Office of Indian Affairs, Southern Superintendency, Department 
of the Interior, National Archives, Washington 9 D~ c. 
36Wright 9 ''Colonel Cooper's Civil War Report on the Battle of Round 
Mountain 9 11 Chronicles of Oklahoma 9 Vol. XXXIX 9 pp. 366=369; "Statement 
relative to the Exodus~f Ho 0 Poith=la=yo=ho=la and his followers from 
the Creek and Cherokee Country in the fall and winter of 1861 and 1 62 9 11 
Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs 9 Choctaw Agency 9 De-
partment of the Interior 9 National Archives. 
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which advocated neutrality, and because of Ross's Neutrality Proclama-
tion earlier in the spring. Opothleyahola was, however, uncertain of 
the support he could expect from the Federal government~ In order to 
obtain this assistance and ensure the success of the planned exodus, 
Opothleyahola and Sands drafted a letter on August 15 1 1861, to Presi-
dent Abraham Lincoln. In it they reminded him of his promise •vthat no 
white people in the world should ever molest us, 11 and explained that 
11the wolf has come ••• our children are frightened and the mother can not 
sleep from fear," and requested "his help to keep off the intruder and 
37 
make our homes again happy." 
This letter was most likely written in Opothleyahola's camp and ap~ 
proved by the Creek chiefs and warriors present, A postscript approving 
the letter gives evidence of growing unity among the anti-Confederate 
Indians: 11The Seminoles also sent word & the full [blood] Indians of 
the Chickasaw too •••• Pascofar the Chief (2) [2nd chief] of the Semi= 
noles was present. He was not able to come with us but sent word." 
Significantly, the body of the letter is signed by Opothleyahola and 
Sands, but the concluding remarks about the Seminoles and Chickasaws are 
signed by Micco Hutke (White Chief), Bob Deer, and Jo Ellis, the dele~ 
gates entrusted to carry the letter to Kansas and Washington. These 
emissaries first made contact with government officials when they spoke 
with Indian Agent James B. Abbott at the Shawnee Agency in Lexington, 
Kansas, around the first of September, 1861. Abbott wrote his immediate 
37Abel, The American Indian JS Slaveholder and Secessionist, pp. - -~ -245~246, n. 491; Opothleyahola and Sands to Lincoln, August 15, 1861, 
Abbott to Branch, September 18, 1861, Letters Received by the Office of 
Indian Affairs, Creek Agency, Department of the Interior, National Ar-
chives. 
26 
superior, Superintendent Harrison B. Branch, on September 18, explaining 
the meeting, and he enclosed the two letters which the Indians requested 
be forwarded to President Lincoln. 38 
One was the Opothleyahola letter, and the other was an explanation 
of worsening conditions in Indian Territory and a request for a council 
with government officials. This second letter, signed by Hutke, Deer, 
and Ellis, and dated September 18, indirectly indicates the close colla= 
boration of the Creeks, Seminoles, and Chickasaws. It would have been 
necessary to read the Opothleyahola and Sands letter in the presence of 
Pascofa, other Seminoles, and the Chickasaws, before receiving their 
approval and post script. This indicates that the letter was carried 
from North Fork Town to an area near the Creek-Seminole border, probably 
along Little River. 39 Hutke, Deer, and Ellis must have been given the 
authority to transcribe this approval onto the letter and to carry an 
oral message. This message then became the basis of the Hutke-Deer-
Ellis letter to Abbott and accounts for its September 18 heading. Ab= 
bott dated this letter and his letter to Branch on the same day, even 
38Ibid.; Hutke, Deer, and Ellis to Lincoln, September 18, 1861, 
Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs, Southern Superinten-
dency, Department of the Interior, National Archives; Abbott to the 
Fort Smith Corm:nission, September 12, 1865, Annual Report 1of ~ Corm:nis~ 
sioner of Indian Affairs for 1865, p. 330; Abel, The Amefican Indian as 
Slaveholder and Secessionist, pp. 244-245, n. 489-.~ 
39 · 
Jones to Dole, October 31, 1861, Thirty-Seventh Congress, Second 
Session] Senate Executive Document Number 1, Vol. I, pp. 658=659; 
Wright, ''Colonel Cooper I s Report on the Battle of Round Mountain, 11 
Chronicles of Oklahoma, Vol. XXXIX, pp. 384-386; McReynolds, .!h£. Semi-
noles9 pp. 293-295; Orpha Russell, "EKVN=HV-LWUCE~ Site of Oklahoma's 
First Civil War Battle," Chronicles of Oklahoma, Vol. XXIX, No. 4 
(Winter 9 1951=1952), pp. 404-406. --
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though the Indian delegation had deposited it over a week before. 40 
The rest of the delegates' journey must be pieced together from 
fragmentary sources. The next confirmed stop of the messages was at 
41 
Iola, Kansas, where they met Eo H. Carruth. The exact date of their 
arrival is uncertain, but by September 10, Carruth and the Indians were 
at Brigadier General Lane's headquarters at Barnesville, Kansas. Whether 
or not the delegates were able to see Lane in person is difficult to 
discern, but they probably did. No record can be found of any corres-
pondence between them, but Coffin in a letter to Dole stated that 11there 
were three Creek Indians came up to se [sic] General Lane who came to 
42 Iola for Caruth [sic] to go with them to General Lane." Why would 
Carruth have traveled on to Barnesville if he did not expect the general 
to be there? Carruth, in an answer to the two Creek chiefs I let_ter, 
40 . Abbott to Branch, September 18, 1861, Letters Received by the 
Office of Indian Affairs, Creek Agency, Department of the Interior, Na-
tional Archives; Hutke, Deer, and Ellis to Lincoln, September 18, 1861, 
Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs, Southern Superinten~ 
dency, Department of the Interior, National Archives; Abbott to Fort 
Smith Connnission9 September 12, 1865, Annual Report of the Connnissioner 
of Indian Affairs for~, p. 330; Abel, The American_Indian ~ Slave-
holder~ Secessionist, pp. 244-245, n. 489, n. 490. 
41 
E~ Ho Carruth was well known to the loyal Creeks, for he had been 
an educator among the Cherokees and Creeks before the outbreak of the 
Civil War. Carruth left the Creek Nation in June of 1861 but promised 
that "he would give a true statement of the condition of himself and 
loyal Creek people" to government officials. When Carruth reached Kan~ 
sas he contacted James Lane, United States Senator and self-styled mili~ 
tary man. Knowing of Lane's interest in enrolling Indians for the pro-
tection of Kansas, Carruth alerted Lane to the possible use of the loyal 
Indians as Union soldiers. He was rewarded with a connnission, dated 
Fort Scott, August 309 1861, issued by the authority of 1~o Ho Lane, 
Commanding the Kansas Brigade." See Abel, The American Indian as Slave-
holder~ Secessionist, pp. 242-243, nn. 485=487. 
42 0 lbida 9 n~ 485; Coffin to Dole, September 26, 1861 9 Letters Re-
ceived by the Office of Indian Affairs, Southern Superintendency, De-
partment of the Interior, National Archives. 
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stated that he was "authorized to infonn you that the President will not 
forget you." Who except Lane, who had commissioned Carruth, could have 
"authorized" him? 
This Barnesville visitation was most fruitful and gratifying for 
both parties. Carruth, seeing a chance to promote Lane's idea for a 
council with the Indians, exchanged the delegates' two letters for five 
of his own addressed to Chief Ross, the two Creek chiefs, Chief Tusa-
quach of the Wichitas, the Seminole chiefs and headmen, and the loyal 
Choctaws and Chickasaws. 43 Carruth, in his letters, asked the tribes 
to send "a delegation of your best men to meet the commissioner of the 
United States Government in Kansas," an,d declared that "our army will 
soon go south and those of your people who are true and loyal to the 
Government will be treated as friends."· He added that "the President 
is still alive.· His soldie::rs will soon drive these men who have vio-
lated your homes from the land they have treacherously entered," and 
concluded nyou will le.arn that the people who are true to the Govern-
44 
ment, which so long protected you are your friends." Carruth also 
gave the Indians verbal reassurances that they would "receive assistiance 
45 
within a few weeks."· 
43 
James Mcintosh to Cooper, September 10, 1861, Carruth to Opoth-
leyahola and Oktarharsars Harjo 11 September 10, 1861, Carruth to the ... 
Chickasaws and Choctaws, September lls, 186ls, Carruth to Tusaquachs, Sep-
tember 11, 1861, Official Recordss, Ser. i, Vol. VIII, pp. 25-26; Carruth 
to Ross, Septeml;>er lls, 186lll Letters Received by the Office of Indian 
Affairs, South~rn Superintendency, Department of the Interior, National 
Archives. Abel, The American Indian as Slaveholder and Secessionist, 
pp. 246-247. - - -
44 
Carruth to Opothleyahola and Oktarharsars Harjo, September lOll 
1861, Official Records, Ser. i, Vol. VIII, p. 25. 
45 
Creek, Seminole, and Chickasaw chiefs to Lincoln, March 31, 1862, 
Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs, Southern Superinten-
dency, Department of the Interior, National Archives. 
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The delegates next visited Reverend Evan Jones, who was then resid-
ing in Lawrence, Kansas. In a letter to Commissioner Dole, Jones ex-
plained that Indians who lived "about Little River, near the Seminole 
country," had reached his home around the first of October and had 
46 
"come ••• to find out the truth about the war." It is uncertain whether 
the Indians then visited personally with Superintendent Coffin before 
returning to Indian Territory. Coffin's first annual report, dated 
October 2, 1861, points out that "the only tribes I have been able to 
reach are the Osages, Quapaws, .Senecas, Shawnees, and a part of the 
Cherokee nation. 1147 In an earlier letter, dated September 26, Coffin 
stated that he was "going to Fort Scott today and will make arrangements 
with Agent Elder to give the notice immediately on their arrival or 
Bring them to Humboldt." Coffin then complained that "the service re-
quired of me at the Sacks [sic] & Fox and Kaw agencies will take me to 
_far off but will try to attend to all if possible. 1148 If Coffin had 
been able to avail himself of this important opportunity, then it seems 
that logic and duty would have compelled him to officially report the 
results to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. No such written commun-
ication has been located. However, some authors still assert that the 
46 Jones to Dole, October 31, 1861, Thirty-Seventh Cbngress, Second 
Session, Senate Executive Document Number !, Vol. I, pp. 658--659. 
47coffin to Dole, October 2, 1861, Ibid., ppj 654-655. 
48Coffin to Do~e, September 26, 1861, Letters Received by the Of-
fice of Indian Affairs, Southern Superintendency, Department of the 
Interior, N&tional Archives. Abel, The American Indian as Slaveholder 
.!.!!2,_ Secessionist, pp. 242-243, n. 48S:-
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delegates spoke personally with Coffin. 49 
Carrying letters and promises of supportj Hutke, Deer, and Ellis 
returned to Indian Territory in October 9 1861. The loyal Indians, des-
perate for specific commitments from the United States government 9 ac-
cepted Carruth's invitation to attend a council, and a second delegation 
was immediately appointed to meet "the commissioner of the United States 
government in Kansas. 11 LeRoy, Kansas, had been selected as the site of 
the proposed council instead of Humboldt, Kansas, as was originally 
plannedo It was at LeRoy that the second loyal Indian delegation ar-
rived on November 1, 1861. The diplomatic representatives were headed 
by Oktarharsars Harjo, recently-elected principal chief of the Creeks 9 
Micco Hutke, Bob Deer, David Fields (erroneously referred to in this 
,,delegation as Phil David), two Chickasaw chiefs, and two Seminole 
h . f 50 c 1.e s. They held a council with Creek Agent Geo~ge A. Cutler in his 
49Ibid., p. 245; Dean Trickett, "The Civil War in the Indian Terri-
tory, 186i," Chronicles of Oklahoma, Vol. XVIII, No. 2 (June, 1940), p. 
152. Fairness concedes that the delegation could have and should have 
visited Superintendent Coffin during their lengthy sojourn in Kansas 9 
but scholarship demands documentary evidence. Neither of the above 
authors cite primary supportive evidence, and this author found none in 
the Official Records, the Annual Reports S?i, ~ Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs, ~-1865, Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs, 
the National Archives, or Kansas newspapers of 1861. 
50some historians claim that Oktarharsars Harjo (Sands) and Micco 
Hutke were in Indian Territory directing the activities of the loyal 
Indians in November and December of 1861. However, documentary evidence 
strongly indicates that they were in Kansas and Washington at that time 
with the loyal Indian delegation. Proof that Sands was in Washington is 
found in Cutler to Dole, November 4, 1861, Cutler to Dole, April 7, 
1862 9 Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs, Southern Super-
intendency, Department of the Interior, National Archives; and Loyal 
Creek Delegation to the Fort Smith Council, September 12, 1865, Annual 
Report of the COffl!llissioner of Indian Affairs for~, pp. 328-329. 
Evidence of Micco Hutke 1 s being in Washington is found in Cutler to Dole, 
November 4, 1861, and Jones to Dole, December 14, 1861, Letters Received 
by the Office of Indian Affairs, Southern Superintendency, Department of 
the Interior and Abel, The American Indian as Slaveholder and Secession-
ist, p. 244, n. 489. 
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h b 4, 1861. 51 ome at LeRoy on Novem er Micco Hutke, accompanied by one of 
the other delegates, left the rest of the Indian group for a short time 
and journeyed to Lawrence, Kansas, to see Reverend Evan Jones, whom he 
had visited on his trip to Kansas. 
The Indian mission was especially anxious to meet with Lane, so 
Cutler escorted them to Fort Scott, Lane's headquarters. Upon reaching 
that post, the Indians were keenly disappointed to find that Lane was 
in Washington, and they talked instead with his successor, Colonel James 
Montgomery. It was then decided that the delegation should depart at 
once for Washington to try to catch Lane and to confer with ranking 
gove:i;nment officials, and Montgomery sent a letter informing President 
Lincoln of the Indians' intentions and their forthcoming visit. Their 
route took them first to Fort Leavenworth, where they stopped to talk 
with Major General David Hunter, then connnander of the Department of 
Kansas, which also encompassed Indian Territory. Hunter approved the 
mission and issued them a draft for travel expenses. Eight or ten of 
the delegates and Cutler continued to the national capital. The Indian 
delegation spent two and one-half weeks in Washington at a cost of 
$960.50. On December 27~ 1861, the representatives arrived back at Fort 
Leavenworth from the journey which 11Strengthened their confidence and 
belief in the power and stability of the government." On the following 
51cutler to Dole 1 November 4, 1861 1 Creek, Seminole, and Chickasaw 
chiefs to Lincoln, March 31, 1862, Letters Received by the Office of 
Indian Affairs, Southern Superintendency, Department of the Interior, 
National Archives; Cutler to Coffin, September 30, 1862, Annual Report 
of the Connnissioner of Indian Affairs for 1862, pp. 138-139; Loyal Creek 
Delegation to the Fort Smith Connnissio;;-September 12, 1865, Annual Re-
port of the Connnissioner of Indian Affairs .f2E. 1865, pp. 328-329. 
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day, Coffin met with the Indian delegates 11 to good satisfaction," and 
"presented them with gifts of pipes, tobacce, and sugar," ,nd sent them 
52 
home by way of Fort Scott. 
Any tangible accomplishments or definite commitments which accrued 
from this trip to Washington were dashed by a series of events that had 
already culminated before the delegates returned to their peeple. The 
realization ef the importance of maintaining Indian Territory came too 
late to the Nerthern military officials, and recurring appeals by Secre-
tary of Interfor Smith, Commissioner Dole, and Superintendent Ceffin 
either fell en deaf ears er went unheeded because of dissension, unpre-
paredness, and lackadaisical attitude on the part:.of government and 
military officials. The time when events in Indian Territory could be 
favorably controlled by Washington was past, and the immediate course of 
events in Indian Territory would be directed, by default, from Richmond, 
the capital of the Confederacy, and by the Indians themselves. 
While these two delegations were in Kansas and Washington, the 
loyal Indians had acknowledged the necessity of being prepared to leave 
their homelands; as early as September, 1861, some were already living 
as refugees in selected camps throughout the western portion of the 
Creek Nation, awaiting information from their representatives in Kansas 
and further develepments in Indian T·erritory. Opothleyahola could 
52cutler to Coffin, September 30, 1861, Annual Report of £h! .£2.!!!-
missiener of Indian Affairs fer 1862, pp. 138-140; Coffin to Dole, De-
cember 28,1861, Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs, 
Southern Superintendency, Department of the Interior, Natienal Archives; 
Abel, The American Indian as Slaveholder and Secessionist, PP• 265-267; 
Annie H. Abel, ~ America;-lndian .!! Participant in ~ Civil !i.!.!: 
(Cleveland: The Arthur H. Clark Co., 1919), PP• 62-74. 
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hardly have been less than elated by the information he received from· 
the first delegation. Lane and Carruth had promised military aid, Ab-
bott and Carruth gave assurance of monetary support and government sup-
plies, President Lincoln had been informed of their situation, and an-
other council had been requested to further assist the loyal Indians. 
Opothleyahola was then willing to implement the plan for the exodus 
that had been taking shape ;in his mind since the Antelope Hills meeting. 
The withdrawal of the loyal Creeks into separate camps in September, 
1861, was spontaneous and unorganized. However, the ensuing unification 
of all the loyal Creeks, Seminoles, Chickasaws, Cherokees, and other 
tribes in Indian Territory under a common leadership, the detailed 
itinerary, and the precision timing displayed during the withdrawal 
were a tribute to Opothleyahola's wisdom and foresight • 
• 
Feeling sure of Cherokee sympathy for his cause and Federal govern-
ment intervention on his behalf, Opothleyahola planned an orderly, or-
ganized migration of loyal Indians to the Cherokee Outlet on the north-
western limits of the Cherokee Nation. It was unfortunate for the loyal 
Indians that Opothleyahola's plans, implemented under severe conditions 
. . ' 
and only partially realized~ ended tragically. Few of his followers 
realized the horror of the ordeal that faced them. 
CHAPTER II 
EXODUS OF OPOTHLEYAHOLA REFUGEES 
The uncompromising position of the loyal Creeks and Seminoles ag-
gravated the high tension existing in Indian Territory in October and 
November, 1861. As pressure heightened, rumors, accusations, and 
threats raced wildly across the area. Sectional sentiment made peaceful 
coexistence between tribal factions impossible, and Indian Territory in 
the early autumn of 1861 was rapidly becoming an armed camp. Neutrality 
was no longer feasible or even possible for those tribal groups who did 
not openly espouse the Southern cause. 
As soon as a Cherokee convention approved resolutions favoring a 
Cherokee-Confederate treaty in August, 1861, Chief Ross began plying the 
former ally Opothleyahola with entreaties for a conference. Ross's at-
tempt to persuade Opothleyahola and his followers to come within the 
Confederate orbit were inspired by his desire to keep the Five Civilized 
Tribes united. Early in 1861 Ross urged neutrality for all Indian Ter-
ritory tribes and was instrumental in abating secessionist sentiment at 
the February intertribal conference and at the Antelope Hills council. 
Reversing his course, Ross in August, 1861, presented resolutions to the 
Cherokee convention favoring alignment with the South. Next he tried to 
persuade his former allies to sign treaties with the Confederacy. 
Ross's actions seem contradictory, but Ross thought collective strength 
through unity was the only way to insure the political and territorial 
':ti, 
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integrity of the Cherokees and other Indian Territory tribes. When unity 
through neutrality became impossibLe, Ross tried to unite the Indian 
Territory tribes in the Confederate cause. 
After the Cherokee convention, Ross acknowledged to Opothleyahola 
and other Creek chiefs that "with one voice we [Cherokee people] have 
proclaimed in favor of forming an alliance with the Confederate States, 
and shall thereby preserve and maintain the brotherhood of the Indian 
nations in a connnon destiny. 111 Opothleyahola and Chief Sands of the 
Seminoles incredulously read Ross letter and returned it with a note on 
the back asking if the author was in fact Chief Ross. A second letter 
from Ross assured the Upper Creeks and pro-Union Seminoles of the course 
chosen by the Cherokees. Enclosed were the resolutions adopted by the 
convention and Ross's address to the convention urging adoption. 2 
The loyal Indians' reaction to the startling turnabout of their 
former friends can only be inferred by their silence. They were aware 
of the precarious position in which they had been placed by the Chero-
kees. This isolation of the loyal Creeks emboldened the Confederate 
Creeks who told Chief Ross that Opothleyahola was "more hostile than 
ever11 and suggested an attack on his followers. On October 31, the 
Creeks informed Colonel Cooper that they planned "to put down the hostile 
1cooley to the Fort Smith Connnission, September 12, 1865, Ross to 
Opothleyahola and other Creek chiefs, September 19, 1861, Annual Report 
of the Connnissioner of Indian Affairs for 1865, pp. 326,353. 
2Ibid.; Thoburn, "The Cherokee Question," Chronicles of Oklahoma, 
Vol. II, pp. 170-188; Woodward,~ Cherokees, pp. 266-267; Abel, The 
American Indian as Slaveholder and Secessionist, pp. 235-237; Wardell, 
~ Poiitical Hist-;;;y of the Cher~e Nation, 1838-1907, p. 133. 
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movements of Opothleyahola and his party" on the following Friday. 3 
When informed of these aggressive intentions by Creek Chief C~nard, 
Ross pleaded with Opothleyahola to come to the Cherokee capital at 
Tahlequah to "smoke the pipe of peace and friendship ••• and that all 
misunderstandings among the family of our red brethren may be forever 
buried in oblivion. 114 
To encourage Opothleyahola to come to Tahlequah, Ross appointed 
Chief Joseph Vann to head a peace delegation "to hold a free and 
brotherly talk ••• .face to face"· with the loyal Creeks. Ross also ob-
tained letters of safeguard from Pike ensuring Opothleyahola's protec-
tion under penalty of death for violating them if he would meet with 
Ross and Pike. Both worked diligently to come to an agreement with 
5 
Opothleyahola. 
Vann carried with him Pike's amnesty prqclamation of October 7, 
1861, which offered "a free pardon to Hopoithle Yahola·and to all 
Creeks and other Warriors now under him in arms against the Confederate 
States and the lawful authorities of the Creek Nation ••• on condition 
that they submit and lay down their arms. 116 No tangible result came 
3canard to Ross, October 18, 1861, John Ross Papers, Thomas Gil-
crease Institute of Ame?;'ican History and Art, Tulsa, Oklahoma; Canard 
and Harjo to Cooper, O~tober 31, 1861, Creek Civil War Folder, Grant 
Foreman Collection, Okl•homa Historical Society, Oklahoma City, 
Oklahoma. 
4 
Ross to Opothleyahola, October 8, 1861, Annual Report of the~-
missioner 2£. Indian Affairs for 1865, p. 354. 
51bid.; Thoburn, "The Cherokee Question," Chronicles of Oklahoma, 
Vole II, pp.: 171-172. 
6 . . 
Pike to Opothleyahola and all Creek and other warriors, October 
7, 1861, Cate Collection Folder, Western History Collections, University 
of Oklahoma Library, Norman, Oklahoma. 
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from Vann's peace mission? and the recalcitrant Creeks and Seminoles 
refused to meet with Ross and declined Pike's peace proposal. 
The final decision by the loyal Indians to assume a defensive 
military posture and to migrate was forced by the belligerent actions 
of the Mcintosh Creeks and by the raising of four armed regiments and a 
battalion numbering over 5,000 ampng the Confederate Indians. 7 Thus 
military resistance and removal became necessary for survival. D. No 
Mcintosh and Chilly Mcintosh 9 who had earlier sworn to avenge William 
Mcintosh's death, were now commanding military units, and Chief Jumper 9 
intriguer and signer of the Confederate-Seminole treaty, was anxious to 
compel the loyal Seminoles to accept the treaty and his leadership. 8 
The situation was a desperate one for the loyal Indians, and rumors 
were rife throughout Indian Territory in the fall of 1861, of an impend-
ing clash between Confederate and pro-Union Indians. After the war 9 
William P. Adair, D. N. Mcintosh, and others remembered the rumor that 
11 the [Indian] Country would soon be over run by a great army from the 
North, which would sweep over it like a besom of destruction, 11 and re-
called "that Ho-poith-la-yo-hola and the Upper Creeks intended to ••• 
annihilate the Lower Creeks." 9 
7Thoburn and Wright 9 Oklahoma~ ! History £f the State and Its 
People 9 Vol. 1 9 pp. 325=326; Fischer and Gill, 11Confederate Indian 
Forces Outside of Indian Territory," Chronicles of Oklahoma 9 Vol. XLVI 9 
pp. 250-251; Francis, 11Confederate Ascendancy in!ndian Territory, 1860-
1861911 pp. 49-52. 
8Thoburn and Wright 9 Oklahoma~ ~ History of the State and Its 
People 9 Vol. I 9 p. 235. 
9ivstatement relative to the Exodus of Ho=poith-la.-yo=ho-la and his 
followers from the Creek and Cherokee Country in the ~fall and winter of 
1861 and 1 62 9 11 Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs, Depart-
ment of the Interior, National Archives. 
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Ross lamented to Opothleyahola that he was "grieved to hear of so 
many bad reports which have been circulated throughout the land," and 
he warned that although they were "no doubt false and without founda-
tion ••• if nqt corrected and silenced, might lead to trouble and blood-
h d "10 s e • Douglas H. Cooper told w. P. Ross, connnanding the First Cher-
okee Regiment of Mounted Riflemen, that Ross was "mistaken in regard to 
Hopoithlayahola's pacific intension" because the loyal Indians were 
"meditating an attack upon my camp, in conjunction with ••• 1000 Jay-
11 
hawkers." Conversely, the loyal Indians felt that they "were 
threatened with entire annihilation, and were ~ompelled to leave our 
12 
homes and all that we possessed in the world." 
Those Indians in Indian Territory remaining loyal to their United 
States treaty connnitments faced a formidable dilennna by October, 1861, 
and on the solutions they derived depended their existence. To meet 
this challenge, they pooled their resources, talents, and leadership. 
Their most important asset was their leadership, which had an Iliad-
like quality; perhaps no other previous Indian endeavor had been so 
brilliantly conceived, organized, and implemented as the journey of the 
Opothleyahola refugees. The sixty-three year old Opothleyahola was the 
organizer of this incredible venture, and around his abilities were 
10 Ross to Opothleyahola, October 8, 1861, Annual Report of the 
Connnissioner of Indian Affairs for 1865, p. 354. 
11 Cooper to Wo Po Ross, November 10, 1861, Cherokee Civil War 
Folder, Grant Foreman Collection, Oklahoma Historical Society; Wright, 
11Colonel Cooper's Civil War Report on the Battle of Round·Mountain," 
Chronicles of Oklahoma, Vol. XXXIX, pp.· 377-378. 
12Loyal Creek delegation to the Fort Smith Connnission, September 
12, 1865, Annual Report of the Connnissioner of Indian Affairs for 1865, 
pp. 328~329. 
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interwoven the talents of portions of about twenty tribes and their 
leaders. Oktarharsars Harjo, as principal chief of the loyal Creeks 
did much of the early organizing and implementing of actual detail re-
quired to coordinate all of the Upper Creek efforts. His diplomatic 
skills were a very important factor in the inception and successful 
execution of the two diplomatic missions to Kansas and Washington •. ·· 
Micco Hutke of Talasi Town on the Little River was also brilliant and 
fearless in his efforts to bring the loyal Indians' desperate situation 
to the"attention of government officials in Kansas. He twice led loyal 
Indian delegations through miles of ConfederateQheld territory to 
13 
Kansas. 
However, for personal charisma, braverys, and skill in combat 9 the 
Seminole leaders were unmatched. The heroic military feats and indomit= 
able spirit displayed by Billy Bowlegss, Halleck Tustenuggeel) and John 
Chupco (Long John) in the Seminole wars were legendary among their 
people. Bowlegs was the unanimous choice of the loyal Semino.tes for 
principal chief, as he had been head chief of the Florida Seminoles for 
14 
several years before his voluntary removal to Indian Territory in 1859. 
13 . 
The exact location of Hutke and Oktarharsars Harjo during Novem= 
ber and December of 1861 is disputed. Some historians credit Hutke and 
Harjos, especially Hutke~ with a major role in the refugee removal of 
Indian Territory in November and December of l86ls, but primary source 
material seems to indicate that Hutke and Harjo were in Kansas and 
Washington during this period. See footnote fifty in Chapter I of this 
work. 
14Pascofa to Lincolns, March 10, 1864, Letters Received by the Of= 
fice of Indian Affairs 9 Seminole Agencys, Department of the Interiors, 
National Archives; Kenneth W. Porters, nBilly Bowlegs (Holata Micco) in 
the Seminole Wars (Part I) s, Ii Florida Historical Quarterly1 Vol. XLV, 
No. 3 (January 9 1967) 9 pp. 219 00 242; Kenneth W. Porterw "Billy Bowlegs 
(Holata Micco) in the Civil War (Part II)~'' Florida Historical Quarter= 
1.Y,9 Vol. XLV 9 No. 4 (Aprils, 1967), pp. 391=491; Carolyn Thomas Foreman 9 
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Pascofa, who had been in Indian Territory longer than the Seminole war 
chiefs, was elected second chief of the Seminoles. His ability to or~ 
ganize is attested to by numerous letters and communications during the 
Civil War and his close planning with Opothleyahola for the two Kansas 
delegations in 1861. 
John Chupco (brother-in-law and apparent successor to Bowlegs be-
fore their removal from Florida) and Halleck Tustenuggee were as con-
spicuous for their gallantry and battlefield leadership during the three 
major battles fought during the exodus as they were in the Seminole 
15 
wars. The Creek military contribution was a Yuchi warrior-chief, 
Little Captain, who was later eulogized by the loyal Indians for his 
extraordinary leadership and gallantry in battle. 16 
Organizing and implementing the refugees' departure taxed the wis-
dom and abilities of these great leaders. Opothleyahola's refugees in-
eluded 4,400 Creeks, 1,100 Seminoles, 300 Yuchis, 250 Cherokees 9 150 
Chickasaws, and over 300 free Negroes and slaves. In addition to the 
Five Civilized Tribes, there were smaller tribes and bands of Indians 
residing in the western portion of the Creek Nation who joined the 
Opothleyahola refugees in the fall of 1861. Among these were the 
11 Billy Bowlegs," Chronicles of Oklahoma, Vol. XXXIII, No. 4 (Winter 9 
1955-1956), pp. 512-532; Dea;-Trickett, "The Civil War in Indian Terri-
tory9 1861," Chronicles of Oklahoma, Vol. XVIII, No. 3 (September, 
1940)9 p. 269. ~ 
15rbid.; Porter, "Billy .Bowlegs (Holata Micco) in the. Seminole 
Wars Part 1) 9" Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. XLV, pp. 219-242; 
Porter, "Billy Bowlegs (Holata Micco). in the Civil War (Part II),n 
Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. XLV, pp. 391-401; Robert Johnson 
Interview, August 31 9 1937 9 Indian-Pioneer History (116 volumes of type-
scripts), Vol. LXXXVI, pp. 179-180, Grant Foreman Collection, Oklahoma 
Historical Society. 
16wright~ ncolonel Cooper's Civil War Report on the Battle of Round 
Mountain," Chronicles of Oklahoma, Vol. XXXIX, p. 287, n. 30. 
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Kickapoosii living along the north bank of the North Canadia-n River; fifty 
17 of their warriors and families joined Opothleyahola. 
Bands of Absentee Shawnee, Delaware, Quapaw, and Piankashaw had 
also been allowed by the Creeks to reside in the relatively uninhabited 
western part of the Creek Nation. These Indians provided the Creeks pro-
tection against the fierce plains tribes to the west. The Creeks valued 
the friendship of these tribes, and in 1841 allocated $120 of their an-
nual annuity to nearly 600 Piankashaw Indians who had settled among 
them. Bob Deer and Jo Ellis, who accompanied Micco Hutke to Kansas in 
September, 1861, were Absentee Shawnees. Many families of these bands 
followed Opothleyahola to Kansas because of their close relationship 
with the Upper Creeks. Before Opothleyahola' s refugees rea-ehed Kansas 
they were also joined by 300 India~s f~om the Wichita Agency. 18 
News of events in the Creek Nation sporadically reached these small 
bands living along the North Canadian River and the Wichita Agency 
Indians, and many must have felt a sense of urgency. Just before mid-
October, 1861, a meeting was called at Council Grove (west of present 
Oklahoma City) on the North Canadian River, where Jesse Chisholm had a 
trading post, to discuss the impending Civil War in Indian Territory. 
This site was centrally located between the small tribes of the western 
Creek Nation and the Wichita Agency Indians. It was from this council 
17Arrell M. Gibson,~ Kickapoos: Lords of !h!, Middle Border 
(Normam University of Oklahoma Press, 1963), p. 197., 
18Tho1I1,as Wildcat Alford, Civilization, written and edited by 
Florence Drake (Normani University of Oklahoma Press, 1936), pp. 6-12; 
Foreman, ~ ~ ~ ..2.f the Indians, pp. 162 .. 163; Wright,-~ Guide !2, 
the Indian Tribes of Oklahoma, p. 138; Russell, 11EKVN-LV-LWUCE~ Site 
~Oklahoma's FirstCivil War Battle, 11 Chronicles of Oklahoma, Vol. 
XXIX, p. 405. 
that Opothleyahola gained many followers who made immediate plans to 
join himi1 but most expressed their intention to remain neutral. The 
leaders of the loyal Indians had to take into account these western 
bands in their exodus plans. These smaller tribes swelled Opothleya-
19 
hola's ranks to approxim,tely 7,600 men, women, and children. 
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A prodigious effort was required to prepare for the mass migr:af::ion 
contemplated by the loyal Indians. Food, clothing, shelter, and all 
personal possessions for this multitude had to be prepared and packed 
for immediate removal. Most of these refugees were not migrant Indians 
subsisting off the land; instead, many were generally affluent citizens 
who could count their wealth of cattle, sheep, hogs, horses, slaves, 
land, homes, and personal possessions in the thousands of dollars. 
Knowing that anything left behind would fall into the hands of their 
hated antagonists, these refugees endeavored to take everything movable 
with them. 
The meat of butchered hogs, sheep, and cattle was sliced and 
salted or cooked, down. Onions, peppers, corn, beets, potatoes, sweet 
potatoes, and other garden vegetables were dried and packed, and corn 
and grains were ground and stored. Cooking utensils (including large 
three-legged cast iron pots and earthen=ware crocks), clothes, and 
household necessities were packed. The unbutchered animals were round-
up to be driven along with the caravan. Horses and dogs were also used 
as pack animals. Wagons, buggies 1 and all conveyances were loaded and 
hitched. Prized possessions and valuables for which there was no room 
19Alford, Civilization, pp •. 6-7; D. N~ Mcintosh to Cooper, October 
27 9 1861, Creek Civil War Folder, Grant Foreman Collection, Oklahoma 
Historical Society; Wright, 12Colonel Cooper's Civil War Report on the 
Battle of Round Mountain, Chronicles 2i, Oklahoma, Vol. XXXIX, p. 376. 
20 
or immediate use were buried to be recovered at a later date. 
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The feverish preparations in the towns and camps scattered through-
out the Creek and Seminole nations must have resembled the activity on 
Texas ranches during spring roundup. The bawling cattle 9 squalling pigs 9 
and other animal noises lent a county fair atmosphere to the refugee 
preparations. Mixed with these sounds were the banging noises of pots 
and pans, the creaks and groans of overloaded wagons, the rattling of 
chains and traces, and the less audible sounds of human activity. Oc-
casionally, above this din, snatches of conversation, sharp comma-nds, 
muffled cries of old people 9 and bursts of childrens 1 laughter9 carried 
through the crisp autumn air. Only the seriousness of the ordeal facing 
the refugees superseded the human grandeur and majesty of the hundreds 
of similar and simultaneous scenes throughout the Creek and Seminole na-
tions. 
As rumors replaced rational thinking and tensions mounted, a clash 
became inevitable. Personal revenge, rumors, and threats finally culmi~ 
nated in small military incidents between the loyal and Confederate 
Creeks. The animosity between the Upper and Lower Creeks 9 which had 
21 festered for years, now oozed from fresh wounds. 
20James Scott Interview 9 June 265> 1937, Eli Ellis Interview, Feb-
ruary 15, 1937, Mary Fuswa Evans Interview, February 15, 1937, Malucy 
Bear Interview, October 25, 1937, Indian-Pioneer History 9 Vol. LXXXI 9 
pp. 78-82 9 Vol. III, pp. 370-371, Vol. III, pp. 396-397, Vol. XIV, pp. 
82-85, Grant Foreman Collection, Oklahoma Historical Society; Debo,~ 
Road!£ Disappearanc~, p. 151; McReynolds, The ~'.!!!!Eoles, ppo 294-295; 
Angie Debo, 11The Location of the Battle of Round Mountains," Chronicles 
of Oklahoma, Vol. XLI, No. 1 (Spring 9 1963) 9 p. 70. 
21wright in "Colonel Cooper's Civil War Report on the Battle of 
Round Mountain," Chronicles of Oklahoma, Vol. XXXIX, p. 384 locates the 
site of one military 11affair" near Thlophlocco on present Battle Creek, 
a north branch of the North Canadian River southeast of Okemah. That a 
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Chief Ross viewed with alarm the "Creek feuds," and he confided to 
Colonel John Drew that he regretted the "confusion and excitement grow~ 
ing out of the Creek affair which might have been amicably adjusted. 11 
Ross hoped that the "Creek feuds would be more readily checked and 
silenced without a conflict of arms. 1122 
It was the Creek clashes which triggered the removal of the loyal 
Indians and which brought Colonel Douglas H. Cooper to Thlopthlocco in 
the Creek Nation on October 29. Cooper9 who felt that it was 1vexceed-
ingly vexatious to be detained11 at Thlopthlocco 11 by party feuds 9 ' 1 never-
theless, hoped to meet with Opothleyahola or at least discover his 
23 
plans. Cooper dispatched messengers to Opothleyahola's camp to try 
to arrange a conference and delayed a few days awaiting an answer. 
Opothleyahola, who had already set the removal plans into action by 
October 27, pretended at first to be interested, but he was only buying 
time to insure the safety and success of his people's migration. Cooper 
nexhausted every means ••• to procure ••• a peaceful settlement 11 between 
the Creek factions, but aft~r his attempts to correspond with Opothleya-
hola "were treated with silence 9 if not contempt, 11 he hurried back to 
his headquarters near Fisher's Store on the Deep Fork. Cooper left 
military incident occurred is substantiated by letters of Chief Ross and 
Colonel Cooper. The·. exact location of this skirmish in the Creek Nation 
is less certain. 
22 
John Ross to Drew, October 20, 1861, Cherokee Civil War Folder, 
Grant Foreman Collection, Oklahoma Historical Society, Wright 9 ucolonel 
Cooper's Civil War Report on the Battle of Round Mountain/' Chronicles 
of Oklahoma, Vol. XXXIX 9 p. 397. 
23Cooper to Drew, October 29, 1861, Creek Civil War Folder, Grant 
Foreman Collection~ Oklahoma Historical Society~ Wright 9 ncolonel 
Cooper's Civil War Report on the Battle of Round Mountain," Chronicles 
of Oklahoma, Vol. XXXIX, pp. 376 9 384. 
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Fisher's Store shortly after November 5 to group the Confederate Indian 
troops under his command and to organize an expedition against the loyal 
d . 24 In ians. 
The exact route or routes of the fleeing Opothleyahola refugees is 
difficult to discern. The refugees themselves kept no official record 
of their exodus, and the reports of pursuing Confederate units are very 
sketchy in geographic data and are deficient in dates before November 
15. Numerous firsthand accounts of participants exist 9 but they were 
not recorded until years after the Civil War. Thus it is easy to under-
stand how so much conflicting information has been written about the 
exodus of the Opothleyahola refugees and their ensuing battles. 
The activity and movements of the loyal Indians throughout Indian 
Territory were closely observed by Confederate Indian scouts and patrols 
in the summer and fall of 1861. The range and accuracy of their obser-
vations is attested by an official report of Colonel D~ No Mcintosh to 
his immediate superior, Colonel Cooper. This brief account is probably 
the most important single record of the distribution 9 destination 9 and 
itinerary of the loyal Indians. Mcintosh reported that by October 27 
the loyal Indians had disbanded into three separate groupso The first 
parcel, "under the pretext of hunting," was to move to Council Grove; 
the second parcel 9 "pretending to return to their homes," was to secure 
possessions and move north; the third parcel took a large number of 
24nstatement Relative to the Exodus of Ho-poith-la-yo-ho~la and his 
followers from the Creek and Cherokee Country in the fall and winter of 
1861 and 1 62," Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs, Depart-
ment of the Interior 9 National Archives; Cooper to Benjamin, January 20, 
1862, Official Records~ Ser. i, Vol. VIII, p. 5; Wright, "Colonel 
Cooper's Civil War Report on the Battle of Round Mountain, 11 Chronicles 
of Oklahoma 9 Vol. XXXIX, pp. 375-377, 384. 
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· 25 
Negroes and went from their encampment north over the Deep Fork;, . ,The 
general truth of these observations is borne out by other accounts of the 
exodus and by the geographic distribution of loyal Indians in the Creek 
and Seminole nations. The first group has reference to the previously 
mentioned Indian bands living along the North Canadian Rivel" in the 
western part of the Creek Nation. 
Thomas Wildcat Alford recalled that "Absentee Shawnees were asso-
ciated in their councils with ••• the Tallihassee T-0wn of Creeks, the 
Delawares; the Piankeshaws, and the Kickapoos" and that these tribes on 
the eve of the Civil War- in Indian Territory "all held councils to-
,14, 
,-
gether" to decide whether to join the Opothleyahola refugees. Most of 
the members of these bands decided to remain neutral, but some joined 
the loyal refugees in 1861. 26 
The majority of these tribes removed to Kansas in 1862 and their 
secret method of avoiding Confederate resistance when departing in 1862 
is remarkably similar to Mcintosh' s description of the 1861 remov~l. 
Alford explained. that a gen~ral council was called in the spring of 1862 
to meet at Council Grove, the "families left their settlement one at a 
time, obstansibly [sic] to go on a long hunting expeditiono •• but all 
27 
were to meet at a.given time at Council Grove." Members of these 
small bands living in the western part of the Creek Nation were joined 
25D. N. Mcintosh to Cooper, October 27, 1861, Creek Civil War 
,. Folder, Grant Foreman Collection, Oklahoma Historical Society; Angie 
I>ebo, "The Location of the Batt le of Round Mountains," Chronicles of 
· Oklahoma, Vol. XLI, P• 82; W;right, "Colonel Cooper's Civil War Report 
of the Battle of Round Mountain," Chronicles of Oklahoma, Vol. XXXIX, P• 
376. . -
26Alford, Civilization, pp. 6-13. 
27rbid. 
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at Council Grove in 1861 by 300 Wichita Agency Indians and fifty Kicka-
poo families to form the first parcel correctly identified by Mcintosh. 
The loyal Creek and Seminole towns and encampments, for the pur-
pose of organization for the exodus, congregated into two groups. The 
eastern group of Upper Creek towns were situated along the valleys near 
the mouths of the Deep Fork and North Fork and along the valley of the 
adjoining South Canadian River. These towns, when sketched on a map, 
quickly suggest the route used by these loyal Indians. This eastern 
area included No~th Fork Town (which was probably the largest refugee 
camp) and the surrounding towns of Hillabee 9 Hillary Square 9 Brush Hill 
(Opothleyahola's home), and the Creek Council Grounds area near High 
Springs. The trail used by loyal Indians along these river valleys be-
gan at North Fork Town, headed in a northwest direction along the east 
bank of the Deep Fork up to the Little Deep Fork, and then along its 
bank to its junction with the Dawson Road. 28 
Opothleyahola's encampment near North Fork Town was early a major 
rallying point for neutral and pro-Union Indians. It was also a refuge 





Thoburn and Wright, Oklahoma: ·-~ History of ~ State and Its 
People, Vol. I, pp. 235-236, Vol. II, pp. 810-811; Russell, 11EKVN-HV-
LWUCE: Site of Oklahoma!$ Fi_rst Civil War Batt le, 11 Chronicles of Okla.-
~ ........ ~~---~.~~ 
homa~ Vol. XXIX, pp. 403-4:p6; ,·Qebo, ~ !.£ Disappearance, p. 150; 
McReynolds, The Seminoles,;cp. 292; Wright, "Colonel Cooper's Civil War 
Report on th~attle of Round Mountain," Chronicles of Oklahomai> Vol. 
XXXIXi> pp. 376, 381-382,,. 384; Trickett, "The Civil War in Indian Terri-
tory, 1861," Chronicles 0·f Oklahoma, Vol. XVIII, p. 268. 
A map of the route fullowed.by Opothleyahola refugees was drawn in 
1864 by John T. Cox fro,m information given him by refugee participants. 
The original is in the National Archives. This map was originally en-
closed with an explanation in Cox to Coffin, March 18, 1864, Annual Re-
port of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for 1864 (Washington: Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1865), p. 333. This explanatory letter and map 
are also in Abel, The American Indian as Slaveholder and Secessionist, 
PP• 261-265, no 53~ - - · 
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contention and constant source of complaint by the Lower Creeks and 
Cherokees. When these eastern refugees headed north they were said to 
have had between 200 and 300 Negroes (free and slave) with them. The 
large nwnber of Negroes and the central refugee camp at North Fork Town 
29 
identifies this group of loyal Indians as Mcintoshes' third parcel. 
The western Upper Creek towns and the loyal Seminole camps situated 
along the western portions of the North Fork and along Little River and 
the South Canadian River constitute the third general grouping of the 
loyal Indians. Two basic reutes were used by these refugees. The Daw-
son Road, the most important· transportation artery in t'he western Creek 
Nation, was originally a military road between old Camp Holmes at the 
mouth of Little River and the original Fott Arbuckle just east of the 
Red Fork on the north side of the Arkansas River. 
This route ran through or near several Creek towns; Edward's 
ifrading Post near Talasi at the mouth of Little River, Thlopthlocco, 
Greenleaf' s Town (or Store), Arbeka, Big Pond (or Roro-Culka), Sell' s 
Store, and Long Tiger Town, principal town of the Yuchi Creeks. It was 
over this route that the majority o.f loyal Creeks traveled north. Along 
with these C~eeks also traveled many of the loyal Seminoles and a small 
band of Shawnee Indians located on Little River (near present Sasakwa) 
2911Statement Relative to the Exodus of Ho-poith-la-yo~ho-la and 
his followers from the Creek and Cherokee Country in the fall and winter 
of 1861 and 1 62," Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs, De-
. partment of the Interior, National Archives, Canard to Ross, October 18, 
1861, John Ross Papers, Thomas Gilcrease Institute of American History 
and Art; Canard and Harjo to Cooper, October 31, 1861, Do' N.' McI~tosh to 
Cooper, October 27, 1861, Creek Civil War Folder, Grant Foreman Collec-
tion, Oklahoma.Historical Society. 
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a few miles above Edward I s Trading Post. 30 
Many of the Seminoles and a band of Delawares, living near present 
Purcell and led by the famous scout and guide, Black Beaver, followed 
the Delaware-Shawnee Trail north. This trail headed nearly straight 
north from a point near Chisholm I s Trading Post on the South Canadian 
River to Black Bear Creek in the Cherokee Outlet. The trail then veered 
straight east and ran into Skiatooka's Place on the Arkansas River. The 
loyal Indians living the farthest south and west used these two well 
known routes.11 the Dawson Road and the Delaware-Shawnee Trail. Refugees 
from the eastern Upper Creek towns traveled worn paths through the 
valleys of the Deep Fork and Little Deep Fork. The Council Grove conm 
ferees traveled northeast until they eventually joined Opothleyahola's 
refugees near Skiatooka's Place.11 but probably before, along the 
Delaware-Shawnee Trail, 31 
From close examination and careful cross~referencing of available 
information, one is able to determine.11 generally, the timing and move= 
ments of the Opothleyahola refugees along these routes. Many small 
camps and groups of refugees began their treks at different times~~ 
those farthest south beginning firstQ Most of the refugees had begun 
30wright, "Colonel Cooper's Civil War Report on the Battle of Round 
Mountain," Chronicles of Oklahoma, Vol. XXXIX, pp. 364-365; McReynolds, 
The Seminoles 9 p. 295; Debo 9 11The Site of the Battle of Round Mountain, 
1861.11" Chronicles of Oklahoma.9 Vol~ XXVII.11 pp. 191.11 194-196; Debo.11 ''The 
Location of the Battle of Round Mountains," Chronicles of Oklahoma, Vol. 
XLI, pp. 81-83; Eli Ellis Interview, February 15, 1937, James Scott 
Interview, June 26, 1937, Indian-Pioneer History, Vol. III 9 pp. 370-371, 
Vol~ LXXXI, pp. 78-82, Grant Foreman Collection, Oklahoma Historical 
Society. 
31 
Debo, "The Site of the Battle of Round Mountain, 1861," Chronicles 
of Oklahoma, Vol. XXVII, pp. 192-193, 199; Debo, "The Location of the 
Battle of Round Mountains," Chronicles of Oklahoma, Volo XLI, pp. 81-820 
The Cox Map (see footnote 28) shows a g~up of 11Delawares & Shawnees" 
moving along a route which approximates the known Shawnee-Delaware Trail. 
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moving by the last week of October and certainly all' of the' first week 
of November. 
D. N. Mcintosh's report indicates that a large portion of the east-
ern Upper Creek refugees had moved north by October 27 and Coope-r con-
firmed this report two days later when he personally traveled up the 
North Fork past North Fork Town as far as Thlopthlocco. Movement up 
the Dawson Road had already commenced because Cooper found that Opoth-
leyahola had left his headquarters in Greenleaf's Town at the junction 
32 
of the North Fork and Dawson's Road. 
Opothleyahola's presence so far away from his home at Brush Hill 
indicates two probabilities. First, he had already planned the move-
ments of the eastern Upper Creek towns and had appointed other leaders 
to execute the details of movement along that route. The second infer-
ence is that Opothleyahola had established a newheadquarters at Green-
leaf's Town sometime before October 29 in order to better organize and 
expedite refugee movements of the western loya( Creek towns. Opothleya-
- . ,! 
hola next "moved his camp to some point above- the Big Pond [Roro .... Culka] 
near the head of the [Little] Deep Fork. 1133 His headquarters close to 
the Yuchi' s Long Tiger Town (near present S.lick) was the pre ... planned 
junction of the eastern and western loyal Creek refugees who moved up 
32cooper to Drew, October 29, 1861, Creek Civil War Folder, Grant 
Foreman Collection, Oklahoma Historical Society. 
3311Statement relative to the Exodus of Ho•poith-la-yo .. ho-la and his 
followers from the Creek and Cherokee Country in the fall and winte·r of 
1861 and 1 62," Letters Received by the Offiee of Indian Affairs, Depart-
ment of the Interior, National Archives. 
34 
the Deep Fork-Little Deep Fork trail and up the Dawson Road. 
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From his advanced posit;i.on Opothleyahola must have felt a certain 
satisfaction in watching the human tide that collected around his head-
quarters. This swollen torrent of men, women, children, animals, wagons, 
campage, and personal possessions had begun only a few days earlier as a 
trickle. At first families moved with their possessions to nearby refu-
gee camps, and then these small camps in turn moved to larger refugee 
camps in designated parts of the Creek Nation. The tribal composition 
of each refugee group differed, and the members of each group came from 
different areas, but each refugee contingent always moved into a larger 
group and always in the same general direction, like small streams feed-
ing into a large river. A participant, James Scott, recalled that his 
! 
refugee party was "joined by larger groups" and that they "in turn joined 
other larger groups." He explained that his duty was "to help drive the 
1 I b h 1 h d h b h h d h b ·d ,i35 catt e,' ut e re inquis e t e jo w en e "joine t e main o y. 
The grim consequences of the migration were first demonstrated to 
the dispossessed Creeks through the confiscation of their property by 
34 . 
Ibid.; Willie Tiger Interview, February 24, 1937, Indian ... Pioneer 
History, Vol. X, pp. 522-523, Grant Foreman Collection, Oklahoma His-
torical Society; Debo, "The Site of the Battle of Round Mountain, 1861," 
Chronicles of Oklahoma, Vol. XXVII, p~ 196; Wright, "Colonel Cooper's 
Civil War Report of the Battle of Ro'Und Mountain," Chronicles of~-
homa, Vol. XXXIX, pp. 365, 381, 386; Carolyn Thomas Foreman, "The Yuchi: 
Children of the Sun, 11 Chronicles of Oklahoma,. Vol. XXXVII, No. 4 (Winter, 
1959-1960), pp. 480-496; Orpha B. Russell, "Notes on Samuel William 
Brown, Jr., Yuchi Chief," Chronicles of Oklahoma, Vol. XXXVII, No. 4 
(Winter, 1959-1960), PP• 497-501. 
3\ames Scott Interview, June 26, 1937, Malucy Bear Interview, 
October 25, 1937, Indian-P:i,oneer History, Vol. LXXXI, PP• 78-82, Vol. 
XIV, pp. 82-85, Grant Foreman Collection, Oklahoma Historical Society; 
Debo, The~!.£ Disappearance, pp. 151-153; McReynolds, ~ Seminoles, 
pp. 293-294. 
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Confederate Creek authorities. Lower Creek Principal Chief Canard and 
other Creek chiefs int1ormed Colonel Cooper, as early as October 31, that 
"All kinds of property known to belong to the opposite Party [loyal 
Creeks] shall be taken and sold for the benefit of the Creek Nation." 
In addition, "all free negroes found with Hopo,ithlayoholo's Party ••• 
shall be sold as slaves, for the benefit of the Creek Nation, and that 
36 
all slaves who have joined Hopoithlayoholo's Party shall be sold also. 11 
This threat was later carried out when the Confederate Creek Na= 
tional Council officially enacted confiscation legislation in 1863 
against the refugee Creeks. Sect ion 134 declared that "property of all 
such persons are hereby declaired [sic] confiscated," and Section 143 
specified that "all free negros who followed Hopo-e..,thle-yoholar and his 
party~. owhen apprehended shall be sold for the benefit of the Creek Na-
tion." Uncompromising finality was evinced in Section 136 which decreed 
that "no person or persons who may have returned after going north shall 
have any claim to property as disposed of by the proper authorit:f:es of 
h . . ,,37 t is Nation. 
The leaders of the exodus realized that they would not be allowed 
to migrate peacefully by their old tribal antagonists, but thr~ugh care-
ful planning and promised support from the Federal government the lead-
ers hoped to thwart Confederate Indian designs against them. To en-
courage their charges, the loyal Chiefs had the Carruth letters, re~ 
turned by Micco Hutke, read aloud by interpreters. Assl.lllling that these 
36 Canard and Harjo to Cooper, October 31, 1861, Creek Civil War 
Folder, Grant Foreman Collection, Oklahoma Historical Society. 
37Chief Sam Checote Manuscriptll Creek Tribal Recordsll Grant Fore-
man Collection, Oklahoma Historical Society. 
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messages were sanctioned by President Lincoln, the refugees must have 
38 been greatly encouraged. Knowledge that a second delegation had re-
cently been sent to Washington, Doc., by way of Kansas, to confer with 
the President and to substantiate his offer of support to the loyal 
Indians must have also been gratifying. 
Even while the refugees were still arriving near Long Tiger Town, 
Opothleyahola and other leaders began executing the next series of move .. 
ments to escape the Confederate Indians. As the refugee train wound its 
way into Opothleyahola 1 s headquarters it was separated into three 
groups. An advance party of warriors accompanied over 300 slaves and 
free Negroes to the crossing of the Arkansas River just below the mouth 
of the Red Fork and to the old deserted Fort Arbuckle post which lay a 
few miles across the river. 39 Their purpose was to assist the old men, 
women, children, and incapacitated refugees who had separated from the 
warriors somewhere between Long Tiger Town and Round Mountain (south of 
38 
Ja~s Mcintosh to Cooper, September 10, 1861, Carruth to Opoth-
leyahola and Oktarharsars Harjo, September 10, 1861, Carruth to the 
Chickasaws and Choctaws, September 11, 1861, Carruth to Tusaquach, Sep-
tember 11 9 1861, Official Records, Ser. i, Vol. VIII, pp. 25-26; Russell, 
EKVN-HV-LWUCE~ Site of Oklahoma's First Civil War Battle," Chronicles 
of Oklahoma, Vol. xxrx, p. 405. 
39This site should not be confused with old Camp Arbuckle estab~ 
lished in 1851 on the South Canadian River or with Fort Arbuckle con-
structed in 1852 just north of the Arbuckle Mountains. 11 Fort Arbuckle'' 
in this work will refer to the abandoned fort surveyed iri 1834 by Cap-
tain J~ L. Dawson and built in the summer of 1834 by Major George Birch. 
The ruins are located in northwestern Tulsa County, and its land ... line 
position is the southwest quarter of the northwest quarter of section 
two, township nineteen north, range ten east. 
James H. Gardner, 110ne Hundred Years Ago in the Region of Tulsa," 
Chronicles of Oklahoma, Vol. XI, No. 2 (June, 1933), pp. 765-785, gives 
an excellent history and description of the 014 fort site. 
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present Keystone) and who had followed them to the Arkansas Riv~r. 40 
The actual crossing was a major task for these refugees because of 
the extreme care that had to be exercised in moving babies, chi!dren, 
those injured and sick, pregnant womens and invalids across the unpre~ 
dictable Arkansas River. In addition, thousands of cattles hogs, sheep, 
dogss and other animals had to swim or walk across the tricky current 
and uneven bottom of the Arkansas River. Over 300 wagons and all types 
of conveyances also had to thread their way across the river. Flat 
boatss built and operated by the Negroes and slaves who had been as-
signed the task, ferried most of the supplies and people acrosso This 
Herculean effort required over a week and was still continuing even as 
41 
Confederate military units charged upon the refugees. 
Most of the refugees who crossed the Arkansas River continued north 
along the east bank of the Arkansas River until they came to the magnif-
icent stands of walnut timber along Walnut Creek and Wildhorse Creek. 
42 Colonel Cooper twice confirmed this rendezvous. By November 5 he wa.s 
convinced that Opothleyahola refugees "near the Red Fork ••• were on their 
40wright, "Colonel Coope:r;is Civil War Report on the Battle of 
Round Mountain," Chronicles of Oklahoma, Vol. XXXIX, p. 386; Russell, 
11EKVN-HV-LWUCE~ The Site of Oklahoma's First Civil War Battle," Chron-
icles of Oklahoma·, Vol. XXIXs PPo 404=405; Cox Map, National Archives, 
Washington, D. C@ 
41Russell, 11EKVN~HV-LWUCE~, The Site of Oklahoma I s First Civil War 
Battle," Chronicles of Oklahoma, Vol. XXIXs pp. 403-405; Wright, 
"Colonel Cooper's Civil War Report on the Battle of Round Mountain,'' 
Chronicles of Oklahoma, Vol. XXXIX, pp. 386-388; Thomas Meagher, "Old 
Tulsa CountyBattlefield Located," Tulsa Tribune, November 19, 1938s p. 
12. 
42cooper to Benjamin, January 20, l862ii Official Records, Ser. i, 
Vol. VIII, p. 5; Cooper to Drew, November 5, 1861, Creek Civil;war 
Folder, Grant Foreman Collection, Oklahoma Historical Society, Wright, 
"Colonel Cooperis Civil War Report on the Battle of Round Mountain,n 
Chronic:les of Oklahoma, Volo XXXIX, pp. 358, 369, 379. 
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route toward Walnut Creek where a fort was being erecteds, and which had 
for some time been their intended destination.n43 
A port-ion of the refugees remained near old Fort Arbuckle.~ The· 
women, children, and disabled persons were sheltered in four large caves 
located one-fourth mile northwest of the abandoned fort. These,caves, 
dug out of the side of a deep gully, were protected by 100 Yuchi war-
riors commanded by Little Captain (or Keptune Uchee) who re,fortified 
44 
the old post and patrolled the nearby area. 
By November 15, Opot;hleyahola had arrived at Skiatooka·'s Place in 
45 
the Cherokee Nation. In the early l850'ss several Cherokee families 
moved into the Cherokee Outlet along the valleys of Hominy Creeks, Wild.!. 
horse Creek, and Walnut Creek. Some settled along the Arkansas River 
as far west as Skiatooka's Place (near present Osage in Osage County). 
This area around Osage and Cleveland is referred to locally as the Big 
Bend Country because of the large bends and loop· in the Arkansas River 
in that locale. The region from the Big Bend Country to the smaller 
creeks.east was sparsely settled and was loosely referred to by the 
Cherokees as Skiatooka's Settlement. Skiatooka and James McDaniels, 
43 
Cooper to Benjamin, January 20, 1862, Official Recordss, Sera is, 
Vol. VIII, p .. 5. 
44wright~ "Colonel Cooper's Civil War Report of the Battle of Round 
Mountain," Chronicles .£!. Oklahomas, Vol.. XXXIX, pp. 286-288; Tricketts, 
"The Civil War in Indian T-erritory, 1861," Chronicles of Oklahomas, Vol. 
XVIIIs, p., 269. 
4511statement relative to the Exodus of Ho-poith-la-yo-ho·-la and. his 
followers from the Creek and Cherokee Country in the fall and winter of 
1861 and '62," Letters Received by the Office of Indi.an Affairss, Depart-
ment of the Interio~, National Archives; James R. Gregory, "Creeks in 
the Civil War," Galveston News, November 27, 1901, p. 5 in the Creek 
Civil War Folder, Grant Fo~n Collection9 Oklahoma Historical Society; 
Cox Map, Neti.onal Archives. 
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influential Cherokees living in this frontier region, were contacted by 
Opothleyahola, and they secretly offered the loyal Indians, with whose 
46 
cause they sympathized, sanctuary. 
As soon as the women, children, and old people had been dispatched 
to old Fort Arbuckle and the Walnut Creek area, the warriors turned west 
off Dawson Road and followed Opothleyahola I s trail toward Skiatooka I s 
Place. Somewhere between the Red Fork and the Arkansas River these 
warriors were joined by the third group of refugees. The loyal Wi,chita 
Agency Indians, the Kickapoos, the Absentee Shawnees 9 and the Pianke-
shaws had merged with Black Beaver's band of Delawares and Seminoles 
along the Delaware-Shawnee Trail. It was somewhere along this trail 
south of Black Bear Creek that the final junction of the refugees was 
probably completed. Also, it is uncertain whether all the refugees 
joined the loyal Creeks before the first battle. Certainly many arrived 
afterwards. 
The children and women moved on to Skiatooka-' s Place and then to 
the predetermined campsites along Walnut Creek and Wildhorse Creek. The 
warriors awaited the arrival of Colonel Coop,er' s forces at Camp Gouge 
located somewhere between the Red Fork and the Arkansas River. 
By November 15, 1861 9 Colonel Coope-r had collected most of the 
available Confederate troops in Indian Territory and had advanced into 
the Creek Nation with 1,400 men to force Opothleyahola to submit to 
46 
Cooper to Benjamin, January 20, 1862, Official Records, Ser. i, 
VoL VIII, p. 8; Wright, ncolonel Cooper's Civil War Report on the 
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27, 1901, p. 5 in the Creek Civil War Folder, Grant Foreman Collection, 
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Confederate rule or drive him out of Indian Territory. 47 He followed 
the North Fork refugees I trail leading up the Deep Fork. Finally, on 
November 19, some of the "disaffected party were seen and a few prison-
ers taken." From them he learned the destination of the refugees. 
The events of November 19, 1861, cannot be chronicled with com-
plete historical accuracy for la.ck of detailed documentary evidence. 
Participants in the conflict between the refugees and the Confederate 
troops reported minor engagements and skirmishes at widely varying 
points on this day. One Confederate Texan later reported that 11 the day 
a t l.·n k. . h. "48 w s spen s 1.rm1.s 1.ng. Cooper or his scouts undoubtedly must have 
seen several parties of stragglers who had either fallen.behind or had 
not yet caught up with the main refugee party. These groups could ac-
count for the skirmishing. Cooper's forces followed the warriors to 
the west toward Skiatooka's Place, but patrols or even a sizable force 
may have been dispatched to trail the refugees who crossed the Arkansas 
River below Red Fork. If so, they may have clashed with the Yuchi war-
49 
riors or refugees who had not yet crossed the Arkansas. 
47 
On May 13, 1861, the Confederate District of Indian Territory was 
created, with Brigadier General Ben McCulloch commanding. This military 
district was reorganized as the Department of Indian Territ9ry on Novem-
ber 22, 1861, with Brigadier General Albert Pike commanding. However, 
in November and December McCulloch and Pike were in Richmond conferring 
with high ranking Confederate officials. Upon Cooper, the ranking of-
ficer in Indian Territory in the fall of 1861, devolved the responsi-
bility for pushing pro-Union forces out of Indian Territory. 
48w. s. Adair, "Civil War Repeated in Indian Territory," Dallas 
Morning News, July 1, 1923, in Thoburn and Wright, Oklahoma: ~ History 
of the State~ Its People 11 • Vol. II, p. 836. 
49Wright, "Colonel Cooper's Civil War Report of the Battle of Round 
Mountain," Chronicles of Oklahoma, Vol. XXXIX, p. 287; Russell, "EKVN~ 
HV=LWUCE: The Site of Oklahoma's First Civil War Battle," Chronicles of 
Oklahoma, Vol. XXIX, pp. 404-405. 
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In the afternoon about 4:00 o'clock, Cooper's forces crossed the 
Red Fork and saw smoke from camp fires. Upon charging the camp they 
found it had been recently deserted, but they discovered refugee scouts 
beyond the camp and pursued them four miles to their main camp located 
in a small skirt of timber along a creek. The loyal Indians then unex-
pectedly counter-attacked out of the timber and outflanked Cooper's ad-
vance guard which fell back to the main body. A "short but sharp con-
flict" ensued between the combatants, which was soon ended by darkness. 
Neither side could claim a victory, and there were few casualtiesQ 
Later that night a loyal Indian detail crept close to the Confederate 
supply train and set fire to the surrounding dry prairie grass, which 
forced the Confederates to withdraw. Then the entire force of refugee 
warriors withdrew across the Arkansas River. 50 The exact site of this 
conflict, referred to as the Battle of Round Mountain, is disputed. 51 
The following morning Cooper's forces entered the abandoned Camp 
Gouge and found only one "buggy, 12 wagons, flour, sugar, coffee, salt 
••• cattle and ponies." Cooper was unable at that time to pursue the 
refugees farther for he had been directed by Brigadier General Ben 
McCulloch "to take [a] position near the Arkansas line" to help repel an 
SOC B . . ooper to enJam1n, 
25, 1861, Young to Cooper, 
Vol. VIII, pp. 5-15. 
January 20, 1862, Brison to Quayle, November 
November 30, 1861, Official Records, Ser. i, 
51Debo, "The Site of the Battle of Round Mountain, 1861," Chroni-
cles of Oklahoma, Vol. XXVII, PR• 187-206; Wright, "Colonel Cooper's 
Civil War Report on the Battle of Round Mountain," Chronicles of Okla-
homa, Vol. XXXIX, pp. 352-397; Debo, "The Location of the Batt le of 
Round Mountains," Chronicles of Oklahoma, Vol. XLI, pp. 70-104; Russell, 
"EKVN-HV-LWUCE: The Site of Oklahoma's First Civil War Battle," Chroni-
cles of Oklahoma, Vol. XXIX, pp. 401-407; Meagher, "Old Tulsa County 
Battlefield Located," Tulsa Tribune, November 19, 1939, p. 12. 
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expected thrust by Union forces into no,rthern Arkansas. In compliance 
with his orders, Cooper moved his force eastward to Concharta. 52 
r 
I 
The Opothleyahola refugees' movements during the next month dis-
prove the misconception that they were originally attempting to flee 
into southeast Kansas or were heading toward the Walnut Creek area in 
h '1 53 sout -centra Kansas. If Opothleyahola had intended to flee to 
Kansas, he had ample time before Cooper returned. Cooper had twice 
officially confirmed that Opothleyahola's intended destination was Wal.-
nut Creek, and that was where the refugees were relocated nearly three 
weeks later--along the wooded valleys of Walnut Creekll Wildhorse Creek, 
Hominy (or Shoal) Creek, and Bird Creek in the Cherokee Outlet. 
The advantages of this area were many. These valleys lay on a 
sparsely settled frontier of the Cherokee Nation. This area east of the 
Arkansas River in the Cherokee Outlet (present Osage County) was re-
ferred to locally as Skiatooka 1 s Settlement. In this area there was 
much sympathy and support (first clandestine but later open) for the 
loyal Indians. Skiatooka and McDaniel stirred up Union sentiment in 
54 
this frontier region for Opothleyahola and his followers. In addition 
52cooper to Benjamin, January 20, 1862, Official Records, Ser. i.11 
Vol. VIII, p. 7. 
53The ''Walnut River" which empties into the Arkansas River just be-
low Arkansas City in southern Kansas was locally referred to as Walnut 
Creek or White Water Creek by the end of the Civil War. Historians of-
ten incorrectly assume that this 11Walnut Creek" in southern Kansas was 
the intended destination of the Opothleyahola refugees. However, the 
"Walnut Creek" twice mentioned by Cooper was a little creek in the 
Cherokee Oµtlet which branched off the north side of the Arkansas River.11 
about six miles above the mouth of the Cimarron River. 
5\ brief biography of James McDaniel is contained in Wright, 
11Colonel Cooper's Civil War Report on the Battle of Round Mountain," 
Chronicles of Oklahoma, Vol..- XXXIX, p. 366, n. 8. In 1861, McDaniel 
lived on Hominy Creek a few miles above the mouth of Bird Creek. His 
home was just a few miles north of Opothleyahola's camp on Walnut Creek. 
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to the support of many Cherokees, the Walnut Creek area lay near_ly adja-
cent to pro-Uni6n Kansas from where they had been promised military aid 
by Major General Hunter, Lane, E,' lf· Carruth, and by the Delaware 
I d . 55 n 1.ans. 
Three more considerations point even more directly to Walnut Creek ___ _ 
along the Cherokee frontier as Opothleyahola's intended destination. 
First, Opothleyahola would never have left women, children, and old 
people near old Fort Arbuckle and along Walnut Creek if he had intended 
to continue north into Kansas from Skiatooka's Place. That there were 
many refugees in that area is verified by the testimony of participants 
and their descendants and by careful research of the old Fort Arbuckle 
site and campsites on Walnut Creek and Wildhorse Creek. 
Second, the basic routes traveled by the refugees all led directly 
to Skiatooka's Settlement. The small western bands and Wichita Agency 
Indians merged with groups coming up the Delaware=Shawnee Trail and the 
eastern Upper Creek refugees joined the other refugee Creeks and Semi-
noles on the Dawson Road. The Delaware-Shawnee Trail heads nearly 
straight north from Chisholm's trading post on the South Canadian River 
to Black Bear Creek (near present Pawnee), where it turns sharply to 
the east and follows that creek to Skiatooka's Place on the Arkansas 
River. The second main route, the Dawson Road, starts at the mouth of 
Little River and proceeds nearly due north to the mouth of the Red Fork 
55Mcintosh to Co'oper, Ja:nu~ry 4, 1862, Carruth to Opothleyahola and 
Oktarharsars Harjo, September 10, 1861, Carruth to the Chickasaws and 
Choctaws, Septembel;" 11,, 1861, Ca,rruth to Tusaquach, September 11, 1861, 
Official Records, Ser, 1 i, Vol •. VIII, pp. 25-26; Abel, ~ American 
Indian as Slaveholder a'nd Sec.essionist, pp. 268-269, n. 545; "Opothley-
.ahola 1;i;ter, 11 Daily State, Record (Topeka, Kansas), January 14, 1862, 
p. 3. 
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just south of Walnut Creek. The transportation parties chosen by Opoth-
leyahola were nearly perfectly suited for his needs. 
Last, Cox's map, the only contemporary map showing the movements of 
the Opothleyahola refugees, also indicates that the refugees were head-
ing first for the Walnut Creek area north of the Arkansas River--Red 
Fork junction. Skiatooka's Settlement was the intended destination of 
the loyal Indian refugees, and the heavily wooded valleys along the 
bubbling streams of this region provided excellent campsites. They af-
forded the homeless Indians shelter from wind and precipitation1 clear 
water for drinking, and cooking, firewood, and concealment. 
Later events also suggest that Opothleyahola planned to wait in the 
northern part of Indian Territory for help from Kansas. Following the 
Battle of Round Mountain, the Opothleyahola warriors rejoined their 
f•milies already~ encamped along the wooded valleys of Walnut Creek and 
56 
Wildhorse Creek, and at old :Fort Arbuckle. Their ranks were swollen 
daily by arrivals of pro-Union Indians from the Leased District and from 
the western regions of the Creek and Seminole nations. 57 The loyal 
Indians' confidence increased accordingly. Also bolstering the hopes of 
56 Lee to Drew, December 29 1861, 'Drew to W., P., Ross, December 1, 
1861 9 Cherokee Civil War Folder, Grant Foreman Collection, Oklahoma His-
torical Society; Wright, "Colonel Cooper's Civil War Report on the Battle 
of Round Mountain," Chronicles of Oklahoma, Vol. XXXIX, pp. 359, 367 
(map), 369, 394; "Statement relative to the Exodus of Ho•poith-la-yo-
ho-la and his followers from the Creek and Cherokee Country in the fall 
and winter of 1861 and 1 62," Letters Received by the Office of Indian 
Affairs, Choctaw Agency, Department of the Interior,, National Archives;· 
Russell, "EKVN-HV-LWUCE: The Site of Oklahoma 1 s First Civil War Battle," 
Chronicles of Oklahoma, Vol. XXIX, p. 406. 
57"Statement relative to the Exodus of Ho-poith-la ... yo-ho-la and his 
followers from the Creek and Cherokee Country in the fall and winter of 
1861 and 1 62, 11 Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs, Depart-
ment of the Interior, National Archives. 
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the refugees was the increasingly friendly disposition of the Cheroke,es 
toward their cause. 
After Cooper had reached Concharta, ', :\3rigadier General McCulloch 
informed him that the Union threat against Arkansas had been averted.-· 
Cooper then made immediate plans to. reengage Opotqleyahola I s forces, 
and moved to Tulsey Town at the end of November. Colonel Drew then in-
formed w. P •. Ross that "Opothleyahola I s camp is in the Cherokee Nation 
on the same creek that Capt.,, McDaniel lives on, about seventeen miles 
58 
above." On the next day, December 2, Opothleyahola was reported to 
be ivabout 6 miles above the mouth of the Red Fork on this side [north] 
of Arkansas River ••• in considerable forces. 1159' 
These reports help clarify a point. The proximity of "considerable 
forces" to McDaniel, who was a captain in the First Cherokee Mounted 
Rifles, and other important Cherokee leaders did not bring about an 
armed conflict. It was Cooper and the Confederate Creeks and Seminoles 
who again forced Opothleyahola to fight. However, the Confederates met 
a more willing opponent on December 9 at Chustalasah (or Caving Banks) 
five miles above the mouth of Bird Creek in a large horseshoe bend. The 
b 1 1 d 1 ' 1 f h .60 att e aste · unti sunset, approximate y our ours. The battle was 
58 Drew tow. Po. Ross, December 1, 1861, Cherokee Civil War Folder, 
Grant Foreman Collection, Oklahoma Historical S9ciety. 
59 Lee to Drew, December 2, 1861, ibid. 
60cooper to Benjamin, Janua"J:"y 20, 1862, D. N. Mcintosh to Cooper, 
December 16, 18.61, Drew to Cooper, December 18, 1861, Sims to Cooper,. 
December 15, 1861, Hall to Cooper, [date missing], McCurtain to Cooper, 
January 18, 1862, Pitchlynn to Coope-r, Jam.iary 18, 18.62, Official 
Records, Ser. i, Vol. VIII, PP• 7-14, 16-21; Trickett, "The Civil War in 
Indian Territory, 1861," Chronicles of Oklahoma, Vol; XVIII,· PP• 271 ... 
. 275; Wiley Britton, The Civil War.£!!~ Border (2 vols., New York: 
Go Pa Putnam's Sons, 1890 .. 1904), pp, 167 ... 171; Fran~is, "Confederate As-
cendancy in Indian Territory, 1860-1861, 11 pp·. 50 ... 60. · 
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longer and was much more fiercely contested than the first engagement. 
The day after the battle both sides fell back. Opothleyahola-1 $ refugees 
returned to their former s·tronghold on Walnut Creek and Wildhorse Creek, 
and Cooper retired to Choska in the Creek Nation twenty miles above 
Fort Gibson.-
That Opothleyahola, had determined to make a stand in Indian Ter:r;i-
tory was proven by his actions su"r~nding the Battle of Chustalasah. 
He had been strengthened by additional warriors since the Battle of 
Round Mountain, he had been cordially received by the Cherokees living 
in the northwest Cherokee frontier, and several officers and a number 
of men of the First Cherokee Mounted Rifles had defected to his side on 
61 the eve of the Battle of Ghustalasah.,, His forces had moved down 
Hominy Creek and sought Coop.er' s command. 
Opothleyahola's aggressive actions can possibly be attributed to 
the refugees' increasing military strength, but they were more likely a 
bluff in order to buy time. Opothley_ahola hoped he could convince 
Coop.er of his strength and that Cooper would go into winter quarters 
and wait until next spring to attempt to drive the loyal Indians out of 
1 
Indian Territory. By then Opothleyahola ho.ped that a majority of the 
old Ross Party adherents, who were only lukewarm in their support of 
the Confederacy, wo.uld join with them again. The supp·ort- of McDaniel, 
61cooper to Benjamin, January 20, 1862, Drew to Cooper, December 
18, 1861, Official Recorda, Ser. i, Vol.- VIII, pp. 7-8, 16-18; ''State-
ment relative to the Exodus of Ho-poith-la,\..yo-ho-la and his followers 
from the Creek and Cherokee Country in the fall and winter of 1861 and 
1 62," Letters Received by the Office of.Indian Affairs,-,Choctaw Agency, 
Department of the Interio·r, N,ationa-1 Archives; Trickett, "The Civil War 
in Indian Territory, 1861, 11 Chronicles of Oklahoma, Vol. XVIII., P• 272. 
~ ' 
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Skiatooka, and others, and the recent defection of many Cherokee of-
ficers and soldiers, convinced Opothleyahola of the unexpressed Sl,lpport 
for his cause by especially the full blood Cherokees, 
The refugees realized that if the full bloods did not openly sup-
port their cause soon they would have to seek help elsewhere. The 
second delegation sent to Kansas and Washington was seeking Federal 
military support, and another avenue of military aid was opened by the 
loyal Indians in December. James McDaniel and David Balon carried a 
letter from Opothleyahola to the Delaware chiefs living around Quindoro, 
Kansas, requesting their support. The letter specified the need for 
d . . 62 men an ammunition. The Delaware chiefs replied that they were 
"ready and willing to help" and that Delaware warriors were "ready to 
spill their Bloodw •• and are only waiting to hear from our great Father 
in Washington. 1163 
Lane and Major General James Blunt needed more· time to raise an 
army and organize an expedition into Indian Territory. The Delaware 
Indians in Kansas were awaiting permission from Washington to provide 
military aid for the refugees, and the full blood Cherokees were waiting 
for a·n opportune time to de-clare their secret pro-Union sentiment. How-
ever, time was a priceless necessity that Opothleyahola could not buy. 
A determined Confederate offensive in late December denied Opothleyahola 
and his followers the three winter months they desperately needede 
Colonel Cooper left the main body of his forces at Choska on De= 
cember 13 and headed to Fort Gibson to µieet with Drew and Chief Ross 
6211opothleyahol.a. Letter," Daily State Rec.G>rd (Topeka, Kansas), 
January 14, 1862, p. 3. 
6311oelaware Chiefs 1 .Lette1:, 11 ibid. 
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"to counteract any movement among the people [Cherokees] in aid of 
Hopoeithleyohola and his Northern allies." At the same time a request 
was sent to Colonel James Mcintosh of Arkansas for some white troops 
"in order that the moral effect of their presence might repress 1 any 
outbreak" of the Cherokees in support of Opothleyaholao 64 Colonel 
Cooper was greatly surprised to find Colonel James Mcintosh, personally 
commanding 1,600 white troops, at Fort Gibson. Cooper and Mcintosh 
ma~e inunediate plans to overpower the loy,l Opothleyahola Indians. It 
was decided that Cooper would try to maneuver behind Opothleyahola's 
position (between him and Kansas) and that Mcintosh would advance di-
65 
rectly upon the refugee camp. 
Of the 6,000 or more Opothleyahola refugees, less than one-third 
were warriorse Opothleyah~la proba-bly never engaged over 2,000 warriors 
in any of the three battles fought against the Confederates. In late 
December, with the additio·n of Colonel James Mcintosh' s troops, the 
Confederates in Indian Territory could send several military units 
totaling well over 3,000 soldiers against Opothleyahola's forces. 
Opothleyahola, who had held out as long as he could, finally 
realized the hopelessness of his situation. He was running low on am-
munition and he was greatly outnumbered with the addition of Mcintosh's 
Arkansas troops to Cooper's forces. Opothleyahola began dispatching 
small parties along "trails leading toward Kansas,11 and it was re-
ported by Cooper that Opothleyahola headed for Kansas two da.ys be.fore 
64 · Cooper to Benjamin, January 20, 1862, Official Records, Ser. i, 
Vol. VIII, p .. 11 • 
. 65cooper to Benjamin, January 20, 1862, James Mcintosh to Scott 
Cooper, January 1, 1862, ibid., pp. 12, 22. 
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the final battle. 66 
On Hominy Creek, just before noon on December 26, 1861, Colonel 
James Mcintosh's troops were fired upon heavily and continuously from a 
rugged hill covered with oak trees. Mcintosh decided to engage the 
refugees without waiting for Cooper and ordered the hill charged at 
noon. In desperate hand-to-hand fighting over the rugged terrain, the 
loyal Indians were pushed back to their camp where they made a final 
stand. From that position they were finally routed and fled north 
67 about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon. 
The campaign against the Opothleyahola refugees was consummated at 
Chustenahlah. It must have seemed to the older followers of Opothleya~ 
hola fleeing into Kansas that a baneful spirit had been cursing them 
since removal and had led them first along the "trail of tears 11 and then 
into Kansas. A snow storm in the middle of the worst winter in years 
was raging. It was shrieking at the fleeing refugees as it tore at 
their rags and pelted their northward-turned faces with sleet and driv-
ing snow. The crimson marks on the snow left by the bleeding feet of 
the refugees helped the pursuing Confederates track them. 
The circumstances surrounding the Opothleyahola refugees' disas-
trous flight into Kansas can be directly traced to old tribal hatreds 
and factions which had developed even before removal. The exodus 
66 Cooper to Benjamin, January 20, 1862, ibid., pp. 11-13. 
67 
James Mcintosh to Scott Cooper, January 1, 1862, Young to Cooper, 
[no date], Griffith to James Mcintosh, December 27, 1861, Lane to James 
Mcintosh; December 26, 1861, Bennett to James Mcintosh, [no date], 
ibid., pp. 22-31; Arthur Shoemaker, nThe Battle of Chmitenahlah," 
Chronicles of Oklahoma, Vol, XXXVIII, No. 2 (Summer, 1960), pp. 180-
184, Trickett, "The Civil War in Indian Territory, 1861," Chronicles of 
Oklahoma, Vol.XVIII, pp. 276-280. 
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experience of 1861 was truly a civil war for the Creeks, Seminoles, and 
Cherokees. Chief Ross sought unity, Cooper wanted a compromise, and 
Pike offered amnesty. However, the Confederate Lower Creeks did not 
want a peaceful reconciliation. They wanted to completely destroy the 
power of the full blood Upper Creeks and their followers, and they were 
nearly successful. 
Opothleyahola and the other loyal Indian leaders can only be criti-
cized for their refusal to leave Indian Territory following the Battle 
of Round Mountain. Not since Chief Tecumseh's famous Indian confedera-
tion had an intertribal campaign been organized and so brilliantly exe-
cuted under such discouraging circumstances. Its leader was a capable 
businessman who was known best as an orator and statesman. 
The exodus was extraordinary in its complexity, and the itinerary 
and strategy required four months of planning. Involved were Indians 
who lived in some instances over 300 miles apart. Their ethnographic 
and linguistic differences were staggering. Many tribes were repre-
sented, and in addition to the loyal portions of the Five Civilized 
Tribes$ there were the Anadarko, Caddo, Penateka'.Comanche, Delaware$ 
Ioni$ Keechi 9 Kickapoo, Piankasaw, Quapaw, Sac-Fox~ Seneca 9 Absentee 
Shawnee 9 Tawakoni., Tonkawa, Waco, Wichita, Wyandotte, and Yuchi Creek 
tribes. 
CHAPTER III 
OPOTHLEYAHOLA REFUGEES IN KANSAS 
The ordeal of battle was not over for many of the fleeing refugees 
following the Battle of Chustenahlah. Colonel Cooper and Colonel Stand 
Watie 9 chagrined by news of Colonel James Mcintosh's precipitate action 
against Opothleyahola's followers, hurriedly pushed toward the Kansas 
line to cut off the retreating Indians. Cooper reached Shoal Creek by 
December 28, and on Dece~er 29 camped on the Osage Trail between the 
big bend of the Arkansas River and the Kansas border. Heading up Bird 
Creek on December 31, Cooper's connnand engaged a small party of refu-
gees. Near the Kansas boundary Cooper turned west toward the Arkansas 
River and intercepted several parties of Creek, Osage, and Cherokee 
Unionists heading for the Walnut River in Kansas. 
Because of the frigid weather and proximity to Kansas, Cooper dis-
continued the search and destroy operations and headed for Skiatooka 1 s 
Place. Enroute he dispersed two small encampments of Union Indians 
along the Arkansas River. During this sweep Cooper 1 s forces killed 6 
loyal Indians and took 150 prisoners, mostly women and children. 1 
Colonel Watie, with an independent connnand, also pursued the de= 
feated loyal Indians after the Battle of Chustenahlah. In a running 
1cooper to Benjamin, January 20, 1862, Official Records, Ser. i, 
Vol. VIII 9 PP• 12-14. 
encounter up Shoal Creek on December 27 his troops killed 10 loyal 
Indians and took 75 prisoners. Watie also rounded up between 800 and 
2 
900 head of cattle, 250 ponies, and 25 pack horses. 
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This cruel harassment of the fleeing refugees was senseless. Those 
Indians overtaken were mainly old people, women, and children, or 
wounded soldiers who had fallen behind. The pursuit was undertaken in 
such cold weather that one of Cooper's soldiers froze to death. The 
Confederate forces then returned homeward, but the unfortunate Federal 
refugees could not. Trails left by the retreating Opothleyahola refu-
gees indicated that most of the loyal Indians headed north up Bird 
Creek and Shoal Creek. Some entered Kansas along the Caney and Verdri-
gris rivers, but most proba-bly first entered Kansas near th~ junction 
of the Arkansas and Walnut rivers. 
The most difficult stage "of the trek was probably the movement 
from these points of entry into Kansas to areas near white settlements. 
Once in Kansas, the terrain became more rugged and the weather more 
frigid. Most of the small groups of refugees were able to elude their 
Confederate pursuers, but none were unable to escape the wintry blasts. 
Driving sleet and snow pelted the refugees' northward turned faces as 
they lunged through deep snow drifts on the frozen plainse The winter 
storm which howled across the Kansas plains was the worst that had been 
recorded in that state for years. In their haste to evade their Con~ 
federate tormentors and in their frantic search for shelter and food, 
the refugees often left their dead along the trails. The frozen, snow~ 
2James Mcintosh to Scott Cooperj January 10, 1862, Watie to 
Mclntoshs December 28, 1862, Boudinot to Watie, December 28, 1862, 
ibid.j pp. 31-33. 
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covered bodies served as markers for other refugees moving up the 
trails. 
The defeated Indians had to travel nearly 100 miles across unin-
habited southern Kansas before they reached river valleys close to 
white settlements. While crossing the plains, some of Opothleyahola 1 s. 
followers encountered a Sac and Fox buffalo hunting party to whom they 
explained their dire circumstances. These hunters helped spread the 
news of the approach of the refugees throughout the white settlements 
3 of eastern Kansas. 
The Federal refugees first encamped in Kansas at many points miles 
apart. They had moved in a northwest direction into Kansas; thos.e who 
had entered near the Arkansas River moved north along the Walnut River. 
Their largest encampment was near Chelsea in north central Butler 
County along the headwaters of the Walnut River. 4 Another group, which 
was much larger, turned northeast and headed across the southern Kansas 
plains between the Walnut and Fall rivers. Most of these first camped 
along the Fall River, but later many moved over to the Verdigris River, 
5 located a few miles east. 
In addition to the Indians •ho fled north with Opothleyahola, 
3Coffin to Dole, January 15, 1862, Letters Received by the Office 
of Indian Affairs, Southern Superintendency, Department of the Interior, 
National Archives; Abel, The American Indian !l2. Slaveholder and Seces-
sionist, P• 80. 
4 
'1News from the Indians," Daily State Record, Jam,1ary 31, 1862, P• 
1; vvvisit to the Indians, 11 Weekly Conservative, February 20, 1862, p. 1. 
5Coffin to Dole, October 15, 1862, Annual Report of the Connnission-
er of Indian Affairs for 1862, p. 136; "The Indian Fights - Additional 
Particulars,11 Daily C~e~ive, January 17, 1862,· p. 2;. nRelief for 
the Indians," Daily Conservative, January 18, 1862, p. 1; "The Indian 
Fights ~ Additional Particulars," Weekly Conservative, January 23, 
1862, p. 1. 
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members of several other bands in Indian Territory withdrew to Kansas in 
late 1861 and early 1862. In the northeast corner of the Cheroke~ Na-
tion, under the protection of the Neosho Agency, resided the Quapaws, 
the Senecas, and a mixed band of Senecas and Absentee Shawnees. These 
tribes, especially the Quapaw, were early subjected to guerrilla war-
fare along the Kansas, Missouri, and Arkansas borders. They had signed 
treaties with Pike, but repudiated them at the earliest opportunity. 
In February, 1862, a large portion of the Quapaw tribe moved north from 
Indian Territory into the adjacent Osage Reserve in southern Kansas. 
Then they drifted further north and joined the Opothleyahola r~fu-
gees on the Verdigris and Neosho rivers in order to receive government 
supplies. 6 In July of 1862, the Quapaws returned to Indian Territory, 
and found that their tribal reserve had been entered by Confederate. 
guerrillas and Federal soldiers who "plundered them of stock, corn, 
7 
and everything that could be used." Being unable to sustain them-
selves in their denuded country, the Quapaws again withdrew to Kansas. 
By the fall of 1862, they were settled on the Ottawa Reserve in Frank~ 
8 
lin County where they resided for the rest of the war. 
The Senecas and mixed Senecas and Shawnees fled their reservations 
in the northeast reaches of the Cherokee Nation in July and August, 
6Coffin to Dole, March 24, 1862, Letters Received by the Office of 
Indian Affairs, Southern Superintendency, Department of the Interior, 
National Archives; Collamore to Dole, April 21, 1862, Official Records, 
Ser. ii, Vol. IV, pp. 11-13. 
7 . 
Elder to Coffin, September 12, 1862, Annual Report of the Com-
missioner .of Indian Affairs for .!§.§1, pp. 143-145. 
8tbid.; Abel, ~;American Indian .!2_ Participant in the Civil War, 
Edmund J. Danziger, J:t., YVThe Office of Indian Affairs and the Problem 
of Civil War Indian R~fugees in Kansas," Kansas Historical Quarterly, 
Volo XXXV, No. 3 (Autumn, 1969), p. 261. · 
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1862. Some traveled only as far as Fort Scott, Kansas, but others con-
tinued north to the Shawnee Reserve east of Lawrence near present Kansas 
9 
City. About 100 of the Senecas traveled north all the way to Wyandotte 
City on the Wyandotte Reserve at the mouth of the Kansas River, where 
: 10 
they subsisted on Wyandotte charity through the wioter of 1862-1863. 
All eventually joined the Quapaws on the Ottawa Reserve, part of which 
had been secured for their use by their agent,, Peter P. Elder. The · 
Neosho agency was established at Ohio City and later at Baldwin City, 
11 both on the Ottawa Reserve. 
A small group of Wyandotte Indians who had been living among the 
Senecas in Indian Territory were also forced by guerrilla activity to 
move into Kansas to. subsist. It is likely that the Senecas who were 
reported to be at Wyandotte City were actually the Wyandottes who had 
"d d h s · Id" r · 12 resi e among t e enecas in n ian erritory. A small group of 
Delaware Indians residing in the Cherokee Nation also moved to Kansas 
in 1862; they returned to their old reservation on the north bank of 
h K R. 13 t e ansas iver. 
9Elder to Coffin, September 12, 1862, Annual Report of the Conunis-
sioner of Indian Affairs for 1862, pp. 143-145. 
10coffin to Dole, March 17, 1862 9 Letters Received by the Office 
of Indian Affairs, Southern Superintendency, Department of the Interior, 
National Archives; Abelf ~ American Indian~ Participant :!:!!, the Civil 
~, p •. 204~ n. 554. 
11 . Ibid., p. 212; Wright, ~ Guide !2_ the Indian Tribes of Oklahoma, 
p. 240. 
12Abel, The American Indian.!:?. Participant in the Civil !!!.!,, _P• 
206. 
13Ibida; .Johnson to Dole.I) November 5, 1862.ll Letters Received by the 
Office of Indian Affairs.I) Southern Superintendency, Department of the 
Interior, Natio·nal Archives. 
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The Wichitas and affiliated tribes from the Leased District moved 
into Kansas at two or three different timeso A small portion of these 
tribes had joined Opothleyahola's caravan, but most removed north later. 
Parts of these tribes moved toward Kansas along t4e Black Beaver Trail 
used by the retreating Union forces from Fort Arbuckle and Fort Cobb in 
early 1861. This was also the same route traveled by the loyal Indian 
. 14 
delegations to Kansas in 1861. Many of the remaining Wichita Agency 
Indians followed this trail to the junction of the Arkansas and Little 
Arkansas rivers near present Wichita, Kansas, in 1862, as did Jesse 
15 
Chisholm, for whom the trail was later named. Some members of these 
tribes honoring their treaties with the Confederacy remained on their 
reservation and some even fought for the South. 
Agent E~ H. Carruth reported that 1, 900 Wichita Agency Indians were 
encamped near Belmont, Kansas, in 1863. Carruth 1 s correspondence and 
annual reports are sketchy, but suggest along with other sources, that 
the Wichita Agency Indians separated into two or three basic groups. 
One remained at the agency in Indian Territory, some moved to the plains 
between the Fall and Verdigris rivers near Belmont, and others moved to 
an area near present Wichita, Kansas, along the Arkansas River, Little 
Arkansas River, and Walnut Creek. Carruth's claim that 1,900 were en= 
camped near Belmont probably included all those refugees that he was 
14Abel, The American Indian as Slaveholder and Secessionist, p. 
319, To Do Taylo~, The Chisholm T-;;il and Other ~tes (San Antonio, 
Texasg Naylor Co., 1936), pp. 24, 31; Debo, "The Site of the Battle of 
Round Mountain, 1861:, 11 Chronicles of Oklahoma, Vol. XXVII, pp. 190-191; 
Thoburn and Wright, Oklahoma~ ~ H~tory of the State and Its People, P• 
321; Wright,~ Guide to th~ Indian Tribes of Oklahoma, p. 259. 
15raylor, The Chisholm Trail and Other Routes, pp. 24, 31; Debo, 
11The Site of the Batt le of Round Mountain, 1861, 11 Chronicles of Oklahoma, 
Vole XXVII, pp. 190-191. 
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supplying from the Verdigris River to the Arkansas River. 16 
In addition to these tribes, there were smaller tribes residing in 
Indian Territory who were not actually affiliated with agencies and who 
had no agents. The largest among these were the Kickapoos. In Septem-
her of 1861, a band of Kickapoos departed for Kansas from Wildhorse 
Creek, a tributary on the lower Washita River, in Indian Territory. 
Most members of the Kickapoo band on the North Canadian River also left 
for Kansas at about the same time, although some members of this band 
17 
later joined Opothleyahola's party. 
The Kickapoos first congregated along the Verdigris River in 
Kansas, six to twelve miles above Fort Roe. About seventy of the Kick-
apoos traveled north to the Northern Kickapoo village near Leavenwortho 
In addition to these seventy who remained on the Northern Kickapoo Re~ 
serve, many Southern Kickapoos moved on the reservation in 1862 and in 
18 
1863 just long enough to draw annuities provided at that agency. Many 
of the Kickapoos later moved to the Sac and Fox Reserve, where they were 
19 
tended to by agent Isaac Coleman. 
16coffin to Dole, May 15, 1863, Letters Received by the Office of 
Indian Affairs, Southern Superintendency, Department of the Interior, 
National Archives; Dole to Smithj October 31, 1863, Carruth to Coffin, 
September 6 9 1863, Thirty-Eighty Congress, First Session, House Execu= 
~ Document Number.!.,,. Vol .. II.I, pp. 143, 304. 
17Gibson, The Kickaipoos~ Lords of the Middle Border, pp. 197-198~ 
Wright,! Guide!£_~ Indian Tribes of Oklahoma, pp. 166-168. 
18Coffin to Dole 9 March 24ll 1862 9 Letters Received by the Office of 
Indian Affairs, Southern Superintendency, Department of the Interior, 
National Archives; Branch to Dole, October 5 1 1863, Thirty-Eighth Con-
gress, First Session, House Executive Document Number.!., Vol. III, p. 
3.5 lo 
19coffin to Dole, May 1.5ll 1863, Letters Received by the Office of 
Indian Affairs, Southern Superintendency, Department of the Interior, 
National Archives~ 
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The small bands of Absentee Shawnees and Delawares living in Indian 
Territory also followed the larger tribes north. The Absentee Shawnees 
living around the Wichita Agency traveled north to the Wichita, Kansas, 
area, and some followed Opothleyahola to the Fall, Verdigris, and Neosho, 
20 
rivers. A portion of the Absentee Shawnee Indians living near present 
Shawnee,· Oklahoma, also joined Opothleyahola, but most waited until 
1863; that year they joined the Black Bob band at the Shawnee Agency in 
21 
Kansas. 
The Black Beaver band of Delawares living near present Purcellll 
Oklahoma, headed north after the Battle of Chustenahlah, and some were 
intercepted by Confederate troops. They resided near the Kickapoos 
along the Verdigris River north of Fort Roe. Later in 1862 they moved 
22 to the Sac and Fox Reserve. 
On January 8, 1862, Lieutenant Colonel Charles s. Glarkll collUllanding 
the First Battalion of Kansas Volunteers, received word of the arrival 
of the Opothleyahola refugee Indians throughout southern Kansas. From 
his headquarters at Iola, Kansas, Clark dispatched Captain Charles F o 
Coleman to examine the condition of the refugees "on the Verdigris 
River thirty-five miles west11 of Iola. If necessary, Coleman was to 
purchase and distribute iiprovisions as the emergencies of the cause may 
require~" 23 
20coffin to Dole 9 December 13ll · 1862, ibid., 
21 
Alfordll Civilization, PP• 6-13. 
22 · 
Coffin to Dole, March 24, 1862, Letters Received by the Office 
o.f Indian Affairs, ·southern Superintendency, Department of the Interior, 
National Archives. 
23c1ark to Coleman, January 9;' 1862)) in Coffin to Dole [no dateL. 
ibido 
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After having provided temporary provisions of corn and beef for 
the Fort Roe refugees, Captain Coleman returned to his headquarters and 
reported the famished condition of the Union Indians. Upon learning of 
their destitute condition, Lieutenant Colonel Clark ordered Coleman and 
three lieutenants to return to the refugees' camp near Fort Roe and to 
extend to them assistance until the arrival of advisers from department-
al headquarters at F'ort Leavenworth. 24 Captain Coleman and Lieutenant 
c. Mw Meek continued to subsist the refugees around Fort Roe through 
25 
January 24e 
During the period from January 9 to January 24 Coleman and a man 
named Dow procured and distributed $2,000 of beef, $715.80 of corn, 
$10.00 of hay, and $5.00 of flour to the refugees. Beef on the hoof 
averaged about $20.00 to $25.00 a head, and the corn, depending on its 
24 
Coyville, Kansas, lies along the Verdigris River near the north-
west corner of Wilson County. Its citizens, afraid that their town 
might be pillaged by Confederate raiders as had nearby towns, formed a 
volunteer company of eighty mounted men in 1861. John R. Row, captain 
of the newly-formed company, directed the building of fortifications 
three miles south of Coyville. This structure consisted of Uthree block 
houses, 16x24 feet, made of heavy logs, and enclosed with pickets six 
feet higho" An embankment was thrown up around it on all s.ides. This 
small outpost was named F'ort Row in favor of its commanding ·officer. 
These soldiers abandoned the site in early 1862 when they joined Kansas 
volunteer regiments elsewhere, and the Opothleyahola refugees the.n oc-
cupied it. When referring to this site, government officially usually 
called it Ford Roe, and for this reason it is so designated in this 
studyQ 
See William G. Cutler, ed., Histor1_ of the State of Kansas (2 
vols.,· Chicago: A.! T <>' Andreas, 1883), Volo I,- p •. 900; and _Dean Trickett, 
nThe Civil War in the Indian Territory, 1862," Chronicles of Oklahoma, ' --Volo XIX, No. 1 (March, 1941), 'P• 67. 
25coffin to Dole, [copy of correspondence of Lieutenant Colonel 
Clarkvs battalion regarding the feeding of refugee Indians in the spting 
of 1862 9 no date], Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs, 
Southern Superintendency, Department of the Interior, National Archives. 
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quality, was 40¢ or 50¢ a bushel. 26 Hay was $5.00 a ton. These exces-
sive prices were much higher than those of the previous year, but 1861 
was a drought year for Kansas and Indian Territory .. This scarcity of 
provisions, when coupled with wartime inflation and the reluctance of. 
citizens to accept government vouchers at full face value, raised the 
f b ' . h I d. 27 cost o su s1st1ng t e n 1ans. 
Incidental to the food provided the Indians was the need for trans-
porting it from surrounding areas to the refugee camps. Also, families 
in outlying areas who could not make it to the main refugee camps be-
cause of sickness, wounds, or other reasons, were transported by wagons 
to Fort Roe. Transportation for the Indians was provided by Lieutenant 
A.G. Carpenter, quartermaster for Clark's unit. He contracted teams 
and wagons from local Kansas citizens for $2.50 a day. From January 9 
through January 24 Carpenter hired fifteen wagons and teams for $82e25. 
The total cost of food and transportation through January 24 was 
28 $2,879.55. 
After that date members of Major General David Hunter's staff 
supervised supplying the homeless innnigrants. When news of the refu-
gees' plight reached Superintendent Coffin at Leavenworth, Kansas, he 
asked Major General Hunter, connnanding the Department of Kansas~ for im-
mediate assistance in alleviating the suffering of the Union Indians 
until the agents of the Southern Superintendency could be assembled. 
26Ibid. 
27nai!Y_ State Record, March 2, 1862, p. 2. 
28 Coleman and Meek to Clark, March 15, 1862, and Carpenter to 
Clark, March 15 9 1862, in Coffin to Dole, [no date], Letters Received 
by the Office of Indian Affairs, Southern Superint'endency, Department of 
the Interior, National Archives& 
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Ordered to Fort Roe to assist the refugee Indians were Captain John 
w. Turner, Chief Conunissary of Subsistence, and Dr. A. B. Campbell, both 
attached to Hunter's staff. Dr. Campbell left Fort Leavenworth on 
January 22, and he and Captain Turner arrived at Fort Roe shortly there-
after. Captain Turner reported finding nearly 5,000 refugees around 
Fort Roe, and predicted that the number would swell to at least 8,000. 
Turner fed the refugees around Fort Roe and made arrangements to supply 
29 them until February 15. 
Dr. Campbell also toured the Indian camps, where he surveyed their 
medical needs. He had the foresight to bring a wagon load of blankets 
and clothing which had been provided by the Chicago office of the United 
States Sanitary Conunission. He distributed these to the "nakedest of 
the naked," and found himself "surrounded by hundreds of anxious faces, 
disappointed to find that nothing remained for them." Dr. Campbell re-
ported that it was "impossible to depict the wretchedness of their con-
dition" and that their "only protection from the snow upon which they 
lie is prairie grass and from the wind and weather scraps and rags 
stretched upon switches." He also stated that most refugees had 11 but 
shreds and rags which did not conceal their nakedness~" and he saw 
"seven [refugees] varying in age from three to fifteen years without 
one thread upon their bodies." In conclusion, he asked why the Office 
30 
of Indian Affairs was not doing something for the refugees~ 
Coffin was doing all he could, but his superintendency was not 
29. D 1 Hunter to o .e, 
S, 1862, and Turner to 
ii~ Vol~ IV~ pp~ 5-90 
February 6, 1862, Campbell to Barnes, February 
Dole, February 5, 1862, Official Records, Ser. 
30 Campbell to Barnes, February 5, 1862, ibid., pp. 6~7. 
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prepared or sufficiently organized to react as quickly to this emergency 
as was the wartime military structure. Coffin ordered all available 
Indian agents in the Southern Superintendency to report to Fort Roe as 
quickly as possible. He began purchasing ''blankets and other necessi-
ties" after Major General Hunter advised him that the army had no 
authority to furnish the Indians clothing or implements. 31 
Coffin and Creek Agent George A. Cutler had an opportunity to visit 
with Opothleyahola, who had journeyed to Leavenworth soon after his ar-
rival in Kansas to plead the cause of his people. On January 22, 1862, 
Opothleyahola, accompanied by Coffin and Outler, held an interview with 
Major General Hunter. Opothleyahola explained the events of 1861 in 
Indian Territory which had culminated in the precipitate flight of the 
Union Indians and requested immediate aid for his followers. Also re-
quested was military support to help the Union Indians repossess Indian 
Territory. Reassurances of aid and support were given Opothleyahola by 
Hunterll Coffin, and Cutler, and he was "deeply impressed with the intera 
view and departed fully convinced" of the sympathy and support of the 
military and the Indian officers. 32 
Opothleyahola was joined at Leavenworth by Halleck Tustenuggee, the 
Seminole war chief, and they awaited the expected arrival of Commissioner 
of Indian Affairs Dole. A few days after the interview with Hunter, 
they arranged to see Senator Lane, who was also a brigadier general of 
Kansas volunteers. At this conference were Fielding Johnsoni> the 
31nole to Smithi> June 5, 1862, ibid., p. 3. 
32"0pothleyahola, the Loyal Indian Tells his Story to Maj. General 
Hunter 9 n Dai!Y Conservative~ January 23, l862i> p. 2; "Opothleyahola, the 
Loyal Indian tells his Story to Maj .. General Hunteri>" Week_!y Conserva-
tive, January 30 9 1862, p. 2. 
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Delaware agent, John Burbank, the Iowa agent, and Wu Fo M. Arny, the 
Apache agent; in addition tp Opothleyahola and Tustenuggee, Lane, 
Coffin, and Cutler also attended. The Indian leaders stated that they 
were anxious to fight in the Union Army if the sa~ety of their women and 
children could be assured. 33 
Another interview was held between Hunter and the Indians on Febru-
ary 3 at Leavenworth. Hunter again assured them of his intention to 
protect the Federal refugees, and he began tentative arrangements with 
Dole for enrolling the Indian soldiers into home guard regiments. 34 
As these conferences with the refugee Indian leaders were occurring, 
efforts to provide for the refugees' needs continued. When Captain 
Turner arrived at Fort Roe, he personally asswned charge of the relief 
measures which had formerly been conducted under Lieutenant Colonel 
Clark's direction. Captain Turner at once visited the Indian encamp-
ments on the Verdigris River and outlying camps. He personally super-
vised the distribution of food to these groups from January 25 until his 
departure for Fort Leavenworth in the first week of February. Before 
leaving, he made arrangements for subsisting the refugees through 
February 15. 35 
33 "Aluktustenuke, Chief of the Seminoles, and Opothleyahola, Chief 
of the Creeks, Hold an Interview with General James H. Lane, 11 Daily 
Conservative, January 28, 1862, p. 2; Trickett, 11The Civil War in the 
Indian Territory, 1862," Chronicles .2! Oklahoma, Vol. XIX, p. 62. 
3411'the Loyal Indians,'' Daily Times, February 4, 1862, p. 2; Smith 
to Dole, January 3, 1862, Official Records, Ser. ii, Vol. IV, p. 5 •. 
35 
Hunter to Dole, February 6, 1862, Turner to Dole, February 5, 
1862, Dole to Smith, June 5, 1862, ibid., pp. 2-9; Coffin to Dole, May 
12, 1862, Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs, Southern 
Superintendency, Department of the Interior, National Archives. 
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Left in charge was Colonel Charles R. Jennison, commanding a regi-
ment of Kansas volunteers. He ordered Lieutenant Horatio N. F. Read 
and Lieutenant Henry H. Opdyke to "procure subsistence for the Loyal 
[ 36 Indians until the arrival of the Indian] agents." The supplies that 
Captain Turner had procured were depleted by February 12, and from 
February 13 through February 16 Read and Opdyke purchased 84,400 pounds 
of beef and 276 bushels of corn. These supplies, including the cost of 
37 transportation, totaled $2,243.50. 
The early attitude of Kansas citizens toward the suffering of the 
refugees can be inferred from the sympathetic accounts of their con-
dition by leading Kansas newspapers. Many, in addition to offering 
sympathy 5 issued requests to Kansas residents to help the dispossessed 
Indianso The Daily Conservative on March 24 5 1862, hoped 11 that the 
Union red men will receive the care and attention their deeds of valor 
so fully entitle them. 11 The Burlington Register lamented the bereaved 
condition of the refugees and stated that they were "entitled to our 
sympathies. 1138 
"They present truly a case that challenges the benevolent, religi= 
ous~ and charitable disposed citizens of Kansas," decried the Dai1=,y_ 
I.fmes. This newspaper felt that·"relief [could] be offered to their 
present extreme suffering, if a committee were appointed in our towns 
36Jennison to Read and Opdyke, February 11, 186?, and Opdyke and 
Read to Jennison, March 16, 1862, ibid. 
37 6 d Read and Opdyke to Jennison, March 1, 18 25 an Jennison to 
Hunter 9 March 1, 1862, ibida 
38oai:\,.y Conservative, February 11, 1862, p. 2; Burlington Register, 
quoted in the Daily Conservative, March 24, 1862, p. 2. 
and cities to collect old clothing." "Let it be done at once!" con-
39 
eluded the article. 
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In February of 1862 residents of Emporia, Kansas, visited a refugee 
camp on the Cottonwood River five miles below Emporia. These sympa-
thetic Kansans furnished the Indians with "old quilts, coats, pants, 
vests, boots, shoes," and other articles. 40 The citizens of Kansas, as 
did the military, reacted justly and humanely to the needs of the refu~ 
gees 9 but on the Indian agents' shoulders rested the final responsibil-
ity for care of the Federal refugee Indians. After Coffin, the Super~ 
intendent of the Southern Superintendency, attended the first conference 
with Hunter and the refugee Indian leaders, he supervised the buying 
and transportation of five wagon loads of "blankets, clothing, shoes 9 
41 
boots 9 and socks," which he sent to Fort Roe. 
Coffin arrived at Fort Roe in early February and found that the 
"destitution, misery, and suffering" among the refugees was "beyond the 
power of any pen to portray," and that "it must be seen to be realized.'' 
He inunediately distributed the supplies that he had purchased at 
Leavenworth, and sent an agent to Neosho, Missouri, "to purchase cattle 9 
pork, corn, and meal" to feed the starving refugees. Before leaving 
Leavenworth 9 Coffin had drawn $3,200 on his salary and the salary of his 
clerk. With this money9 he kept the Indians supplied with corn and meat 
39"Indian Destitut.ion 9 11 Daily Times, February 11 9 1862, p. 2. 
4011News from the Indians 9 11 §meoria ~ 9 quoted in the Dai.ly State 
Record. 9 January 31; 1862, p. 1; nvisit to the Indians 9 11 Emporia ~ 9 
quoted in the Week!Y Con~ervative9 February 20, 1862, p. 1. 
41Coffin to Dole, February 13, 1862, Annual Report .2f ~ Conuni.s= 
sioner of Indian Affairs for 1862, p. 146. 
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which he hoped would save most of them until other supplies arrived from 
42 
Neosho. 
Even after distributing five wagon loads of supplies, there were 
"over two thousand men, women,,and children, entirely barefooted, and 
: 
more than that number who have not rags enough to hide their nakedness.," 
This desperate situation was further aggravated by the daily arrival of 
twenty to sixty Indians at Fort Roe'!'! Many were runners requesting that 
"provisions ••• be sent to the destitute on the way, and for transporta-
43 
tion for the sick and feeble and helpless." 
Perhaps most frustrating to Coffin was the lack of money to supply 
even the most fundamental needs of food, clothing, and shelter for his 
charges. Coffin proposed to furnish them with "a pair of shoes, socks, 
and blankets, or its equivalent in other coarse clothing," and even 
though he felt that "less than this looks like cruelty," there was no 
44 
money available to cover even these fundamental needs. 
Conunissioner Dole arrived at Leavenworth, Kansas, but missed Cof-
fin, who had left earlier for Fort Roe. Appraising the situation and 
realizing Coffin's extreme need for money, Dole wired the Secretary of 
the Interior, Caleb B. Smith, on February 6, 1862: "Six thousand 
Indians driven out of Indian Territory naked and starving. General 
Hunter will only feed them until 15th. Shall I take care of them on 
the faith of an appropriation? No funds now applicable." Sil\ith re-
plied: "Golon and suppiy the destitute Indians. Congress will supply 
42Ibid. 
43Ibid., P• 145 .. 
44Ibid.,, P• 146. 
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the means. 1145 
The plight of the refugee Indian did not go unheeded in Congress, 
for on May 28, 1862, the United States House of Representatives passed 
a resolution requesting the Secretary of the Interior "to inform this 
House how many Indians have been driven into Kansas by the rebels have 
been or are now being fed and clothed. 1146 The United States Senate also 
examined extensively the refugee problem in connection with the Senate 
resolution for the refugee Indians 1 relief. 47 
On July 5, 1862, Congress passed an act suspending the annuity ap-
propriations of Indian tribes, "all or any portion of whom shall be in a 
state of actual hostility to the government of the United States, in-
eluding the Cherokees, Creeks, Choctaws, Chickasaws, Seminoles, 
Wichitas, and other affiliated tribes." The law further stipulated 
that the President could apply these annuity appropriations ''for the 
relief and support of such individual members of said tribes as have 
been driven from their homes and reduced to want on account of their 
friendship to the government. 1148 
Assured by Secretary of the Interior Smith that money would be 
provided for the Opothleyahola Indians j Dole appointed Dr. William 
Kile, a physician, on February 10, 1862, a special agent to purchase 
45Dole to Smith, June 5, 1862, Official Records, Ser. ii, Vol. IV, 
p. 3. 
46Ibid. 
47congressional Globe, February 14, 19, 29,,. and 25, 1862, pp. 815, 
849, 875, 891, 940. 
48united States Statutes at Large (85 Vols., Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1789-1972), Vol. XII, p. 528. 
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and deliver clothing and provisions to the Indians. This enabled Cof-
fin to devote his time to administering to the refugees in the field.49 
By February 13, 1862, only Seminole Agent George C. Snow had re-
ported to Coffin. Creek Agent George A. Cutler and Seminole Agent 
Isaac Coleman had not yet arrived. Wichita Agent E. H. Carruth had not 
yet received his commission from Dole, and Coffin had received no word 
of an official appointment of a Cherokee agent to replace the deceased 
50 Cherokee Agent Charles W. Chatterton. Responsibility for this slow-
ness by the Office of Indian Affairs cannot rest on Coffin alone. The 
whole Office of Indian Affairs and the Southern Superintendency were not 
prepared for quick action. 
Coffin concurred with Dole's suggestion to separate the refugees 
into groups according to their former administrative agencies. Cutler 
arrived soon after February 13 and took charge of the 4,500 Creeks, 
whose "suffering was immense and beyond description." Coleman, agent 
for the Choctaws and Chickasaws, was also given charge of the Cherokees 
who had joined with Opothleyahola in Indian Territory. Snow, who had 
arrived at Fort Roe on February 10, took charge of the 1,100 Seminoles 
living along the Verdigris River. The obstacles facing the Indian of-
ficers were formidable. Coffin estimated that it would require 
$167,000 to care for the refugee Indian just through the second quarter 
of 1862. After they had been in Kansas over a month, their condition 
was little better than when they had arrived. Special Agent Kile felt 
49Dole to Kile, February 10, 1862, Dole to Smith, June 5, 1862, 
Official Records, Ser. ii, Vol. IV, pp. 4, 9. 
50coffin to Dole, February 13, 1862, Annual Report of the Commis-
sioner of Indian Affairs for 1862, p. 146. 
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that "history will never correctly chronicle the extreme suffering of 
these Indians." He reported that more than thirty Creeks had been 
badly frostbitten and that "the toes of some were rotting;" and others 
had their hands, ears, and noses frostbitten. 51 
One fourteen year old boy's condition was particularly deplorable. 
Kile stated: "One of his feet had just sloughed off about the middle 
or at the instep. The other will come off at the ankle. He is nearly 
naked. His clothing consists of a piece of a check shirt," and the 
weather was "extremely cold with snow one inch thick." The Verdigris 
River was at that time frozen solid enough to be crossed. 52 
Kile found among the refugees "10 bare tents" and "hides, bark, 
grass and everything that is possible to shelter them from the wind and 
storms.'' His unofficial census of the refugees around Fort Roe in late 
February, 1862, included 4,305 Creeks, 1,095 Seminoles, 176 Quapaws, 
544 Yuchis, 106 Delawares and Ionies, 69 Chickasaws, 636 Kickapoos, and 
75 Keechies. Also, 300 more refugees arrived at Fort Roe after the en-
rollment, swelling the refugee population around the fort to approxi-
mately 7,306. 53 
In addition to the ~ndians around Fort Roe, there were also 368 
refugees on Walnut River, 360 on the Verdigris River, sixteen miles 
above Fort Roe, and about 500 near the junction of the Cottonwood and 
Neosho rivers. Thus, the total number of Opothleyahola refugees and 
51Kile to Dole, February 21, 1862, Letters Received by the Office 





all other refugees from Indian Territory in Kansas in late February of 
1862 was approximately 8,534, 54 
Coffin must have felt nearly hopeless as he viewed the task that 
confronted him. The scarcity of money rendered him unable to provide 
the type of service that he would have liked, he was unable to hire as 
many physicians as were needed, and he could not afford to pay travel 
expenses and transportation charges for moving supplies all the way to 
Fort Roe below Coyville from populated areas further northeast. 
Another factor complicating Coffin's work was the unsanitary con-
ditions in the camps along the Verdigris. In the middle of February, 
1862, Coffin reported that there were "twelve to fifteen hundred dead 
ponies laying around in the camps and in the river.u55 Coffin later 
stated·that when warm weath,er set in, there was a terrible "stench 
arising from dead ponies ••• in the stream and throughout the camp. 11 56 
After the refugees remained on the Verdigris for some time longer, about 
2,000 of their ponies died of cold and.hunger in and around their camps, 
and the water there became unfit for human use. 57 
For these reasons, removal from the Verdigris River valley around 
Fort Roe became necessary. As early as the end of February, 1862, Kile, 
Coffin, and the other Indian agents were in LeRoy, Kansas, talking to 
farmers and "arranging for wood and camping grounds" along the Neosho 
River. Kile traveled up the Neosho River from LeRoy, and Coffin worked 
54Ibid. 
55coffin to Pole, February 13, 1862, Annual Report ,2i the Commis-
sioner 0f Indian Affairs i£E. 1862, P• 145. 
56coffin to Dole, October 15, 1862, ibid., p. 136. 
57cutler to Coffin, Septe~per 30, 1862, ibid., p. 139, 
down the river trying to locate camp sites for the refugee Indians. 
The Sac and Fox Indians also offered part of their reservation as a 
sanctuary for the indigent Indians.SS 
Removal of the Verdigris valley refugees began on March 1, 1862, 
88 
when Agent Snow began moving the 1,500 Indians under his charge to the 
Sac and Fox Reserve. The Seminoles, who wanted to return to Indian 
Territory, were reluctant to move further north, and the savage March 
weather dampened their spirits even more. During early March in Kansas 
the weather was raining, snowing, sleeting, hailing, or freezing most 
of the time. 59 
The refugees, who made a hurried retreat under severe weather con-
ditions only two months before, were again caught in severe winter 
weather. The harsh circumstances of the march were aggravated by the 
weakened condition of the refugees. The weather turned cold the first 
night on the trail and commenced snow;i.ng and snowed hard most of the 
next day, which was the "coldest day of the season." The Indians re-
mained encamped in a stand of timber the day the snow fell, but most of 
them were on the road the ~ollowing day, although "it was too cold to 
travel" in their condition. Many traveled that were barefooted, and 
many more that "the feet was a small part of them that was bare. 1160 
All through March the Fort Roe refugees walked, rode their ponies, 
58Kile to Dole, February 21, 1862, Letters Received by the Office 
of Indian Affairs, Southern Super;i.ntendency, Department of the Interior, 
National Archives. 
5911camp Near Fort Scott, Kansas," Kansas State Journal, April 3, 
1862, p. 2. 
60 
Coffin to Dole, March 3, 1862, Letters Received by the Office of 
Indian Affairs, Southern Superintendency, Department of the Interior, 
National Archives. 
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or were carried on wagons to the Neosho River valley. By March 24, 
there were still 1,600 Creeks, Yuchies, and Ionies near fort Roe under 
Agent Carruth's care. From six to twelve miles above Fort Roe were 
Kickapoos and Delawares under the ca:r:e of Special Agent Samuel R. Ayers, 
a local Kansas citizen. A few miles below LeRoy on the Neosho River 
were 200 Quapaws, supplied by Agent Elder, and 176 more were with Car-
ruth at Fort Roe. Dr. Kile and Agent Coleman looked into the needs of 
the refugees encamped on the Cottonwood River south of Emporia. Snow 
and Cutler remained at LeRoy to care for the Indians there. 61 
There were also oth~r,,·smaller groups .pf refugees scattered across 
, ...... 
Kansas. A party of seventy, nearly all women and children, arrived at 
the salt works on the Fall River in mid-March. Coffin sent two teams 
to bring them to LeRoy. Two parties of WOJnen and children were located 
near the Cliff of the Rocks on the Arkansas River, 150 miles southwest 
of LeRoy. Coffin's clerk organized and supplied a party of between 100 
and 150 men to pick up these refugees, reported to have escaped from 
Fort.Arbuckle in the Chickasaw Nation. 62 
The Seminoles, who had reached LeRoy by March 6, 1862, refused to 
continue on to the Sac and Fox Reserve. To make·room for other tribes 
who had been promised camps along the Neosho River near LeRoy, the 
Seminoles were resettled by April 24 south of LeRoy on the Neosho River 
near Neosho Falls. By the end of April, nearly all the outlying refu-
gee groups were settled along the Neosho River, and Superintendent 
Coffin had established his headquarters at LeRoy. The Wichitas and 
61coffin to Dole, March 24, 1862, ibid. 
62Ibid. 
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affiliated tribes, camped along the Verdigris, Fall, Walnut, and 
Arkansas rivers, were supplied by their agent from an office at Belmont, 
Kansas, in Woodson County. 
Because. of the number of refugees and the distances involved, mov-
ing the Indians required much planning and e.xpenditure. Many wagons 
and te.ams were needed to move those refugees unable to walk or ride a 
horse. This transportation was provided by Kansas citizens, most of 
whom lived around LeRoy. One LeRoy resident, John P. Hamilton, remem-
bered that "it was a very easy matter for a person with a team to get 
a job and receive his pay in government vouchers at the rate of $2.50 
per day for single team and wagon." He explained that the teamsters 
would camp overnight and on the "ensuing morning ••• would load from one 
to two families and their effects (the latter being very meager) into a 
wagon and start." The children and old people rode and the "women and 
men, at least, the principal portion of them, walked. 11 63 
The economic and sanitary advantages of the Neosho valley were 
many, and the Creeks had historically always chosen their homes along 
creeks and streams. The Neosho River afforded clear uncontaminated 
water and contained timbered belts averaging between one and one half 
miles wide. Growing in these wooded areas were oak, hickory, black. 
64 walnut, ash, sycamore, hackberry, locust elm, and cottonwood trees. 
When the exiled Indians; were finally assembled along the Neosho River, 
their camps stretched for nearly eleven miles. 65 "Scarcely a suitable 
63 John P. Hamil ton, "Indian Refugees in Coffey County, 11 LeRoy Re-
porter, August 14, 1931. 
64cutler, ed., History of the State of Kansas, Vol. I, p. 1189. 
65Henry Johnson, "Old Indian Camp and B.urial Ground," [no date], 
Indian-Pioneer History, Vol. V., pp. 459-4560. 
camping place could be found upon the river, extending from two miles 
above LeRoy to Neosho Falls," Hamilton commented, that did not have 
its "complement of Indians. 1166 
Captain Turner had correctly predicted the drastic effect of the 
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Indian influx upon LeRoy and Neosho Falls residents: "No farmer would 
look with complacency or quietude upon such a crowd of destitute people 
brought around them and ••• serious difficulties would arise." He con-
tended that the greatest irritant would be the Indians' indiscriminate 
·cutting of young timber, because they "never regard these thi11gs and 
67 they would necessarily commit great damage.s." Also, residents of 
LeRoy must have disliked having their "town ••• filled with Indians and 
negroes during the day and a portion of the night. 1168 Nevertheless, 
many whites profited from the presence of the Indians, and it "proved 
quite a harvest for the merchants." A few of the Indians who had money 
and valuables were willing to exchange them at far below their value 
for food and supplies. Also, Indians owning extra ponies or having 
stolen horses could be found everyday "amongst the farmers trying to 
sell or exchange a pony for a hog or something to eat. 1169 
A LeRoy correspondent for the Daily State Record of Topeka re~ 
ported that "times are getting better here. Everybody has their pockets 
full of treasury notes. Corn is worth twenty-five cents, flour $3.50 
66 John P. Hamil ton, "Indian Refugees in Coffey County," LeRoy 
Reporter, August 14 and 21, 1931. 
67Turner to Dole, February 15, 1862, Official Records, Ser. ii, 
Vol. IV, pp. 7-9. 
68John P. Hamilton, "Indian Refugees in Coffey County," LeRoy 
Reporter, August 14 and 21~ 1931. 
69 Ibid. 
92 
and cattle have advanced considerably. 1170 Undoubtedly, much of the 
reason for the prosperity of the LeRoy area was the profit derived from 
selling food and supplies and from providing transportation for the 
Federal refugee.s. The weal th and comfort of the Neosho valley res i-
dents were sharply contrasted by the abject poverty and acute. suffering 
of the refugees surrounding them. Their lot had improved little since 
their first entry into Kansas in January of 1862. 
The living conditions of the Opothleyahola refugees were very 
crude. They had few cooking utensils, and their shelter consisted of 
11pieces of cloth, old quilts, handkerchiefs, aprons ••• stretched upon 
sticks." They were so i,mall that many were not even "sufficient to 
cover the emaciated and dying forms beneath tq.em. 11 Had adequate winter 
clothing been made available to the refugees, the crude shelter would 
have been more effective, but after having resided in Kansas for more 
than three months, some refugees were still completely naked. 71 The 
food was also a constal"\t source of complaint. Coffee, sugar, vinegar, 
and pepper were issued to the sick Indians only upon the requisition of 
a physician, and tobacco, considered a necessity by the Indians, was 
not provided at all. The quality of much of the food issued to the 
Indians was doubtful. One example of poor food issued was a large 
supply of bacon that had been condemned as unfit for human consumption 
by military officials at Fort Leavenworth.7 2 
Failure to provide the refugees with basic necessities of life 
70naily State Record, March 2~ 1862, p. 2. 
7lcollamore to Dole, April 21, 1862, Official Records, Ser. ii, 




aggravated and even helped increase the already grave physical con-
dition of the refugees, causing many to succumb to ailments and disease 
which would ordinarily not have been fatal. Dr. Samuel D. Coffin was 
appointed Directing Physician for the Southern Refugee Indians in Kan-
sas. Assisting him were Dr. J.C. Carter and Dr. A. McCartney. Dr. 
Albert Wiley, physician at the Sac and E'ox Agency, attended to the 
refugees who had fled that far north.73 
Dr. Coffin reported that no record of deaths was kept; because so 
many refugees died without medical attention and were quietly bu,ried by 
friends and relatives. Superintendent Coffin estimated thatat least 
10 percent of the Opothleyahola refugees in Kansas died before October 
of 1862. 74 The survivors complained that their "camps on the Verdigris 
and Neosho are lined with graves. 117 5 In the vicinity of LeRoy, hundreds 
of refugees died, and they were buried in "shallow graves" and in 
"hollow logs, with the ends ••• closed with chunks of wood. 1176 
Principal diseases were measles, mumps, and diptheria, and because 
of the closeness and exposed condition of the refugees, these diseases 
were difficult to check. The attending physicians also reported many 
cases of respiratory diseases, including tuberculosis, colds, chills, 
73 
Samuel Coffin to Dole, July 5, 1862, Letters Received by the Of-
fice of Indian Affairs, Southern Superintendency, Department of the 
Interior, National Archives. 
74Ibid.; Coffin to Dole, October 15, 1862, Annual Report of the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs for .1..§.§1, p. 136. 
75creek, Seminole, and Chickasaw Chiefs to Lincoln, March 31, 
1862, Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs, Southern 
Superintendency, Department of the Interior, National Archives. 
76Henry Johnson, "Old Indian Camp and Burial Ground,'' [no date], 
Indian-Pioneer History, Vol. V, pp. 459-460. 
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fever, influenza, and pneumonia. The ·inclement weather and the lack of 
proper clothing and shelter resulted in many cases of frostbite. Many 
we·re severe enough to require amputation. Improper diets accounted for 
gastrointestinal problems, scurvy, and diarrhea. Als9 reported were 
cases of syphilis and gonorrhea. Doctors performed a few abortions and 
also dressed some gunshot wounds. Over one-fifth of all the refugees 
on the Neosho River could have been considered sick, but far less than 
that number received medical attention.77 
Bitterness was evinced by the ·refugees, who felt that their loyalty 
to the Federal government deserved better treatment. Even more dis-
tressing to them were Superintendent Coffin's attempts to move them 
further north. Their frustration and bitter feelings were voiced in a 
letter to President Lincoln, which was signed by the leading chiefs of 
the refugee Creeks, Seminoles, and Chickasaws. The more important 
signers of this letter were Opothleyahola, Sands, Micco Hutke, Pascofa, 
and Halleck Tustenuggee. This communication contained a scathing.de-
nunciation of Creek Agent Cutler and Superintendent Coffin, and asked 
that they be removed. The chiefs wanted someone who "thinks and does 
less for money and more · for the poor Indians," and they preferred to 
"perish rather than remain ••• subject to the whims of men ••• totally in-
different to our welfare. 11 78 
The chiefs' vindictiveness toward Coffin and Cutler can probably 
77coffin to Mix, August 28, 1862, Samuel Coffin to Dole, 1862 no 
day or month, Lett;ers · Rece.;ived by the Office of Indian Affairs, 
Southern Superintendency, Department of the Interior, National Archives. 
78creek, Seminole, and Chickasaw Chiefs to Lincoln, March 31, 1862, 
ibid. 
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be better understood if these agents are seen as scapegoats for the 
refugees' frustration against their inhuman suffering, continuing re-
versals, and the broken hopes of the war. However, the letter makes 
serious claims of negligence and indifference against several officials 
of the Office of Indian Affairs. Grieving the Indians most was the 
failure of the Federal .army to gain control of Indian Territory and re.-
turn dispossessed Indians to their homes, as promised by military of• 
ficials. 
By the fall of 1862, the Neosho valley indigents realized that 
Indian Territory would remain in Confederate hands until at least the 
following epring. Wiih the approach of cold weather, the only choice 
left the·refugees was where they would spend the winter in Kansas--
along the Neosho River or at the .Sac and Fox Agency?" By October of 
1862, white. settlers along the Neosho valley were demanding that their 
land be vacated. They wanted to carefully husband their remaining sup-
ply of timber, which they feared would be depleted by the. refugees for 
firewood and shelter in the coming winter months. Coffin had originally 
planned to move most of the refugee Indians, especially those of the 
· Five Civilized Tribes, to the Sac and Fox Reserve. near Quenemo, Kansas. 
However, the Creeks refused, as had the Seminoles earlier, to go any 
further north. Fortunate.ly, Coffin and Kile had made arrangements with 
Coffey and Woodson county farmers to use the wooded valleys of the 
Neosho River until·a more suitable place could be found. 79 
Coffin, however, strongly urged the Federal refugees to move closer 
to a source of supplies and shelter before another winter. A delegation 
79Ibid.; Kile to Dole, February 21, 1862, ibid. 
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of Sac and Fox chiefs had visited the refugees at LeRoy in the spring 
of 1862 and offered them a temporary home on the Sac and Fox Reserve 
in Osage County. Made available to the refugees in this generous offer 
were 204 buildings and a large quantity of surplus timber which had 
been cut but not used in constructing the buildings. 80 
The buildings near Quenemo on the Sac and Fox Reserve had been 
constructed by Robert S. Stevens in 1860 and 1861. However, they re• 
mained unoccupied most of the time because the Sac and Fox Indians, who 
were still in an uncivilized cultural stage, preferred to live in their 
native shelters. They also spent a large part of each ye.ar chasing 
buffalo herds across the west Kansas plains. The houses were con-
structed of wood with framed windows, stone or brick chimneys and 
foundations, and large cellars. There was also a saw mill conveniently 
located near the houses. The building of the houses had produced rumors 
of graft because of the questionable need for them and the celerity of 
. d h dd k h" 81 construction an so y war mans ip. 
To the homeless refugees, the prospect of spending a winter in 
permanent housing must have been appealing. Nevertheless, they spurned 
the offer in early 1862 because they still hoped that they would be al-
lowed to return to Indian Territory that year. When the offer was again 
extended in the fall of 1862, the civilize.a Indians accepted rather than 
80 
William T. Hagan, The Sac and~ Indians (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1958), pp. 239-240; Martin to Branch, October 20, 1863, 
Thirty-Eighth Congress, First Session, House Executive Document Number 
l, Vol. III, p. 345; Martin to Coffin, February 28, 1865, Coffin to 
Dole, March 6, 1865, Martin to Dole, May 14, 1865, Letters Received by 
the Office of Indian Affairs, Southern Superintendency, Department of 
the Interior, National Archives. 
81 Hagan, The Sac and Fox Indians, pp. 239-240. 
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spend another winter exposed to the excruciating Kansas weather. Refu-
gee members of the Five Civilized Tribes had "possessed well improved 
farms" before the Civil War and had been "living in houses far better 
than those ••• in southern Kansas." Because they had been prosperous in 
Indian Territory, they were "unacquainted with the hardships of camp 
1 ife in the winter. 11 82 
The Neosho valley refugees began moving from their camps in late 
September, and by mid-November of 1862 they were relocated near the 
Sac and Fox Agency at Quenemo. The ·removal was not completed without 
complaints of conspiracy between Coffin and Stevens and other government 
contractors around the Sac and Fox Agency to defraud the Indians and 
gove.rnment. It was Coffin I s political enemies within the Office of 
Indian Affairs and in the military who complained the loudest, and no 
evidence was ever presented to prove that Coffin had profited personally 
by moving the Indians onto the Sac and Fox Reserve. Coffin probably 
moved the refugees to the Sac and Fox Reserve because he felt that it 
was in their best interests. For doing so he might have received small 
sums of money or supplies from contractors and speculators near Quenemo, 
but no charges of graft were ever brought against him. 83 
The horrors of flight into Kansas in 1861 and the rigors of camp 
life in 1862 were traumatic experiences for the Opothleyahola refugees. 
For their loyalty to the Federal government, they paid a high price. 
82creek, Seminole, and Chickasaw Chiefs to Lincoln, March 31, 1862, 
Letters Received by the. Office of Indian Affairs, Southern Superinten-
dency, Department of the Interior, National Archives. 
8311 The Indian Swindler," .!:.QE! Scott Bulletin, July 12, 1862, p. 2; 
Rebuttal of an article from the Conservative, Fort Scott Bulletin, 
July 26, 1862, p. 2; "Corrections," Fort Scott Bulletin, August 9, 
1862, p. 2. 
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Many of these refugees, well educated and wealthy, we.re accustomed to a 
life style above that of most whites in surrounding states. They were 
not inured to the hardships and privations of forced exile, and over 10 
percent of the Opothleyahola refugees died by October of 1862. 
This tragedy could have been mitigated had the basic needs of the 
refugees been met, but there was gross negligence on the. part of the 
Federal government in caring for these unfortunate wards of the state. 
As late as April and May of 1862 many refugees were nearly naked, no 
buildings or even te.nts had been provided for their use, and medical 
services were very limited. Many of the sick died before their medical 
needs could even be attended. The poor quality and scarcity of food 
was shocking, and over 2,000 ponies were allowed to die by officials 
who would not give the horses even a meager supply of hay or corn meal. 
Combined with the refugees' physical suffering was the mental anguish 
of being unable to return to their homes. Instead, they were twice 
moved further north. 
The Office of Indian Affairs must share most of the blame.for the 
wretched condition of the Opothleyahola refugees during 1862, for it 
was this government agency that was ultimately responsible for the 
Indians' welfare. The officers of the Southern Superintendency were 
slow in arriving at Fort Roe, and their first efforts were clearly un-
organized and woe.fully inadequate. Additionally, their attitude toward 
the refugees, as pointed out by the chiefs, was sometimes unsympathetic 
or unconcerned. 
However, others must share some of the responsibility for negli-
gent tre.atment of the Opothleyahola refugees. Throughout 1861 and 
1862, military officials, including Brigadier General Lane, his 
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assistant E. H. Carruth, Major General Hunter, and Brigadier General 
Blunt, unadvisedly assured th~ Union Indians that Indian Territory would 
be secured and the refugees returned to their homes. Those·promises, 
which were not fulfilled in 1862, greatly heightened the dissatisfaction 
of the ·refugees. 
Lack of inadequate funds was the severest handicap of the Indian 
officers who were trying to alleviate the refugees' suffering, and 
hence cumbersome ·governmental bureaucracy was .indirectly ·the greatest 
impediment to efficient and adequate·care of refugee·needs. The 
Opothleyahola refugee.a' arrival in Kansas was known to Congressional 
members as early as January of 1862, but it was 'not until July ·that an 
appropriation bill was passed to care.for the loyal Indians. Perhaps 
ultimate responsibility for the Opothleyahola refugees' predicament·in 
late 1861 and in 1862 can be attributed to their involvement in their 
own tribal conflicts and in aligning with the North in the American 
Civil War. 
CHAPTER IV 
CHEROKEE REFUGEES FROM INDIAN TERRITORY 
Through the spring of 1862, the Cherokee Nation under the leader-
ship of Chief John Ross was still politically united under the Con-
federate banner, except for the 300 Cherokees who had followed Opoth~ 
leyahola into Kansas. Thus far the Cherokees had escaped the twin 
perils of military occupation and tribal disunity. Events of the Civil 
War, however, would soon make a mockery of Ross's attempt to unify the 
interests of the Ross Party and the Treaty Party. The Confederate wed-
ding of these old rival factions was repugnant to members of both 
parties, but especially to man'.y members of. the Ross Party who, al though 
sympathizing with the North, were forced to align with the South for 
the sake of tribal unity. 
Evidence of the lack of concern for the Southern cause was clearly 
evinced on two occasions by the military actions of the Confederate 
First Cherokee Regiment of Mounted Riflemen. This unit was commanded 
by Colonel John Drew, and officered by Lieutenant Colonel William P. 
Ross, Major Thomas Pegg, and Captain James McDaniel; it.was composed of 
Cherokees who were all closely identified with the Ross Party. However, 
a second Cherokee regiment, the Confederate First Cherokee Regiment of 
Mounted ,Volunteers, organized and commanded by Stand Watie, included 
Treaty Party adherents. Watie's regiment staunchly supported the Con-




while fighting on the Confederate side. The first indication of their 
reluctance to support the Confederacy was their refusal to fight against 
the Opothleyahola refugees at Chustalasah. Some of Drew's regiment even 
defected, including Captain James McDaniel, and fo,ught on the Union 
Indians' side. Again, in March of 1862, Drew's regiment withdrew from 
act ion at .the Batt le of Pea Ridge in Arkansas, bt,it not before they had 
taken scalps, which included those of some Southern Indian soldiers. 1 
The Ross Cherokees who had not really wanted to join the Confeder~ 
acy were simply biding their time, awaiting an opportune moment to de-
clare for the United States government. Events were in progress by late 
1861 which would make this possible. Plans were begun as early as mid-
1861 to send an expedition into Indian Territory in support of the loyal 
Indians still there. A few individuals familiar with the political 
situation in Indian Territory realized that the Ross Cherokees joined 
the South out of necessity. They adequately explained Ross's position, 
and assured Union military and political leaders that many Cherokees 
2 
were eagerly anticipating the arrival of a strong Federal force. 
Senator Lane of Kansas was indirectly the person most responsible 
for the first Federal invasion (sometimes termed the 11Indian Expedition) 
1cooper to Benjamin, January 20, 1862, Official Records, Ser. i, 
Vol. VIII, p. 8; Fischer and Gill, "Confederate Indian Forces Outside 
of Indian Territory, 11 Chronicles of Oklahoma, Vol. XLVI, pp. 256, 258-
259. 
2 Reverend Evan Jones, a Baptist minister in the Cherokee Natibn be-
fore the Civil War, was the most vocal defender of Cherokee loyalty to 
the Union, and his letters to Indian officials and military officers as~ 
serting the loyalty of the Ross Cherokees are numerous. However, Super-
intendent Coffin, Commissioner Dole, and military officers in Kansas 
also sent letters to President Lincoln and other political figures i~ 
Washington, a:,suring them of the desire of the Cherokees to embrace the 
Union again. 
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of Indian Territory in 1862. The purpose of this military expedition 
was to regain political and military control of Indian Territory, to 
protect Union sympathizers there, and to return the loyal refugees in 
Kansas to their homes. The motives, however, of civilian and military 
officials in carrying out this mission were much more complex. There 
was much controversy and political intrigue involved in organizing the 
expedition, and one disputations issue was the use of Indian troops. 
One of the first to advocate the utilization of Indian soldiers 
was Senator Lane, who had also been commissioned a brigadier general by 
President Lincoln. 3 He planned to use them in conjunction with the 
brigade of volunteers which he was raising for the defense of Kansas. 
He wanted to employ the warriors of tribes in Kansas to establish a 
strong Indian camp near the Cherokee Neutral Land in southeast Kansas 
to prevent Confederate raids into Kansas. For this purpose, Lane in-
vited representatives of the Sac and Fox 9 Shawnee, Delaware 9 Kickapoo, 
Potawatomie, and Kaw tribes to meet with him at Fort Lincoln, Kansas, 
in late August of 186\. The proposed council was called off, but one 
of Lane's brigade officers, J.E. Prince, issued a circular requesting 
the enrollment of Indian troops. 4 
Lane's attempts to protect the southern Kansas border not only in-
eluded the use of Kansas Indians but also Union Indians in Indian Ter-
ritory. He corresponded with the Five Civilized Tribes through former 
3Thirty-Seventh Congress, First Session, Senate Executive Document 
Number 1 (Washingtont Government Printing Office, 1802), Vol. I, pp. 
1-6. ,... 
4 Abel, The American Indian~ Slaveholder and Secessionist, pp. 
229-231. 
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Indian educator, E. H. Carruth, whom he had commissioned for that pur-
5 
pose. To further his plans for Indian enrollment, Lane had to gain 
the consent of the War Department and the Office of Indian Affairs. 
Commissioner Dole supported Lane's proposal for a different reason 0 He 
hoped that this would speed the organization of an expedition into 
Indian Territory to support the Indians of especially the Creek and 
Cherokee nations remaining loyal to the United States government. 
Finally, on January 2, 1862, Secretary of War Simon Cameron sanctioned 
the organizing and equipping of rvindians from the borders of Kansas and 
Missouri" ostensibly for the purpose of helping the Federals retake 
Indian Territory. 6 To help initiate this policy, Dole hurried to Kansas 
in late January of 1862, and on arriving found that the number of 
Indians had been greatly increased by the addition of the Opothleyahola 
refugees. Mainly on the insistent urging of the refugee chiefs 9 it was 
decided to include the refugee Indians in the proposed enrollment. 
Opothleyahola and Halleck Tustenuggee impressed Major General Hunter, 
Senator Lane, and Commissioner Dole during their interviews with their 
. 7 people's strong desire to fight their way back to their homeland. 
5carruth to Opothleyahola and Oktarharsars Harjo, September 10, 
1861, Carruth to the Chickasaws and Choctaws, September 11 1 1861 9 Of-
ficial Records, Ser. i 9 Vol. VIII, pp. 25-26; Carruth to Ross, Septem~ 
ber 11, 1861, Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairss, 
Southern Superintendency, Department of the Interior, National Archiveso 
6smith to Dole, January 3, 1862 9 Annual Report of ~ Commissioner 
of Indian Affairs for ~, p. 150. 
71iopothleyahola 9 The Loyal Indian, tells his story to Major 
General Hunter,' 1 Daily Conservative, January 23, 1862, p. 2; "A.luktus-
tenuke Chief of the Seminoles and Opothleyahola Chief of the Creeks 
Hold An Interview With General James Ho Lane," Daily Conservative, 
January 28 9 1862 9 po 2; "The Loyal Indians," Daily Times, February 4, 
1862, p. 2. 
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Further clarifying the expedition was a directive from Adjutant 
General Lorenzo Thomas, granting Lane aut;hority to ''raise about 8,000 
to 10,000 Kansas troops and to organize 4,000 Indians."8 Controversy 
over command of the force between Lane of the Kansas volunteers and 
Hunter of the regular army elicited two responses from President 
Lincoln, indicating that Major General Hunter was in command of the 
F d 1 d . . 9 e era expe 1t1on, Lane then telegraphed Lincoln: "All efforts to 
harmonize with Major General Hunter have failed. I am compelled to de-
cline the brigad:i,.ership. 1110 
The new Secretary of War, Edwin M. Stanton, further compounded the 
woes of the Indians by refusing to induct them into the army. On Feb-
ruary 11, 1862, Dole instructed Coffin to discontinue preparations for 
enrolling the Indians. 11 The next disconcerting event was the creation 
on March 11, 1862, of the District of Kansas from the old Department of 
Kansas. Through this action, Major General Henry W. Halleck, who com-
manded the Department of Mississippi, also had the Kansas district under 
his command. Halleck was opposed to the "jayhawking expedition" and 
did little to implement ·it. Hunter was replaced in rapid succession by 
8 
Thomas to Hunter, January 24, 1862, Official Records, Ser. i, 
Vol. VIII, P• 525. 
9Lincoln to Stanton, January 31, 1862, Lincoln to Hunter and Lane, 
February 10, 1862, ibid., pp. 538, 551. 
lOLane to ~incoln, February 16, 1862, Collections of the Kansas 
State Historical Society (17 vols., Topeka: Kansas Stat"; Historical 
Society, 1875-1928), Vol. XI, p. 226, 
11Smith to Dole, February 6, 1862, Coffin to Dole, February 28, 
1862, Coffin to Dole, March 3, 1862, Letters Received by the Office ~f 
Indian Affairs, Southern Superintendency, Department of the Interior, 
National Archives; Abel,~ American Indian.!! Slaveholder .!!!5! Seces-
sionist, P• 279, n. 573. 
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two district connnanders, Brigadier General James w. Denver and Brigadier 
General Samuel D. Sturgis. Neither was in office long enough nor did 
they have the inclination to organize a military invasion of Indian 
Territory. 
Connnissioner Dole, perceiving the demoralizing effects of the re-
cent milit.ary policy, asked Secretary of the Interior Smith to convince 
military officials in Washington of the importance of enrolling Indians 
in the proposed expedition. A directive from the Department of War on 
March 19, 1862, ordering the organizing and arming of an expeditionary 
force of white and Indian soldiers, reaffirmed the proposed invasion of 
Indian Territory. A special agent, Judge James Steele, was dispatched 
from Washington to meet with Major General Halleck and to procure arms 
at Fort Leavenworth. Preparations were immediately begun by the Indian 
. 12 
agents for enrolling the Indians. 
A flurry of activity hurried the long delayed military project. 
LeRoy and Humboldt, Kansas, became the enlistment centers for the Indians, 
and Major General David Hunter dispatched Colonel Charles R. Jennison to 
Humboldt~ .. and breveted him brigadier general for the purpose of helping 
the Indian officers there. 13 Dole connnunicated with the officers se-
lected to lead the two Indian regiments, and requested them to report 
innnediately to Fort Leavenworth to be mustered in. Robert W. Furnas 
12Thomas to Dole, March 19, 1862, Official Records, Ser. i, Vol. 
VIII, pp. 624-625; Dole to Smith, June 5, 1862, Annual Report of~ 
Connnissioner of Indian Affairs for 1862, p. 148; Steele to Dole, March 
26, 1862, Steele to Dole 1 March 27,-rs6'2, Letters Received by the Of-
fice of Indian Affairs, Southern Superintendency, Department of the 
Interior, National Archives. 
1311The Loyal Indians," Weekly Conservative, March 27, 1862, p. 2. 
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from Nebraska was mustered in as colonel on April 18, 1862, and he pro-
ceeded inunediately to LeRoy. With the assistance of agents Cutier and 
Snow, he enrolled 1,009 refugee Indians into the First Indian Regiment 
of Home Guards which included eight companies of Creeks and two com-
panies of Seminoles. The Second Indian Regiment of Home Guards was 
being raised under the conunaqd of Colonel John Ritchie. 14 
Attempts for an early departure to Indian Territory, however, were 
stymied by Brigadier General Sturgis, who had assumed conunand of the 
District of Kansas on April 10, 1862. Sturgis, opposed to the whole 
expedition for personal and political reasonsj issued an order on April 
15 directing that "no Indians will be mustered into service in this 
[Kansas] district ••• military authorities are hereby required and di-
rected to arrest and bring to this post [Fort Leavenworth] any person 
• • •. 1 . • f h • d II 15 or persons acting 1n v10 at1on o t 1s or er. 
The District of Kansas was innnediately thrown into confusion and 
dismay. Perhaps Colonel Furnas's distress was the most acute. He re-
ceived a copy of the order, and on the next day he was visited at LeRoy 
by a Major Minor from Iola, Kansas, who knew that Furnas had been en-
rolling Indians. Upon inquiry, Minor found that Furnas had on his 
person written detailed instructions from Adjutant General Thomas of 
the War Department authorizing him to raise "from the loyal Indians ••• 
14Thomas to Furnas, April 2, 1862, Official Records, Ser. iii, Vol. 
II, p. 2; Robert C. Farb, "The Military Career of Robert W. Furnas," 
Nebraska History, Vol. XXXII, No. 1 (March, 1951), pp. 18~28; Abel, The 
American Indian!.§. Participant in~ Civil War, pp. 106-108. 
15 General Orders No. 8, April 25, 1862, Official Records, Ser. i, 
Vol. XIII, p. 365. 
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in Kansas a Regiment of Infantry." Minor, thoroughly confused, made no 
16 
arrest. Coffin, Furnas, and Richie fired off indignant letters to 
Dole in Washington, but before matters could come to a head, Kansas was 
again reestablished as a department with Brigadier General James G. 
Blunt commanding. On May 5, 1862, Blunt rescinded Sturgis's order and 
confirmed that "all instructions issued by the [War] Department at 
Washington to the colonels" will be complied with and "the two Indian 
17 
regiments will be raised with all possible speed." 
The last impediment to Indian enlistment had been removed by 
Blunt's order, and final organization, arming, and equipping were in-
tensified. Added emphasis came from Adjutant General Thomas, who sent 
an order on May 8 hurrying up the organization of the two Indian regi-
18 
ments. Organization of the First Indian Regiment had been nearly 
completed before Sturgis's interference, but much work had to be exerted 
in May and June to prepare the Second Indian Regiment for military duty. 
Colonel Ritchie needed to spend valuable time in the Osage country pre-
paring the Osage Indians for enrollment. The Second Indian Regiment 
was composed mostly of Osages, but there were also many other smaller 
tribes represented. Shawnee and Delaware Indians residing in Kansas 
16 
Thomas to Furnas, April 2, 1862, ibid., Ser. iii, Vol. III, p. 2; 
Robert c. Farb, "The Military Career of Robert w. Furnas," Nebraska 
History, Vol. XXXII, No. 1 (March, 1951), pp. 18-28; Abel, The American 
Indian~ Participant in the Civil War, pp. 106-108. 
17 General Orders No. 2, May 5, 1862, Official Records, Ser. i, Vol. 
XIII, p. 365. 
18carruth to Coffin, September 19, 1862, Annual Report of~~-
missioner of Indian Affairs for 1862, p. 166; Coffin to Dole, June 4, 
1862, Ellithorpe to Dole, Ju;:;-9-;-1s62, Coffin to Dole, June 15, 1862, 
Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs, Southern Superinten= 
dency, Department of the Interior, National Archives. 
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were joined by fifty-four refugees of the Affiliated Tribes who had come 
from the Wichita Agency. Among these tribes were the Delaware, Keechi, 
Ioni, Caddo, and Kickapoo. There w¢re also sixty Quapaw and sixty 
Cherokee warriors in the regiment. 
The two Indian regiments were armed and trained in LeRoy, but not 
fast enough to suit Colonel William Weer named to head the Indian Ex-
pedition by Brigadier General Blunt. The white troops who had been as-
sembled at Humboldt were sent to Baxter Springs, near the southern border 
of Kansas, by Weer. He first proceeded to the Osage Catholic Mission 
in the Osage country to promote the enlistment of Osages, and then ar-
rived at LeRoy on June 8, 1862, to get the Indians movinge He found 
that the refugees were reluctant to leave until they received assurance 
of military support by white troops during the expedition and after its 
arrival in Indian Territory. The Indian soldiers also demanded adequate 
supplies and transportation. 
The first demand reflected the fear in the minds of the refugees 
that they would again be overwhelmed by Confederate Indians supported 
by white troops;. they did not want a repetition of the,ir experience of 
the previous autumn and winter. Weer received a deputa.tion of the 
Indian chiefs at LeRoy and assured them of military support. Allenfs 
Battery of the Sixth Kansas Regiment, which had been ordered to LeRoy1 
performed maneuvers on June 13 and fired a.few rounds, greatly impres-
sing the Indian soldiers. Colonel Weer had to "overcome the thousand 
excuses of the Indians" and had to "get them away from the influence of 
the chiefs," but by June 13 the Indian soldiers had "gone into camp, 
separate from their families, preparatory to a final start." Final 
preparations for leaving consisted of drinking bullet proof medicine, 
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accompanied by appropriate rituals. The concluding event was a tribal 
19 war dance held on June 13, the day before leaving. 
The request of the Indians for supplies was complied with by 
Brigadier General Blunt, who had subsistence stores and other necessary 
items shipped to Humboldt. The Indian soldiers (l,000 in the First 
Regiment and 600 in the Second Regiment), Allen's Battery, and a small 
detachment of the Sixth Kansas Regiment, arrived at Humboldt on·the riight 
of June 16, 1862. The Indian units received their supplies, but details 
still plagued Weer in his attempt to get the Indian regiments prepared 
for the expedition. A mustering officer had not arrived to officially 
enlist the seven companies of Osage soldiers, and the supplies provided 
the Indian troops were devoid of tin ware, medicine, and stationery. 
Nor had physicians been obtained to care for the Indian soldiers, many 
of whom were sick or not yet fully recovered from the rigors of the 
refugees' camp life of the previous winter. In spite of the many dis-
couragements and setbacks, the Indian portion of the expedition hurried 
south from Ht.unbolt on June 21 to catch the white troops already sta-
tioned along the border of Indian Territory. 20 
The inception and organization of the Indian Expedition had been 
partially political, and thus one of the important objectives !of the 
expedition was also political. Civilians, Indian officers, and military 
men had many intimations of the divided political structure of the 
Cherokee people and expected open support in Indian Territory from the 
19 Weer to Moonlightf June 13, 1862, Official Records, Ser. i, 
Vol. XIII, PP• 430-431. 
2°weer to Moonlight, June 21, 1862, ibid., pp. 441-442. 
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Ross followers. Colonel Weer received Cherokee messengers from Indian 
Territory who assured him of the loyalty of many of the Cherokees. It 
was reported that the Cherokees had "a secret society of Union Indians 
called Ke•too-wah" containing 2,000 warriors." The messengers claimed 
that the Federal tr0ops w0uld be "hailed as deliverers." Weer was con• 
fident that Chief Ross would "come out openly for us when we reach 
there" and that many Confederate Indian soldiers only "await our ad .. 
vance in order to take the field on behalf of the [Federal] Govern-
21 
ment. 11 Major General Blunt shared these sentiments when he explained 
to Secretary of War Stanton "that a large majority of the Cherokees are 
loyal, and that whenever Ross and the other leading men of the [Chero-
kee] nation are satisfied that we are able to hold the country they 
will cooperate with us. 1122 
In anticipation of this support from Union sympathizers, Weer 
cautioned Colonel Frederick Salomon, commanding the First Brigade of 
the Indian Expedition, that the "evident desire of the Government is to 
restore friendly intercourse with the tribes and restore loyal Indians 
with us to their homeso 11 Weer also warned Salomon that "great care 
must be observed that no unusual degree of vindictiveness be tolerated 
between Indian and Indian." Colonel William B. Judson, commanding the 
Second Brigade of the Indian Expedition, received similar instructions.23 
·• Dole and Coffin eagerly looked forward to communicating directly t" 
21weer to Moonlight, June l~, 1862, ibid., pp. 430-431. 
22 
Blunt to Stanton, July 21, 1862, ibid., p. 486. 
23James Phillips to Salomon, June 27, 1862, and James Phillips to 
Judson~ June 28, 1862, ibid., pp. 452, 456. 
111 
with the loyal Indians in Indian Territory, and in anticipation of such, 
they assigned E.'' H.' Carruth and Ho' w. Martin. as special agents to ac-
company the Indian Expedition. Coffin asked Martin to "enquire [sic] 
into the Loyalty of all the promine'nt Indian Chiefs, Head Men, Braves, 
• j 
and their bands." Coffin explained that this information would be 
"very important in determining ••• the extent of the Obligations of the 
Federal Government under former Treaty Stipulations with the Indians of 
h I d . . 1124 t e n ian Territory. Coffin's instructions to Carruth were more 
specific. He asked Carruth to "assure all l0yal Indians in the Indian 
Territory of the disposition of the Government of the United States to 
protect them in all their rights." Carruth was also asked to "care-
fully look into the condition of the country," and to determine the 
25 
"loyal Indians ••• condition and prospects." 
Also accompanying the expedition was Reverend Evan Jones, who had 
left his ministry in the Cherokee Nation after its Southern alliance. 
Jones carried a personal letter for Chief Ross from Superintendent Cof-
fin. The letter extended promises of protection and support for the 
loyal Indians, and Coffin included his desire that "Communication so 
long cut off may be renewed and all that have remained loyal may be re-
stored unimpared to all rights and privileges that they enjoyed" before 
26 
the war. 
The departure of the Indian troops was a sad occasion for their 
24coffin to Martin, June 23, 1862 9 Letters Received by the Office 
of Indian Affairs, Southern Superintendency, Department of the Interior, 
National Archives. 
25coffin to Carruth, June 16, 1862, ibid. 
26coffin to Ross, June 16, 1862, ibid. 
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families, but for the Indians agents and many of the soldiers it was 
·: I 
·, 
the happy culmination of months of planning and high expectations. The 
Office of Indian Affairs ·was relieved to have the financial care and the 
protection of over 1,600 Indians transferred from their hands to the 
Kansas Military Department. The feeding of these troops, including the 
Shawnees, Delawares, and Osages even after they ~ad been mustered into 
the army, had been a burden to the agents. Even more important were 
the prospects of an early return of their charges to Indian Territory 
upon the successful completion of the Indian Expedition. 
The Indian soldiers were jubilant. They marched out of Humboldt, 
four abreast, chanting war songs and whooping. A war whoop would com-
mence at the head of a column, travel back to the rear, and then start 
at the head again. This would continue for some time. These unmilitary 
actions were accented by the Indian soldiers' unorthodox appearance. 
They wore blue military jackets which fit them poorly. The cuff of the 
arm invariably seemed to nearly cover entirely the entire hand or to 
reach only just below the elbow. Equally ludicrous were the stiff high-
crowned wool hats perched atop the Indians' flowing black hairo Instead 
of the standard military mounts, the Indians rode their small ponies 
27 
from which their legs dangled nearly to the ground. 
In late June of 1862 Weer's Indian soldie~s and accompanying white 
contingent reached Baxter Springs, Kansas. Along the way they had been 
joined by enough Osage warriors to fill Colonel Ritchie's Second Indian 
Regt~ent. The troops awaiting them at Baxter Springs had been ordered 
27coffin to Dole~ June 25, 1862, ibid.; Britton,~ Civil !:!!E. £.!! 
the Border, Vol~ I, p. 2990 
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by Weer to wait for the Indian regiment. At dawn on June 28, 1862, the 
First Brigade of the expedition, composed of two sections of the 
Indiana Battery and one battalion of the Second Ohio Volunteer Infantry, 
moved south along the military road: and entered Indian Territory. They 
forded the Grand (or Neosho) River at Hudson's Crossing and camped 
there. The next day the Second Brigade, which included the unmounted 
portion of the First Indian Regiment, started south and joined the 
other white troops at Hudson's Crossing. After a two day delay, they 
moved south again until they reached Carey's Ford. At that point they 
crossed to the east side of Grand River and camped at Round Grove on 
Cowskin Prairie. 
Mounted troops of the First Indian Regiment and the Second Indian 
Regiment, and a detachment of the Sixth Kansas Regiment, were sent out 
to patrol the northern part of the Cherokee Nation lying east of the 
Grand River. On June 28, Colonel Ritchie with the Second Indian Regi-
ment entered Indian Territory, passed the slower moving main column, 
and reconnoitered the area ahead of Weer. A second patrol of 200 
mounted men was dispatched under Major William A. Phillips from the 
First Indian Regiment to the Cherokee Nation east of the Grand River 
along the Arkansas boundary, and penetrated ten miles inside the Mis= 
souri border. 28 
These reconnaissance patrols assured Weer that his eastern flank 
was at least temporarily secure, and he shook off his lethargy and 
initiated troop movements to surprise a force of Confederate soldiers 
under the command of Colonel J. J. Clarkson located at Locust Grove, 
28 
Weer to Moonlight, June 30, 1862, Weer to Moonlight, July 2, 
1862, Official Records, Ser. i, Vol. XIII, pp. 458-461. 
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two miles east of Grand River and about thirty miles north of Tahlequah. 
On July 2 Weer broke camp on Cowskin Prairie. He ordered Colonel Jud-
son to move down the west side of the Grand River with most of the main 
force. Judson took the baggage and supply trains with him to Cabin 
Creek on the Texas Road. Later the same day Weer moved with 300 men, 
including part of the Firs't Indian Regiment under Lieutenant Colonel 
Stephen Wattles and slipped rapidly down the east side of the Grand 
River. This small Federal force surprised Clarkson's command at sun-
rise on July 3 and killed or captured between 100 and 200 of the Con-
federate Missourians, including Colonel Clarkson. On that same day, 
Colonel Lewis R. Jewell and his Sixth Kansas Cavalry Regiment engaged 
Colonel Watie a few miles east of Locust Grove, drove him below the 
Arkansas River, and prevented him from helping Clarkson. 29 
All the forces of the indian Expedition were moved to Cabin Creek 
a few miles west of Locust Grove, and except for scouting patrols, the 
Federal forces remained inert during the first two weeks of July. From 
this position Weer hoped that his supply trains from Fort Scott would 
reach him soon, but he also figured that he was close enough to in-
fluence the Cherokees at Tahlequah and Park Hill. 
The combat action against Watie and Clarkson was relatively unim~ 
portant from a military standpoint, but its effect on the Cherokee 
people was profound. Even before the engagement at Locust Grove, Weer 
had reported that "the whole Cherokee tribe can be induced to surren-
der. Our approach is alarming them. They are moving their families 
29weer to Moonlight, July 4 and 6, 1862, ibid., pp. 137-138; 
Britton, The Civil War on the Border, Vol. I, pp. 301~302; Abel, The 
American ~ian ~ ~t~{~t in the Civil War, pp. 130~132. 
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and property across the Arkansas." Weer concluded that the Cherokees 
"fear the terrible reprisals of the Indian exile~" in the Indian regi-
30 
ments. After the skirmish at Locust Grove, the defeated soldiers of 
Clarkson's command who escaped fled to Tahlequah.and spread word of the 
invincible Federal force descending upon the Cherokee Nation. Panic 
set in among the Cherokees, and Colonel John Drew's Confederate Chero-
kee regiment fell apart. Between 300 and 400 of his soldiers entered 
the Federal camp at Cabin Creek and asked to be enlisted in the Union 
army. This portion of Drew's regiment was organized into three com-
panies and sent to Fort Scott to be mustered into Ritchie's Second 
Indian Regiment. Ritchie concluded that "2,000 more Cherokees will join 
us in a few days. Our enemy is retreating. 1131 
After the Locust Grove victory, Weer felt that the time was right 
psychologically to write Chief Ross about the Cherokee people's senti-
ments toward the Federal government. Weer assured Ross that the Federal 
troops would "injure no one who is disposed to do what treaties made by 
his nation bind him to do" and explained that the Federal troops were 
in the Cherokee Nation to protect all loyal members of the tribe. Weer 
asked for an official conference at his camp and promised Ross a safe 
return. 32 These instructions were forwarded to Chief Ross by Dr. Rufus 
Gillpatrick, but Weer was taken back by Ross's abrupt reply. Ross ex-
plained that the Cherokees had an official treaty of alliance with the 
30weer to Moonlight, July 2, 1862, Official Records, Ser. i, Vol. 
XIII, pp. 459-460. 
31Ritchie to Blunt, July 5, 1862, ibid., pp. 463-464. 
32weer to Ross, July 7, 1862, ibid., p. 464. 
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Confederacy and declined the invitation to meet with Weer. 33 
Weer was reassured, however, by civilian and military officials, 
and Cherokee deserters, that Chief Ross was simply awaiting a more 
favorable time to declare his loyalty to the United States government. 
Meanwhile, Weer moved from his camp on Wolf Creek near the mouth of 
Cabin Creek to Flat Rock Ford on. the Verdigris River •. Weer had been 
advised of a possible deployment of Confederate troopi;i from Arkansas 
into Indian Territory. From his camp on Flat Rock Ford twelve miles 
: 
above Fort Gibson, he soon sent out two scouting parties. 34 
One cavalry unit commanded by Major William T. Campbell dashed 
south to Fort Gibson, drove out a small detachment of Confederate 
cavalry, and captured the fort. The other Federal cavalry unit µnder 
the command of Captain Harris S. Greeno was ordered to the Tahlequah-
Park Hill area. Captain Greeno, one company of whites, fifty Cherokees, 
and Dr. Gillpatrick departed on the morning of July 14 and re.ached 
Tahlequah, the Cherokee capital, about 5:00 p.m. the same day. They 
surrounded the town, but could find only four or five men who had not 
yet fled. Greeno camped two and one-half miles south of "Tahlequah and 
continued on to Chief Ross's home, Rose Cottage, at Park Hill the next 
morning. He found Park Hill in a chaotic state, and at Rose Cottage 
were Ross, other Cherokee government officials, and over 200 men of 
Drew's regiment, including several officers. 
33Ross to Weer, July 8, 1862, ibid., pp. 486-487. 
34Abel, The American Indian~ Participant in the Civil War, p. 
136; Barney King Neal, Jr., "Federal Ascendancy in !ndian Terr;i tory, 
1862-1863," Unpublished Master of Arts Thesis JS till water: Oklahoma 
State University, 1966), pp. 43-46~; Gary N. ijea.th, "The First Federal 
Invasion of the Indian Territory," Chronicles .Q.; Okla.hoina, Vol. XLIV, 
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These Cherokee leaders were debating among themselves, trying to 
decide the wisest course for them to pursue as individuals and as a 
nation. Should they honor their commitment to the Confederacy or should 
they throw themselves on the mercy of the Federal invader? Even though 
most of the Cherokees favored the North and secretly wanted to welcome 
the Indian Expedition, they questioned the wisdom of doing so until the 
Federal army could prove its ability to hold Indian Territory north of 
the Arkansas River. However, like the Opothleyahola followers in 1861, 
the Cherokees did not have enough time to await more favorable circum-
stances. 
Colonel Douglas H. Cooper, the ranking Confederate officer in 
Indian Territory in July of 1862, had ordered the officers of Drew's 
regiment to report at once with their men to Fort Davis. This order had 
been received at Park Hill just the day before Captain Greeno's arrival, 
and the refusal to obey it would be dereliction of duty. Cooper also 
sent another directive to Chief Ross ordering him in the name of the 
Confederacy "to issue a proclamation calling on all Cherokee Indians 
over 18 and under 35 to come forward and assist in protecting the 
country from invasion." Not to do so would mean failing to comply with 
the Confederate-Cherokee treaty. Ross and the Cherokee officers were 
trying to decide whether or not to implement these orders when Greeno 
reached Park Hill.35 
Greeno ascertained the situation and called the Cherokees together. 
He gave a lengthy speech on the military victories of the Union armies 
35Ibid.; Wardell,~ Political History of the Cherokee Nation, 
1838-1907, p. 155; Woodward, The Cherokees, pp. 279-280; Carruth and 
Martin to Coffin, July 19, 1862, Report of the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs for 1862, pp. 158-159. 
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in the East and in the West and of the invincibility of the Federal 
military. He again explained to the Cherokees the conciliatory policy 
of the United States government toward the loyal Cherokees, as had 
Weer in his letter to Chief Ross. Lieutenant Colonel W. P. ;Ross, Major 
Thomas Pegg, and the other Cherokee officers of Drew's regiment agreed 
to allow Captain Greene's smaller force to arrest them as prisoners of 
war on the condition that they would later be allowed to join the 
Northern army. Chief Ross was also arrested, but was paroled •. , Thus 
his quandary was also ended, for technically he could not issue Cooper's 
proposed proclamation because he was a prisoner of war. Greeno spent 
the night at Park Hill, and on the next day, July 16, left for Flat 
Rock Ford accompanied by the 200 Cherokees who had defected from Drew's 
regiment. 36 
These former Confederates were attached to the newly formed Third 
Indian Regiment. The raising of this regiment had been authorized by 
Colonel Weer who had received over 1,500 Cherokee recruits since enter-
ing Indian Territory. The first Confederate defectors, approximately 
400 from Drew's regiment after the skirmish at Locust Grove, were added 
to the Second Indian Regiment to bring it to full strength. The rest 
were incorporated into the Third Indian Regiment. Brigadier General 
Blunt approved the·or.ganization of the regiment as a regular force, and 
Phillips w.as promoted to colonel to command it. 37 
36Greeno to Weer, July 15, p.m. and 17, 1862, Official Records, 
Ser. i, Vol. XIII, pp. 161-162, 473; Wiley Britton, ~ Union Indian .i.!1 
the Civil War (Kansas City, Missouri: Franklin Hudson Publishing Co., 
1922), pp. 69-72. 
37weer to Moonlight, July 12, 1862, Blunt to Salomon, August 3, 
1862, Official Records, Ser. i, Vol. XIII, pp. 487-488, 531-532; "From 
South-west Missouri," Daily Conservative, September 30, 1862, p. 2. 
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After Weer had ordered Major Campbell to Fort Gibson, he feared 
that Campbell might be overpowered by a large force from Fort Davis, 
and he marched with 600 men to Fort Gibson to join Campbell's small 
unit. This marked the high tide of the Indian Expedition•s advance 
into Indian Territory. Weer retraced his ste.ps to hi~ camp at Flat 
Rock Ford on the Grand River, and three days later on July 18, Colonel 
Salomon usurped command of the Indian Expedition. Salomon arrested 
Weer, claiming that Weer had marched his troops 160 miles from their 
base of supply and that adequate communication with other troops had 
not been maintained. Salomon also decried the forced marches "under 
the violent southern sun without any adequate object," and the lack of 
anything to drink but "putrid, stinking water~" Weer's intemperance 
was also noted, but probably the principal reason for Salomon's insub-
ordination was Weer's refusal to heed his officers' pleas to fall back 
closer to Kansas and their source of supplies. Members of the Indian 
Expedition, having only a three-day supply of rations, had been put on 
half rations, and Weer had no knowledge of when the next supply train 
would arrive. Salomon assumed personal command of the expedition and 
put the white troops in motion northward up the Texas Road at 2:00 a.m. 
of July 19. Salomon continued his march until he reached Hudson's 
Crossing of the Grand River on Quapaw land in the northeastern corner 
of the Cherokee Nation.38 
When Salomon withdrew he left the Indian regiments behind to watch 
the movements of the Confederates. Not all the Indian troops were in 
camp when Salomon assumed comm.and. About 200 soldiers of the First 
38 Salomon to Weer, July 20, 1862, Official Records, Ser. i, Vol. 
XIII, pp. 484-485. 
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Indian Regiment under Lieutenant A. C. Ellithorpe were scouting near 
Vann's Ford on the Verdigris River, and a detachment of the Second 
Indian Regiment under Major John A •. Foreman was at Fort G:Lbson. Colonel 
Furnas, realizing the danger of the situation for the Indian forces, 
called a war council for 8:00 p.m. on July 19 and ordered the commanders 
of the three Indian regiments to attend. The regimental commanders de-
cided to unite their forces into the Indian Brigade and placed Colonel 
Furnas at its head. 39 
The Indian Briga~e moved to the Verdigris River twelve·miles tJest 
of Flat Rock Ford and camped. the First Indian Regiment, commanded by 
Lieutenant Colonel Wattles, became uncontrollable due to the lack of 
the constraining influence of white troops. Also accountable for their 
behavior was the Creek soldiers' fear that they were being led into the 
Creek Nation where they could be trapped by Confederate Creek forces. 
The Indian Brigade spent one night in the Creek Nation along the Verdi-
gris River, and simultaneously 180 Osage warriors of the Secon,d Indian 
Regiment dese.rted to go buffalo h1,mting. Furnas next moved his command 
to Pryor Creek, northwest of Locust Grove, where clear water and ade-
quate forage was available. On July 23, 1862, the Indian Brigade was 
ordered by Colonel Salomon to establish a camp between Horse Creek and 
Wolf Creek twenty miles beiow Hudson's Crossing. Furnas requested and 
received a section of Allen's Battery to compliment his demoralized and 
depleted force. Many Creeks deserted to LeRoy, Kansas, at this time. 
39General Orders No. 1, July 19, 1862, Furnas to Blunt, July 25, 
1862, ibid., pp. 481-512; Carruth and Martin to Coffin, August 2 anq 
July 25, 1862, Annual Report .Q! ~ Commissioner of Indian Affairs .ill 
1862, pp. 161-164. . ; 
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From Wolf Creek, Furnas tried in effect to control all of Indian Ter-
ritory north of the Arkansas River.40 
On July 23, Furnas ordered ~ajor Phillips and 400 men of the Third 
Indian Regiment to the Tahlequa~~Park Hill area to protect loyal Chero-
kee citizens from harassment by.Confederate raiders. It was appropriate 
that the Third Indian Regiment was dispatched because it was their 
families who were endangered. After reaching Tahlequah and Park Hill, 
Phillips continued south toward Fort Gibson. At Bayou Menard, Phillips 
ran into a portion of Watie's Confederate ·force under Lieutenant Colonel 
Thomas F. Taylor and routed it. Lieutenant Colonel Taylor was killed 
and nearly 100 other Confederates were killed, wounded, or captured. 
Phillips commented that his troops' "presence just at the moment was 
very fortunate, and probably saved Park Hill. •• ~ The enemy was pouring 
in his forces to overrun and destroy 
41 
the loyal Cherokees ." Not 
only did Phillips deter Taylor's unit, but his presence also alarmed 
Colonel Cooper. He assumed the Federals to be north of Fort Pavis in 
considerable numbers, and he ordered all Confederate forces in Indian 
Territory to fall back south of the Arkansas River in order to regroup 
his forces at Fort Davis. 42 
Phillips also withdrew. He·moved to the vicinity of Flat Rock 
40Furnasto Blunt, July 25, 1862, Official Records, Ser. i, Vol. 
XIII, pp. 511-512; Carruth and Martin to Coffin, ,August 2, 1862, Report 
of the Commissioner .Q.f Indian Affairs !f?!. 1862, pp. 162-164;' Britton, 
The Union Indian Br:i.gade in~ Civil m, pp. 81-83. 
41Phillips to Furnas, July 27, 1862, Official Records, Ser. i, 
Vol. XIII, pp. 181-182. 
4211From the Indian Expedition," Daily Conservative, ~ugust 16, 
1862, p. 1; Britton, ~ Civil ·.~ 9.!!: the Border, Vol. I, pp. 310-312. 
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Ford, from where he carefully watched Confederate troop movements for 
two days. Finally, he was forced to move north to Furnas's camp on 
Wolf Creek because his men had been on half rations for five days. 
Upon reaching Wolf C_reek, Phillips found that the rest of the Indian 
Brigade had bee.n removed to Baxter Springs, Kansas. He left n.is men at 
Wolf Creek with orders to follow him the next morning and continued on 
to Furnas's headquarters. Thus, by late July of 1862 all Federal 
forces had been removed from Indian Territory except small scouting 
parties. 
The withdrawal of white troops in the Indian Expedition to the 
northeast corner of Indian Territory and finally to Kansas spread fear 
among the Union Cherokees. Especially panic-stricken were the·families 
and relatives of Indians who had joined the Northern army. Nearly all 
their men were serving in the Union army, and withdrawal of these forces 
left them defenseless. Fearing vindictive retaliation from Watie's 
Southern Cherokee forces, most of the loyal Cherokees in the southern 
part of the Cherokee Nation fled to Park Hill in late July and August 
of 1862. Their flight contrasted markedly from the early stages of the 
well-planned Opothleyahola exodus. The Union Cherokees gathered up 
whatever possessions and supplies they could carry or load on their 
horses or wagons and hurried separately or in small groups to the 
Tahlequah-Park Hill area, which was a stronghold of Union support. Left 
by the Cherokee refugees were beautiful homes, large numbers of cattle 
and horses, and well-cultivated farms which were at peak production. 43 
43carruth and Martin to Coffin, July 25, 1862, and Carruth and 
Martin to Furnas, July 25, 1862, Annual Report of the Commissioner of 
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The dread of retaliatory action by old Ridge Party factionists in 
Colonel Watie 's regiment was we11 founded. Major Phillips' s timely ar-
rival and routing of Lieutenant Colonel Taylor's force at Bayou Menard 
probably saved Park Hill and Tahlequah from being pillaged. Shaken by 
the attempted raid by Watie' s forces, hundreds of Federal Cherokees 
followed Phillips' s forces to Cowskin Prairie in the northern portion 
of the Cherokee Nation near the Indian Brigade ·camp on Wolf Creek. 
Left behind in the precipitate flight were .Chief Ross, and the Cherokee 
national records and treasury. Colonel Furnas ordere.d Phillips to pick 
up Ross, who was officially on military parole, but the need to rescue 
Ross and the Cherokee archives had been perceived even earlier by 
Brigadier General Blunt. He had already ordered Colonel William F. 
Cloud of the Sixth Kansas Regiment to Park Hill, and oh his way down 
Cloud passed Phillips, who was heading north after the skirmish at 
Bayou Menard. Phillips offered Cloud the service of 250 Indian soldiers 
unde.r Major Foreman, which Cloud gratefully added to his small contin-
gent. 44 
The extra troops were not necessary, for Cloud's trip to Park Hill 
was uneventful; Cooper's forces were all below the Arkansas River. Upon 
reaching their destination, Cloud and his Indian soldiers loaded several 
wagons with official Cherokee documents and money from the Cherokee 
treasury. Chief Ross, who must have ~een despairing for his life before 
in the Civil War, p. 83; Wiley Britton, The Aftermath of the Civil War: 
Bas;;f"°on Inve;;;:-gation of War Claims (Kansas City, Mis-;;uri: Smith~ 
Grieves Co., 1924), pp. 212-213. 
44 
Phillips to Furnas, July 27 and August 6, 1862, Official Records, 
Ser~ i, Vol. XIII, pp. 181-184. 
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Cloud's arrival, and six families of his relatives, numbering thirty-
three persons, also loaded their possessions on buggies. · The small 
refugee train arrived at Baxter Springs, Kansas, on August 7, 1862, and 
Ross continued on to Fort Scott to confer with Brigadier Gene.ral 
Blunt. 45 
Blunt suggested that Ross travel on to Washington to explain di-
rectly to President Lincoln the actions of the Cherokee Nation in 1861, 
and to convince him of the loyalty of the majority of the Cherokees to 
the Unite.a States government. Blunt had written Secretary Stanton 
earlier, explaining the peculiar situation in the Cherokee Nation, and 
he wrote·a similar letter after his conference with Ross to Lincoln. 
In it he endorsed the cause of the loyal Cherokees and spoke highly of 
46 Chief Ross. 
Ross and his relatives traveled East and scattered to various 
places where they resided until the end of the war, and their exile 
was not unpleasant. Commissioner Dolei, who was familiar with the hard-
ships and suffering of the Opothleyahola re.fugees and many of the 
Cherokee. refugees, was unsympathetic when Chief Ross asked him that 
$17,000 be placed at his disposal to maintain the Ross family refugees. 
Ross and the Cherokee documents were in Philadelphia, where Ross re-
sided throughout the rest of the war. The two-story colonial house at 
45salomon to Blunt, August 9, 1862, ibid., pp. 551-552; Britton, 
The. Union Indian Brigade in the Civil ~' p. 74; Britton, The After-
math of the Civil War: Based.£!!. Investigation of War Claims, p. 212; 
Britton, ~ Civil War .£!!. the Border, Vol. I, pp. 306-307. 
46Blunt to Stanton, July 21, 1862, and Blunt to Lincoln, August 
13, 1862, Official Records, Ser. i, Vol. XIII, pp. 486, 565-566. 
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708 South Washington Square belonge.d to Ross I s second wife. Ross was 
often in Washington, however, tending to the official business of the 
Cherokee Nation. Such was the case when he·headed Cherokee delegations 
to 1;1).e capital city in 1863 and 1864, and out of his frequent visits 
with President Lincoln evolved a warm personal f:riendship. 47 
Within a few days after Cloud and his party left Indian Territory, 
Colonel Watie's regiment raided the southern part of the Cherokee Na-
tion. The Southern Cherokee soldie.rs destroyed crops, burned hay and 
buildings, and carried off personal possessions, including clothes, 
of loyal Indian families. Federal Cherokees who had not yet fled 
either hid in the woods or were forced to swear allegiance to the Con-
federacy. Two men were killed at Park Hill by Watie's troops when they 
arrived, and more were killed in the next few days. At Fort Gibson, 
Daniel Ross and Dan Gunte.r 's ge.neral store was wrecked and 100 hogheads 
48 
of sugar were poured on the ground. The triumph of the Ridge. faction 
over their old hated enemies, the Ross followers, was complete when on 
August 21, 1862, Watie was elected principal chief of the Cherokee Na-
tion by a rump national council. There continued through the rest of 
the war two se.parate Cherokee national governments, each claiming legi-
. 49 t1.macy. 
The Union Cherokees who had followed Phillips northward first 
47wardell ,. & .PolitiGal History of the Cherokee Nation, 1838-1907, 
pp. 156-158; Woodward, The Cherokees, p, 280; Thirty-Eighth Congress, 
First Session, House Executive Document Number l, Vol. III, pp •. 143-144. 
48 Woodward, The Cherokees, p. 281. 
49Ibid.; Abel, The -American Indian~ Rarticipant in the Civil War, 
p. 193. 
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camped on Cowskin Prairie, but when.it became apparent that all white 
and Indian troops were being withdrawn to Kansas, they had to·gO·along 
for protection. By a forced night march, they reached Baxter Springs 
on August 9, 1862. When the white·troops under Salomon moved to Fort 
Scott, the Cherokee refugee.a also moved further north. They hal te~ and 
camped on Dry Wood Creek, however, twelve·to .fifteen miles south of 
50 
Fort Scott in the Cherokee. Neutral Land.. Even though they were "t'efu-
gees from their homes, they wanted to remain on land owned by then'!:. 
Camp Dry Wood was located just below the northern boundary of the 
Cherokee Neutral Land (the boundary between present Bourbon and Craw .. 
ford counties in Kansas). In addition to being located on land owned 
by them, Camp Dry Wood offered other advantages. Itf'1 proximity to Fort 
Scott insured protection from major Confederate incursions, and it lay 
near the· Texas Road, a main military artery. Also, Dry Wood Creek pre-
sented adequate camping facilities; there was running water, and the 
bottomland, nearly three-fourths of a mile wide, was well covered with 
cottonwood, elm, hackberry, hickory, post oak, red oak, poplar, and 
walnut trees. 51 
The number of Cherokee .refugees at Dry Wood was estimated to be as 
high as 3,000 and as low as lltlOO, but probably averaged a little under 
2,000. The·exact number of refugees would have been hard to determine, 
because the population .of the camp was not stable. Many ·refugees ar-
rived at Dry Wood in small groups through the fall of 1862, but there 
were also over 200 of the initial group who ·moved to Fort Scott. This 
50carruth and Martin to Coffin, $eptembe,r 28, 1862, Annual Report 
of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for 1862, p. 167. -- ' - . --.--
51 . 
Cutler, History of~ State of Kansas, Vol. I, p. 1118. 
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group of Cherokee refugees remained in Fort Scott through 1865, and 
were partially supported by a Fort Scott relief agency. The reason for 
their residency in Fort Scott, apart from the other members of their 
tribe, is uncertain, :b;ut they: probably had friends or relatives there. 52 
The Office of Indian Affairs was nearly as unprepared to take care 
... 
of the Cherokee refugees as it had been for the Opothleyahola refugees. 
Although the burden of feeding an additional 2,000 refugees must have 
appalled the Office of Indian Affairs, the administrative procedures 
were already set up, and the needs of the Cherokee refugees were at-
tended to more promptly. The Cherokee refugees had been subsisting on 
small amounts of food brought with them and on limited rations pro-
vided by the army, but when the Federal troops continued to Fort Scott 
from Dry Wood, the indigent Indians were without a source of food. 
Coffin and the agents of the Southern Superintendency were busy 
helping move the Opothleyahola refugees to the Sac and Fox Reserve when 
they learned of the arrival of the Cherokee refugees. Consequently,, 
they were unable to tend immediately to the needs of these latest refu-
gees. However, Indian agents Carruth and Martin, who had accompanied 
the Indian Expedition, began immediate preparations to feed and care for 
the starving and homeless Cherokee families at Dry Wood. The forced 
night march of the Cherokees from Cowskin Prairie and lack of adequate 
shelter at Dry Wood had caused many of the refugees to develop common 
colds, influenza (with accompanying chills and fever), and pneumonia. 
Dr. Ritchie of the Second Indian Regiment made his medical supplies 
5211RepQrt of Capt. Insley," "Relief for the Refugees-Report," 
Daily Conservative, April 9, 1863, p. 2; Carruth and Martin to Coffin, 
September 28, 1862, Annual Report of the Commissioner .Q! Indian Affairs 
for~' p. 167. 
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available to the refugees, but he could not attend to the refugees 
personally because he had to remain with the regiment when it traveled. 
Soon Dr. David Palmer was employed to care for the refugees. Although 
the Cherokees were not in nearly as poor physical condition as were the 
Opothleyahola refugees in 1861, one physician was inadequate to properly 
care for nearly 2,000 people. Consequently, many Cherokee refuge.es 
died--some needlessly.53 
Carruth and Martin did not want to be burdened with the responsi-
bility of providing for the Cherokee refugees any longer than necessary, 
so they found convenient excuses to shift the burden of their labors. 
Neither were actual Cherokee agents, but had been assigned only as 
special agents to accompany the Indian Expedition. Martin, having been 
assigned by Dole, left Dry Wood for further instructions, and on Septem-
ber 29 Carruth hurried to Leavenworth, Kansas, to join a second Federal 
expedition then being organized. 54 
Before leaving, Carruth and Martin had arranged for supplies to be 
purchased from Fort Scott for the Cherokee refugees and had "for con-
venience in issuing rations, organized them into companies of one 
hundred each." There were "fifteen of their companies, some of them 
more than full. 1155 To oversee the distribution of supplies, Carruth 
and Martin appointed a special commissary agent, A. M. Jordan, three 
days before their departure. Jordan labored under the twin handicaps 
53Ibid.; Jordan to Dole, December 6, 1862, Letters Received by the 
Office of Indian Affairs, Cherokee Agency, Department of the Interior, 
National Archives. 
54Ibid. 
55 . Martin and Carruth to Coffin, September 28, 1862, Annual Report 
of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for 1862, p. 167. 
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of insufficient help and lack of knowledge of Indian affairs, but he 
was diligent in providing the Indians with supplies. That task alone 
occupied most of his time. He · drove. a thirty mile round trip twice a 
week·to Fort Scott to p'ick up fqod supplies for the Camp Dry Wood refu-
gees. Arrangements had been made by Carruth .and Martin for Jordan to 
pick up food supplies only, and thus many of the refugees were without 
clothing or shelter.56 
Most of the first supplies, especially articles of clothing, to· " 
reach the suffering Cherokee families were provided by Kansas and 
Missouri citizens. Two appeals for the relief of the refugee families 
were issued. Major Benjamin S. Henning, the commandant at Fort Scott, 
appealed to Kansas and Missouri citizens to "secure old clothing, and 
old quilts or blankets, for nearly three thousand Cherokee refugees, 
that are so entirely destitute that many have ho clothing at all, and 
no tents of any kind to cover them." He warned that the "cold, rainy 
weather is coming on," and that refugees having "no hom~es, or stables, 
or anything for them to get into," are "sleeping on the ground, with 
nothing to cover them." Henning reminded the·citizens that these·refu-
gees "are the loyal Cherokees, or rather, their families, as the men 
are fighting f9r us. 1157 Major General Samuel R. Curtis affirmed Major 
Henning's sentiments and emphasized that the refugees "are the wives 
and little ones" of the Union Indian soldiers. ''I recommend them to 
56Jordan to Dole, Decem?er 6, 1862, Letters Received by the Office 
of Indian Affairs, Cherokee Agency, Department of the Interior, National 
Archives. 
57Henning to Beers, September 30, 1862, Lette.rs Received by the 
Office of Indian Affairs, Southern Superintendency, Department of the 
Interior, National Archives. 
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the kind consideration of a geqerous country," he concluded, The benev-
olent response of Kansas and Missouri citizens was very beneficial to 
the Cherokee refugees in the fall of 1862 and throughout the following 
winter. A "Society fo~ the Relief of the Loyal Cherokee Refugees" was 
organized in October of 1862 at Saint Louis, Missouri. The society was 
administered by a fifteen member "Cherokee Relief Committee," whose job 
it was ''to provide clothing, blankets, etc., for the destitute Chero-
kees.1158 
A relief committee for all Civil War refugees at Fort Scott was not 
organized until April of 1863 at Leavenworth, Kansas, and in addition to 
other essentials, it distributed food. Although this organization was 
established too late to help most of the Cherokee refugees, it did sup-
ply relief for those Cherokees who had moved to Fort Scott and who re-
mained in Kansas until the end of the war. 59 
Additional relief for the Camp Dry W0od refugees had come late in 
October of 1862. By then Superintendent Coffin was able to leave the 
task of settling the Opothleyahola refugees on the Sac and Fox Reserve 
to other agents, and he visited the Cherokee refugee camp on October 31. 
Finding them in a "very destitute condition," he furnished them with 
provisions, medicine, clothing, blankets, and shoes. In order to pro-
tect the refugee families from th.e approaching winter weather, Coffin 
procured a large number of damaged te.nts from Major General Curtis at 
58Appeal from Curtis, October 14, 1862, and Report of King, 
October 21, 1862, ibid~ 
59 "Report of Capt. Insley," "Relief for the Refugees," Daily Con-
servative, April 9, 1863, p. 2. 
131 
Saint Louis. 60 
After attending to the immediate needs of the Cherokee refugees, 
Superintendent Coffin·tried to persuade them to move to the Sac and 
Fox Reserve with the re.st of the Federal refugees. He explained that 
because of the need for "rigid economy," this would be best for the 
government and for the refugee.s. Coffin must have be.e.n surprised by 
the sarcastic reply of the embittered Cherokee refugees who felt that 
their needs had been grossly neglected by the Office of Indian Affairs. 
A Cherokee refugee committee composed of L. W. Hilderbrand, James 
Waters, Sikiki, and Joseph Dubal complained that the refugees were 
"exposed to the inclemency of the weather from the want of tents or 
other covering, thereby generating death and disease." The committee-
men agreed that it was expensive to feed and clothe the refugees at 
Camp Dry Wood, but asked if economy and expediency was "to be counted 
with the lives of the Cherokee women and children." The committeemen 
also informed Coffin that the Cherokee refugees would not move away 
from their own land. 61 
Unable to convince the Cherokee refugees of the necessity of moving 
to the Sac and Fox Reserve, Coffin advertised in Kansas newspapers for 
a contract to supply the needs of the Camp Dry Wood Indians through the 
coming winte~. To assist in distributing these anticipated supplies, 
60coffin to Dole, November 10, 1862, Annual Report of the Commis~ 
sioner of Indian Affairs for 1862, pp. 169-170; Coffin to Dole, Septem---- - . ·---ber 24, 1863, Thirty-Eighth Congress, First Session, House Executive 
Document Number l, Vol. III, p. 293. 
61coffin to the Cherokee Refugee Indians, October 31, 1862, 
Hilderbrand, Water, Sikiki, and Dubal to Coffin, October 31, 1862, 
Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for 1862, pp. 170-
171. 
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Coffin retained A. M. Jordan as special agent. Stettaner and Brot~er 
was the general contractor whose bid was accepted to supply the Cherokee 
refugees, and this firm had already started gathering goods from vprious 
sub-contractors and had already made arrangements for transportation 
when the Dry Wood Creek refugees were unexplainedly moved by the army 
N h M. . 62 to eos o, 1ssour1. 
... 
The moving of these Cherokees to Neosho was with their consent. 
They were disgruntled and disillusioned with the guardianship of the 
Office of Indian Affairs. Besides not being properly provided with the 
basic human needs of food, clothing, and shelter, they were not even 
given adequate military protection. In the first of October, 1862, a 
band of William c. Quantrill's guerrillas raided Camp Dry Wood and 
carried off a week's supply of provisions, leaving the Cherokee women 
and children without anything to eat. They endured all these things, 
but most insulting to their proud spirits was Coffin's attempt to move 
63 
them off their own land for reasons of economy. 
The Cherokee Nation was tantalizingly close to the dispossessed 
refugee families who wanted so much to return. Feeling that anything 
was better than their helpless condition at Camp Dry Wood, some refugees 
slipped back into the Cherokee Nation and hid from Confederate raiders. 
However, most felt that their best prospect for food, protection, and 
an early return to the Cherokee Nation lay in moving closer to the camps 
62coffin to Dole, Septe~ber 24, 1863, and Coffin to Herining, Decem-
ber 28, 1863, Thirty-Eighth Congress, First Session, House Executive 
Document Number.!., Vol. 111, pp. 293, 310-311. 
63coffin to Dole, November 14, 1862, Letters Received by the Office 
of Indian Affairs, Southern Superintendency, Department of the Interior, 
National Archives. 
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of the Union Indian regiments in southwest Missouri and northwest 
64 
Arkansas. The Cherokee refugees questioned Union army officers con-
stantly, asking when Indian Territory would again be safe to enter, and 
if the Indian Home Guard regiments could be used to help them reenter 
the Cherokee Nation. Not content with just letters 9 some refugee fami-
lies in the Cherokee Neutral Land area moved to Missouri and A~kansas 
and began f9-llowing the Indian regiments from camp to camp. They were 
joined by an even larger number of Cherokee refugees who fled into 
Arkansas after Watie's raids across the Arkansas River in August and 
65 
September of 1862. 
These refugee families, in attempting to follow their Indian 
soldiers, were severely hampering the movements of the Union troops 
under Brigadier General Blunt's command. Humanity demanded that they 
not only be protected but that they also be fed. The draw on Blunt's 
commissary soon became unbearable. Knowing that many more of the refu-
gee families would eventually join his encampments 9 Blunt decided to 
move the camp followers as well as the Dry Wood refugees to a central 
location. Thus, he could feed and protect them without their encumber-
ing his troop movements. The exact date of the removal of the Camp Dry 
64A second Federal invasion into Indian Territory, southwest M;i.s-
souri9 and northwest Arkansas occurred in the late fall of 1862. Feder-
al victories at the Battle of Fort Wayne, October 22 9 1862, in the 
Cherokee Nation and at the Battle of Prairie Grove, December 7, 18629 
in northwest Arkansas gave the Union control of the territory north of 
the Arkansas River in Indian Territory and Arkansas. However, Federal 
control of this area was not firm, and in order to prevent cavalry 
raids, Union troops were stationed in northern Arkansas and southern 
Missouri during the winter of 1862-1863. The southern most Federal out= 
post was Colonel Phillips and his camp of Indian soldiers near Maysville, 
Arkansas, on the Arkansas-Cherokee border. 
6511The Indian Refugees," Dail;y; Conservative, December 18p 1862, p. 
2; Britton, The Union .!.!l<i!!!!:. Brigade .!E, the Civil War, pp. 169~171, 205. 
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Wood refugees is uncertain, but on December 2, 1862, Blunt ordered Major 
Foreman of the Third Indian Regiment to establish a post at Neosho, 
Missouri. Foreman was informed that he would "take charge of all Refu-
gee Indians, that may be ~ent to· that place [Neosho] from fort Scott, 
placing them in houses and make them as comfortable, as the means .~f 
your command will admit." Foreman was also instructed to "seize Grain, 
Beef, and Pork from the enemy," but was told that "when subsistence for 
the Refugees cannot be _procured from the enemy, 11 it would be iv issued 
66 
from the Commissary." 
The Cherokee refugees from Camp Dry Wood were transported to Neosho, 
Missouri, soon after the Battle of Prairie Grove, Arkansas, on December 
7, 1862. Phillips reported that Major Foreman 11moved down a number of 
Cherokee families from the Drywood," and Coffin later claimed that "it 
~as Major Foreman, who got up, managed, and engineered ••• the removal of 
the Cherokee Refugee Indians from Camp Dry Wood ••• to Neosho, Missouri, 
in December [of 1862]. 1167 Hence it was Foreman, probably acting under 
Blunt's orders, who removed the refugees. Foreman, with four and later 
five battalions of the Third Indian Regiment, protected the refugees at 
68 
Neosho throughout the winter of 1862-1863. 
66Blunt to Foreman, December'2, 1862, Letters Received by the Of-
fice of Indian Affairs, Southern Superintendency, Department of the In-
terior, National Archives. 
6\bid.; Wiley Britton, ''Some Reminiscences of the Cherokee People 
Returning to theil;' Homes: the Exiles of a Nation," Chronicles .2f 2!!!-
~, Vol. v, No. 2 (June, 1927), p. 174; Britton, .!.h!. Aftermath .Qi the 
Civil!!!!.~ Based .2.!! Investigation .Qi~ Claims, p. 213. 
68 ,. 
Coffin to Dole, April 9, 1863, Letters Received by the qffice of 
Indian Affairs, Southern Superintendency, Department of the Interior, 
National Archives; Phillips to Curtis, January 19, 1863, Official 
Records, Ser. i, Vol. XXlI, Pt. 2, PP• 60-61. 
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Superintendent Coffin was highly incensed over the removal of the 
Cherokee refugees by the army because he was not consulted, and he felt 
that it was an infringement on the prerogatives of the Office of Indian 
Affairs by military officials. As soon as he found out about the re-
moval, he ordered Cherokee Agent Justin A. Harlan, who had been caring 
for the 300 Cherokees at the Sac and Fox Reserve, to proceed to Neosho 
on the next military wagon train out of Fort Scott. Harlan was in-
structed to take charge of the refugees and to "distribute all goods 
and supplies to the Indians yourself ••• and to tolerate no interference 
69 
with your duties from any quarter." 
To assist Harlan, who was suffering from rheumatism, Coffin ap-
pointed A. J. Proctor as a special Indian agent on December 24. His ap-
pointment was necessary because special agent Jordan refused to travel 
to guerrilla-infested Missouri with his charges. Harlan and Proctor 
left for Neosho on January 1, 1863, and arrived a week later. Harlan 
had little trouble obtaining supplies from government contractors, be~ 
cause these supplies were carried on military wagon trains from Fort 
Scott. This was because of a direct request sent to Major Henning at· 
Fort Scott by Coffin. Henning was asked to furnish transportation and 
military escorts for supply trains sent out to the Neosho refugees. 
Coffin also requested that "all additional expense of transportation, 
escortl> military protection fund ••• rendered unavoidable by said re-
moval [of the Cherokee refugees to Neosho], be charged to the War, and 
69coffin to [HarlanJ, December 29, 1862, Coffin to Dole, January Si> 
1863i> Thirty-Eighth Congress, First Session, House Executive Document 
Number 1., Vol. !Ill> pp. 309-311. 
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h I . D . II 70 not tote nter1or epartment. 
Neosho was much more acceptable to the civilized Cherokees, who be .. 
fore the w•r had had business relations with its citizens. Some promi-
nent Cherokees had even sent their daughters there for an education. 
When the refugees arrived in December of 1862 they found many houses 
that had been vacated by occupants who had fled either north or south 
to escape the internec~ne border warfare in that area. There were four 
or five excellent springs of pure water in Neosho and an abundance of 
hardwood timber for fuel. The availability of nearby mills enabled the 
refugees to grind corn and wheat into flour and meal, which was the 
chief diet of the refugee families through the winter. For the Chero-
kee refugees, the move to Neosho was very ·fortunate •. Th'.ey.'.t'7ere·. ·closer 
to their homes, and they certainly suffered much less than if they had 
71 spent the winter in damaged' tents on Dry-Wood Creek. 
The living conditions were much healthier at Neosho, and the death 
rate, especially from pneumonia, dropped considerably. However many 
Indians and residents of Neosho died that winter of smallpox and typhoid 
fever. Smallpox spread quickly among the Indian soldiers and refugee 
families becau$e most had not been inoculated. It even spread among the 
Cherokee soldiers at Phillips' s camp near Maysville, Arkansas, and he 
estabUshed a smallpox hospital about one half mile outside his camp. 
70coffin to Henning, December 28, 1863, Coffin to Dole, January 5, 
1863, Hatlan·,to ·Coffin, Septeml:ier · 2, '1863, tbi_d_._;_ PP.•: .2.9.7.;_ :3:0_9_ .. _3:l_lJ. t. 
Coffin t9 Proctor:, ,December--24; .. 1862, Letters Received by the' Office of 
iniian Affairs, Cherokee Agency, Department of the Interior, National 
Archives. 
71 . Britton, 
ta their Homes; 
v, pp. 174-175; 
172. 
"Some Reminiscences of the Chei::okee People Returning 
The 'E_xiles of a ·Nation, 11 Chronic lei; of Oklahoma, Vol.· 
Britton., :!'.!!! Union ;J:ndian Brigade in the Civil :war~ P• 
Except for these epidemics, the Cherokee refugee families at Neosho 
survived the winter of 1861-1862 in good condition. 72 
In addition to the large number of Cherokee refugees being sub-
137 
sisted at Neosho and the smaller number at Maysville, there were also a 
large number of loyal Cherokee families who were living as refugees 
within the Cherokee Nation. They had been forced to leave their homes 
because of the scarcity of food and the fear of Confederate guerrilla 
raids, and had moved to the vicinity of Park Hill and Tahlequah along 
the Illinois River, and to the Fort Gibson area. Colonel Phillips was 
directed by Brigadier General John M. Schofield "to give protection as 
far as possible to the loyal Indians" and 11 to assist the loyal familiel J 
in furnishing subsistence to each other, by transporting it from places 
where it can be found to those that are destitute, and supplying food 
to those who must otherwise suffer from want~" Phillips interpreted 
this as meaning "to subsist, as far as possible, destitute Indians in 
the [Cherokee] Nation. 1173 
Colonel Phillips and his troops diligently carried out their 
humanitarian mission during the winter of 1862-1863. By March 3, 1863, 
Phillips had dispatched ten wagon trains to Indian Territory at various 
times to feed the refugees in the Cherokee Nation. These supply trains 
were usually escorted by about 400 men. Expediency forced him to de-
velop a laborious three-stage system for feeding the refugee families. 
72Britton, The Aftermath of the Civil !'.!!£: Based £!!,.. Investigation 
of War Claims, p-:--i"l3; Wiley Britton, Memoirs of the Rebellion on the 
Border, l§.§1 (Chicago: Cushing, Thomas, and c;:-,1882), pp. 13T:'132, 
176-177. 
73scofield to Phillips, January 11, 1863, Phillips to Curtis, 
January 19, 1863, Official Records, Ser. i, Vol. XXII, Pt. 2, pp. 32, 
60-61. 
138 
First grain was secured from the fertile grain-producing counties in 
southeast Missouri. Then it was hauled into Arkansas where small mills 
were available to grind some of it into meal. However, much of the 
grinding was done at Hildebrand's Mill in the central part of the Chero-
kee Nation. The flour, oatmeal, and corn meal was then qistributed at 
Park Hil~, Tahlequah, Hildebrand's Mill, and Fort Gibson, where the 
refugees obtained it. They sometimes went for days without flour or 
any kind of meal. A close account of the flour and meal was kept, and 
Judge Riley Keys and a Judge Thompson, justices of the Cherokee Nation, 
and Reverent Evan Jones supervised the actual distribution of the food 
supplies to the refugees. Eight or ten pounds of flour and meal were 
74 
distributed to each family depending on the amount available. 
Colonel Phillips's humanitarian support of the helpless refugee 
families in Indian Territory during the winter of 1862-1863 was a very 
important factor in retaining the trust and support of a majority of the 
Cherokee people by the United States. Also influential in uniting many 
of the Cherokee people for the Union cause was Phillips's sanction and 
close support of a Cherokee National Council meeting in the Cherokee 
Nation in February of 1863. The purpose of this meeting was to counter-
act the council held by the Southern Cherokees in August of 1862, at 
which Watie was elected principal chief. 
In late January of 1863, Lieutenant Colonel Lewis Downing was sent 
into the Cherokee Nation by Colonel Phillips to clear out any Confeder-
ate forces which might try to disrupt the proposed council meeting. The 
74Phillips to Curtis, January 29, February 4, 6, 11, 15, March 3, 
1863, Phillips to Blunt, March 3, 1863, ibid., pp. 85, 96-97, 101, 108-
112, 139-142. 
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decision was fortunate, for Downing arrived just in time to force some 
of Colonel Watie's men to retire south across the Arkansas River, which 
they had just forded in hopes of intimidating the Northern Cherokees. 
Greatly desiring that the council be held, Phillips moved most of his 
forces at Camp Curtis, near Maysville, Arkansas, to Cowskin Prairie in 
the Cherokee Nation. The presence of Phillips's troops was important 
for another reason; within his second and third regiments were a quorum 
of members of the same council that had voted for the Confederate-
Cherokee alliance in 1861. 75 
A new election of council members was considered inexpedient and 
unnecessary, and the Cherokee National Council convened on February 4, 
1863, at Cowskin Prairie. Many bills were passed during the month that 
ensued. The council, with Lewis Downing as its presiding officer, and 
Thomas Pegg as acting principal chief, abrogated the treaty with the 
Confederate States and deposed all civil and military officials of the 
nation disloyal to the United States or the Cherokee Nation. Also pleas-
ing to Unionists was an act abolishing slavery in the Cherokee Nation. 
Before adjourning, the council appointed a delegation of staunch Union-
ists to represent the Cherokee Nation in Washington. Members were 
Principal Chief John Ross, Lewis Downing, Reverend Evan Jones, and James 
McDaniel (who had staunchly supported Opothleyahola in 1861). Phillips 
needed to fall back to Arkansas on February 17 to support other Union 
troops, but he left 100 men to protect the Cherokee National Council 
until its adjournment. Following the meeting on Cowskin Prairie, there 
75Phillips to Curtis, January 29, February 4, 1863, ibid., PP• 85, 
96-97; Abel, ~ American Indian ~ Participimt in the Ci'vil War. 
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Ch k h 1 . . l . . 76 were two separate ero ee governments, eac c aiming egitimacy. 
The exile of the Cherokee refugees completed the exodus of Federal 
refugees from Indian Territory. Over 10,000 Indians loyal to the United 
States government had fled from their homes in Indian Territory by the 
fall of 1862. The Cherokee exodus in 1862 again clearly indicated the 
factional cleavage that had existed within the Five Civilized Tribes 
since their removal from the eastern United ~t_ates, The Ross Party 
Cherokees were once more forced to suffer because of the results of a 
treaty that had been forced upon them. The readiness of a major por-
tion of the Cherokees to embrace the invading Federal army in 1862 
clearly indicated their suppressed loyalty to the United States govern-
ment. Chief Ross had known in 1861 that a declaration of loyalty to the 
Federal government by the Cherokee National Council would have caused a 
rupture in the Cherokee Nation and the dislocation and death of many 
Cherokees. The events of 1862 proved his earlier fears and vindicated 
his decision to align with the Confederacy in 1861. 
Federal refugees from the Cherokee Nation were located in Kansas, 
Missouri, Arkansas, and Indian Territory. In the winter of 1862-1863, 
these exiles resided in groups in the Cherokee Neutral Land in Kansas, 
at Fort Scott, Kansas, at Neosho, Missouri, and at Colonel Phillips's 
camp near Maysville, Arkansas. A small group of Cherokees located in 
Kansas on the Sac and Fox Reserve who had earlier fled north with 
76Phillips to Curtis, February 15 and 17, 1863, Official Records, 
Ser. i, Vol. XXII, Pt. 2, pp. 111-112, 114-115; Dole to Smith, October 
31, 1863, Thirty-Eighth Congress, First Session, House Executive Docu~ 
~Number.!., Vol. III, pp. 143-144; Wardell,~ Political History El, 
the Cherokee Nation, 1838-1907, p. 172; Abel,~ American Indian as 
Participant in~ Civil War, p. 256. 
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Opothleyahola ana his followers. Also, many Cherokees had fled their 
homes but were living as refugees near .supply centers established in 
the Cherokee Nation by Phillips at Hildebrand's Mill, Tahlequah, Park 
Hill, and Fort Gibson. A unique, but not undesirable exile, was spent 
by members of the Ross family in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and other 
Eastern cities. Most Cherokee refugees suffered physically and mentally 
during their exile, and many even died, but they escaped the physical 
horrors of severe winter exposure suffered by the Opothleyahola refugees 
in the winter of 1861-1862. In addition, the Federal Cherokee refugees 
would return to their homes sooner. 
CHAPTER V 
FEDERAL REFUGEES IN EXILE 
By early 186~, approximately 10,500 Federal Indian refugees had fled 
from Indian Territory and were existing amid squalor and misery in far-
flung refugee camps in Arkansas, the Cherokee Neutral Land, Missouri~ 
Kansas, Colorado, and even Mexico. Many others, who had not escaped 
from Indian Territory, were living a precarious existence as exiles 
from their homes. They hid from Confederate raiders in nearly inacces-
sible terrain and on abandoned farms in out-of-the-way places. The 
number of Indians remaining loyal to the Federal government, who had 
been deposed from their homes and who were residing inside or outside 
Indian Territory, probably numbered over 15,000 by early 1863. 
The Opothleyahola refugees by early 1863 resided primarily at two 
locations, the Sac and Fox Agency near Quenemo, Kansas, and near Neosho 
Falls, Kansas, along the Neosho River. Refugees at the Sac and Fox 
Agency included approximately 3,600 loyal Creeks, 225 Chickasaws~ and a 
smaller group comprised of 900 Euchees, Kickapoos, and Cherokees. 
Choctaw and Chickasaw Agent Coleman was caring for all the refugees at 
the Sac and Fox Agency except the Creeks, who were under the charge of 
Creek Agent Cutler. At or near the Sac and Fox Agency were close to 
5,000 refugees. To the south at Neosho Falls, Kansas, were nearly 800 
refugee Seminoles under Seminole Agent Snow. 
Another group of refugees in Kansas in 1863 were the Quapaws~ 
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Senecas, and mixed Senecas and Shawnees, who were part of the Neosho 
Agency, which also included the Osages. The Osages had preferred to 
stay on their reserve in southern Kansas, but the other Neosho Agency 
tribes had accepted land in the northern part of the Cherokee Nation 
and were residing there at the outbreak of the Civil War. After their 
exodus, described earlier in this study, they had settled on the Ottawa 
Reserve along the Marais des Cygnes River near Ohio City, Kansas, with 
the consent of the Ottawa tribe. There were about 600 refugees at this 
location, which included about 159 Seneca-Shawnee Indians and 151 
Senecas, the remainder being Quapaws. 
Neosho relations with the Ottawas were less than agreeableo Neosho 
Agent Elder explained to Superintendent Coffin that "relations with the 
Ottawas would render their removal from the land necessary early in the 
spring." However, the Senecas, Quapaws, and mixed Senecas and Shawnees 
lived on the reserve throughout the remainder of the Civil War. In 
1864, the Ottawas were allotted land in severalty, and the remainder of 
the reserve was held in connnon by the tribe. This incurred a move on 
the part of the refugees from the land that had been individually as-
signed to the Ottawas to that part of their land held in connnon. 1 
The physicalconditi6n and general welfare of the Opothleyahola 
refugees had improved greatly in 1863, and this amelioration was at-
tested to by the refugee agents in their annual reports in the fall of 
1863, and by physicians who had been assigned to care for them. Creek 
1Elder to Coffin, September 12, 1863, Annual Report of the Connnis-
sioner of Indian Affairs for 1862, pp. 143-145; Elder tp Coffin, Sep-
tember 20, 1863, Annual R:epo°rt of ~ Commissioner £! Indian Affairs 
for 1863, pp. 305-306; A.,1 V9 1 Coffin to W0 1 G0 1 Coffin, September 25, 
1863, ibid., pp. 307-309; Coffin to Dole, September 24, 1864, Elder to 
Coffin, September 15, 1864, Annual Report of~ Connnissioner of Indian 
Affairs for~, pp. 303-307, 315-317. 
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Agent Cutler stated that fatalities among the Creeks during 1863 were 
"not one half what it was during the same period last year," and he 
added that the Creeks had "almost ••• recovered from the terrible suffer-
ing theyendured in the fearful exodus from their country." Choctaw and 
Chickasaw Agent Coleman indicated in 1863 that the condition of his de-
pendents had stabilized and that "mortality amongst them has been small 
owing to the skill and diligent attention they have receivedo" 2 
Seminole Agent Snow was enthused over the condition of his refugees 
at Neosho Falls, Kansas, and reported that the vigeneral health of the 
Indians has been remarkably good and the mortality among them quite 
smallo •• the consequence of which is that they feel well contented." It 
is obvious that the health conditions among the refugee Indians at the 
Sac and Fox Agency and at Neosho Falls had improved considerably in 
3 
1863 and that deaths during that same time had declined sharply. 
Perhaps contributing most to the improved physical condition of 
the Opothleyahola refugees in 1863 was efficient medical attention. 
Superintendent Coffin's most urgent task upon the arrival of the physi= 
caUy exhausted Opothleyahol~refugees early in 1862 has been to provide 
for their medical needs. 
I 
He applied for immediate relief, but due to 
lack of preparation and the immediacy of the need, his early efforts 
to get medical attention for the refugees were sporadic. 
This was not the case by the winter of 1862-1863 or throu.ghout the 
following year. Medical services received by the refugees were adequate 
2cutler to Coffin, September 5, 1863, Annual Report of the Commis-
sioner of Indian Affairs for 1863, pp. 299-301; Coleman to Coffin, Sep-
tember z;· 1863, ibid., pp~Ol-3020 
3 . Snow to Coffin, September 4, 1863, ibid., pp. 303=304. 
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if not excellent. Nearly all of the agents in the Southern Superinten-
dency attested to the improved physical condition of their charges, and 
to their good medical attention. Refugee letters to officials in the 
Office of Indian Affairs were often critical, but never once did they 
contain derogatory·connnents about the medical attention they had re-
ceived during 1863. 
Dr. A. 1 V .·, Coffin was appointed directing physician for the refugee 
Indians and was ordered by Southern Superintendent Coffin to "minutely 
inquire int,o the social and sanitary conditions of these refugees," and 
plan what steps would be "required to better the present and future 
status of these hapless exiles." In his efforts, Dr. Coffin was only 
partially effective due to the Indians' mistrust and fear. Dr. Coffin 
viewed this mistrust philosophical:].y, because he felt that the refugees 
were "in a land not of their own, surrounded by soulless, God-forsaken 
sharpers, who eagerly embraced every opportunity to swindle and defraud 
them." Because of this, Dr. Coffin felt that the Indians suspiciously 
viewed "every effort to introduce among them social or sanitary regula-
4 
tions, though eventuating in their good." 
Dro Coffin found that the most prevalent illnesses among the refu-
gees were "gastric or gastro-enteric in their character.n He diagnosed 
the cause of these illnesses as "irregularity in the amount of nutrient 
contained in any given measure or weight of food." His explanation of 
how the refugees contracted gastritis is descriptive of the quality and 
quantity of food provided Indian refugees in 1863. The first cause of 
4A0 1 V/ Coffin to w .. Go Coffin, September 25, 1863, Ketcham to 
Coffin, September 15, 1863, ibid., pp. 302-303, 307-309. 
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gastric illness as described by Dr. Coffin was "flour made from damaged 
grain ••• it contains but little nutrient. The Indian is accustomed to 
animal food. Now, to satisfy the demands of his system he must consume 
a large quantity." This, Dr. Coffin claimed, caused "great irritation, 
if not severe inflammation" in the digestive tract. 
The second method by which the Indians contracted gastric illness 
was due to the inferior beef issued them. Dr. Coffin maintained that 
••• the proportion of bone is so great that seven-days rations 
are consumed in four,·if not, in three, days, and the remainder 
of the seven days must be pass.ed without animal food. Exces-
sive hunger is the result and, when the sufferer receives his 
next supply, he gorges to satisfy hunger and a severe, if not 
fatal, attack of gastritis or gastro-enteritis is sure to 
follow. 5 
It is significant that the physician in charge of the health of the 
refugee Indians in Kansas denounced the quality of food being provided 
and pointed to it as the greatest cause of illness among them. It is 
not clear whether the Indian officials were paying suppliers full price 
for damaged grain and poor beef or if that was all that was available. 
Nevertheless, the fact that the refugees were issued food on a regular 
basis indicates that conditions had improved over the previous year, 
when they had been starving. 
The most fatal disease among the refugees in. 186J, according to Dr. 
Coffin, was pnuemonia; it was the illness most often treated next to 
gastritis. Dr. Coffin claimed that there was no disease contracted by 
the Indians that was unique to their race, but that it took nearly twice 
as much medicine to cure the same illness in the red man as in the white 
man. In attempting to explain why Indians fell victim to minor illnesses 
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that were not normally fatal to white men, and why Indians needed twice 
as much medication to heal their illnesses, Dr. Coffin said the cause 
was obvious: 
Deprived of comfortable houses, of their accustomed food, 
forced to eat the same diet for months without change, com-
pelled to take the earth for a bed, with but a miserable 
excuse for a roof above them, their social relations really 
broken up-·in short, subject to a combination of physical 
and mental causes sufficient to crush an iron constitution, 
it is no cause for surprise ••• if we find them falling victim 
to maladies that otherwise would not be regarded. 
Dr. Coffin cited the number of refugee deaths through September, 1863, 
as being "over two hundred, while the births do not amount to eighty. 116 
When Dr. Coffin took over his duties as directing physician for the 
refugees, he found only two official resident physicians commissioned, 
by Superintendent Coffin for the needs of these Indians. Dr. Ho Co 
Ketcham was located at the Sac and Fox Agency, and Dr. A. Bernard was 
taking care of the refugees around Belmont, Kansas. In addition, Dro 
A. M. McCartney attended refugees at Neosho Falls, and at Ohio City on 
the Ottawa Reserve their needs were cared for by Dr. D. D. Swallow. 
Neither had official commissions. Dr. Coffin relieved Dr. Bernard of 
his responsibilities in January of 1863, as the needs of the refugees 
at Belmont did not warrant a full-time physician. He personally ren-
dered medical service as was needed at Belmont until April 1, 1863, 
when an outbreak of disease again required a physician on a full-time 
basis. He appointed Dr. J.B. Lockwood. Around the middle of May, he 
officially commissioned Dr. Swallow, who continued at Ohio City, and on 
July 1, 1863, he also commissioned Dr. McCartney, who had been serving 
at Neosho Falls. The appointment on a full-time basis of qualified 
··.14a 
physicians and their supervision by Dr. Coffin, combined with quantities 
of high quality medical supplies, was perhaps the most effective assis-
tance rendered the refugees throughout their exile in Kansas. 7 
Also contributing to their improved condition, was the fact that 
some of the refugees had been able to raise small patches of corn and 
vegetables during the spring season, resulting in an improved diet. 
However, Creek Agent Cutler explained that early in the spring it had 
been difficult to get many of them to plant a crop because they believed 
they would "return to their country before they could realize any bene-
fit from their labors. 118 
Beneficial likewise to the Opothleyahola refugees at the Sac and 
Fox Agency and at Neosho Falls were the money and supplies that their 
soldier relatives or friends sent or brought back. Creek Agent Cutler 
told Coffin that 11A large portion of the soldiers pay has been sent out 
to the [refugee] families and has done much to alleviate their suffer~ 
ings. 11 Cutler explained that the refugee families had been 11almost 
naked 9 11 and contended that 11 all of them would have been had if it had 
not been for the very timely material aide they received from their 
9 
relatives and friends in the army. 11 
The morale of many refugee families was further boosted by occas~ 
sional visits of the soldiers themselves. Much to the chagrin and dis-
pleasure of the Indian Home Guard white officers, their men would often 
7A. V. Coffin to W. G. Coffin, September 25, 1863, Ketcham to 
Coffin, September 15, 1863, ibid. 9 pp. 302-303 9 307-309. 
8 
Cutler to Coffin, September 5, 1863, ibid., pp. 299-301. 
9Ibid. 
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slip out of camp without official leave to visit their families in 
10 
Kansas. This was especially true of the SeminoLe Indians whose fami-
lies were located closer to them at Neosho Falls than were the Cherokee, 
Choctaw, and Chickasaw refugee families at the Sac and Fox Agency. 
Acting Principal Chief of the Seminoles Pascofa told Indian Commissioner 
Dole that he had "encouraged our men to stay in the army. But, whenever 
they would come to see their families when I thought they had stayed 
long enough, I would hurry them back to their company." These soldiers 
were not only morale boosters, but it is certain that they brought much 
needed goods and money to their families and friends. 11 
Desp':tte the fact that Agent Cutler was optimistic about the im= 
7 
proved condition of the Creek refugees in 1863, he conceded that their 
plight was still "far from pleasant," and decried that "the clothing 
that was distributed to them nearly ten months ago ••• was nearly worn 
out," and that "many of them are now almost entirely naked." By Novem-
ber 1, 1863, he deemed the Creeks' situation serious enough to pen an 
urgent appeal to Superintendent Coffin, complaining that "the naked and 
destitute Creeks" at the Sac and Fox Agency had reached a point where 
"it would absolutely be criminal" if they were not rendered immediate 
assistance. He further explained that the "weather is extremely cold 
and the ground is covered with snow. Many, very many, of our people 
10nole to Usher, March 7, 1864, Annual Report .21 ~ Commissioner 
of Indian Affairs for 1864, pp. 325-326; Cherokee Chiefs and Headmen to 
Phillips, January S:-1864, Cherokee Civil War Folder, Grant Foreman 
Collection, Oklahoma Historical Society. 
11 Pascofa to Dole, July 29, 1863, Letters Received by the Office 
of Indian Affairs, Seminole Agency, Department of the Interior, National 
Archives. 
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are entirely naked; some grown women are literally without a garment to 
cover their nakedness •••• The majority are in old and worn out tents, 
12 
condemned tents." 
Choctaw and Chickasaw Agent Coleman also wrote Superintendent 
Coffin and pointed out that although many of his refugees' shoes were 
worn out and that a "large majority of them are ba,refooted, 11 he only 
wanted clothing "for those who were actually suffering." He asked 
Coffin for permission to purchase on credit "a sufficient quantity of 
goods to give temporary relief" to the refugees. Coleman contended that 
it was inhuman to wait 11 for the goods that are to be purchased [through 
a special Congressional appropriation], as there is no probability that 
they will reach here short of two months." Coleman concluded that their 
13 Hnecessity is too urgent to admit delay." 
Dr. Coffin, when describing the Kansas refugees' condition in the 
winter of 1863-1864, stated that the 
••• intense cold weather that visited us during ••• the fourth 
quarter of 1863, and the first ten days of January, 1864, 
found the Indians with an insufficient supply of clothing, 
blankets, shelter. The old stock of clothing, and etc., 
being entirely worn out, and the new not arriving for dis= 
tribution before the twelfth of January, 1864 9 intense 
physical suffering was endured by all, and fatal lesions 
resulted to many. Many died immediately, while others 
dragged out a miserable existence for a few weeks or months 
and expired.14 
12cutler to Coffin, September 5, 1863, Annual Report of the Com-
missioner of Indian Affairs for 1863, pp. 299-301; Cutler to Coffin, 
November 1, 1863, Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs, 
Southern Superintendency, Department of the Interior, National Archives. 
13 
Coleman to Dole, October 30, 1863, ibid. 
14A. v. Coffin tow. G. Coffin9 August 25, 1864, Annual Report of 
the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for 1864, pp. 307-309. 
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This was the very condition that the refugee agents had warned of and 
of which the refugees themselves had complained so bitterly. 
The clothing and shelter problems facing the refugees had been 
anticipated by Superintendent Coffin as early as August, 1863, when he 
requested and received estimates from his agents of necessary articles 
and supplies for the fourth quarter of 1863. He itemized these re~ 
quests and estimated their cost. He sent this information to Commis-
sioner of Indian Affairs Dole, requesting that nunless the families of 
these unfortunate refugees are supplied with the necessary clothing, of 
which they are entirely destitute, they will have to suffer the most 
untold hardships imaginable, especially if the approaching winter proves 
15 
.to be severe." 
Superintendent Coffin also urged that a special appropriation be 
made at the next session of Congress to meet these expenditures. The 
necessity for a special appropriation was because the refugees 1 tribal 
funds from which their supplies were being paid had already been ex-
hausted for 18630 Coffin 1 s celerity and determination in securing 
shelter for the refugees matched his zeal in impressing on the Office 
of Indian Affairs the need for large expenditures in relief of the 
refugee Indians in Kansas. Coffin took matters in his own hands when 
he left his headquarters at Leavenworth, Kansas 9 on September 6, 1863!1 
enroute to Saint Louisll Missouri, to secure damaged tents from General 
John MQ Schofield for the use of the destitute families of refugee 
Indians in Kansas. Coffin, by exerting 11 tremendous efforts, obtained 
15coffin to Mix, September 12~ 1863, Letters Received by the Of~ 
fice of Indian Affairs, Southern Superintendency, Department of the 
Interior, National Archives. 
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800 pretty fair tents." 16 
The refugee Indians, distressed as they were by the lack of ade-
quate clothing and shelter, were,,impressed by the efforts being made by 
their agents, whom they believed were doing all they could to alleviate 
their problems. The Creek refugees, while assembled in general council, 
composed a letter to "Our Father 1 " who was probably either President 
Lincoln or Commissioner of Indian Affairs Dole. In a resounding vote 
of confidence they stated that they were "well fed and well clothed 9 
17 
and that our agent and superintendent both do all r;hey can for us.rv 
In fact 9 the letters written to Superintendent Coffin by his agents 
complaining of refugee conditions in the fall of 1863 were not critical 
of Coffin personally but of the ineptness and slowness of Congress' 
appropriation of money for supplying the needs of the refugees. 
The hardships, suffering, and unnecessary deaths of the Indian 
refugees in the winter of 1863-1864 can be directly attributed to cum= 
bersome federal bureaucracy. The supplies, which did not arrive in 
Kansas until January 12 9 1864, had been itemized and requisitioned as 
early as September, 1863. 
Cherokee Agent Harlan criticized the government's inefficient sys= 
tern of supplying the Indians: 
The practice of letting the contracts for all Indi~n supplies 
for only three months, I think is all wrong:·• The letting 
takes place about the beginning of the quarte~. By the time 
the contract goes to Washington 9 and is approyed and returned 
here, the contractors notified 9 provisions bought, a trained 
16coffin to Mix, September 16, 1863 1 ibid. 
17creek Chiefs to "Our Father" [Dole], April 1, 1863, Letters Re-
ceived by the Office of Indian Affairs, Creek Agency, Department\ of 
the Interior, National Archives. 
escort got together, and then travel three hundred miles, 
one half of the quart.er is necessarily gone, and frequently 
more ••• ! have frequently complained of the insufficient 
supply of food and clothing;~ •• 
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Harlan's rage against bureaucratic incompetence and indolence must have 
been shared by other Indian agents, for it more than any other factor 
• d d h i ff 11 • h f I ff • 18 1mpe e t ere orts to a eviate t ere ugees su ering. 
The condition of the Seminole refugees at Neosho Falls was .de= 
picted, from their point of view, by Acting Principal Chief Pascofa. 
He praised his agent, Coleman, several times, but deplored his people's 
condition. He complained that the women looked as though they did not 
get enough to eat, that the beef was often low in quality, sometimes 
plentiful, and sometimes scarce. Pascofa also related to Dole that 
sufficient clothing had not been issued to go around to all the refu-
gees, and that they were also destitute of blankets. He contended that 
they were issued only one blanket to every three people 1 and this was 
not sufficient because "the old women all sleep by themselves, 11 leaving 
several without blankets. He spoke several times of the Seminoles' 
great need for sugar and coffee, and he explained that "sometimes we get 
no sugar or coffee for two or three weeks," and that when it was dis-
tributed they received 10not more than one sixth pound per week to each 
person." However, Pascofa was quick to acknowledge that 11 except for 
I 
sugar we get plenty ••• of good substantial food. 1119 
At another time, Chief Pascofa not only indicated that his refugee 
18Harlan to Coffin, September 30, 1864, Annual Report of the Com~ 
missioner of Indian Affairs !2E, 1864, pp. 309~311. 
19Pascofa to Dole, August 29, 1863, Letters Received by the Office 
of Indian Affairs 9 Seminole Agency. Department of the Interior, National 
Archives. 
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people had received insufficient clothing, but also questioned its 
quality. He pointed out that "the clothing you' have sent us have not 
been sufficient for the women and children," and is "too light and 
easily torn." Pascofa thought that enough money had probably been spent 
on clothing, but contended that had it been "properly spent for heavy 
goods we would have plenty." The refugees personal feelings about 
higher quality and heavier cloth was revealed by Pascofa when he said 
that "our women are not proud. They don't care how coarse their cloth~ 
ing is [if] their nakedness is hid." He then explained that the women 
"would like to have two (2) dresses, one of heavy coarse goods and one 
of good calico. 1120 
Of interest is the difference between the refugee appeals to the 
Federal government in 1863 and their appeals in 1862, soon after arrival 
in Kansas. In 1862, they were requesting any kind of assistance they 
could get, and were hoping simply to survive and to keep their relatives 
and friends alive. Their requests and complaints in 1863 were a de-
cided contrast. Pascofa in 1863 asked for "three ounces of sugar per 
week," instead of two as in 1862. Rather than be thankful for anything 
to live in, the refugees wanted better quality tents, or even houseso 
Instead of clothing of any kind to hide their nakedness, they desired 
heavier, more durable goods. Their demands in 1863 were not unreason= 
able, and the need continued great, but the very nature of the requests 
indicate how much their condition had improved over the previous year. 
Often in 1863 they were asking for luxuries like coffee 9 sugar9 and high 
quality goods, indicating that their basic needs were being met. 
20Pascofa to Dole, July 29, 1863, ibid. 
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Wichita Agent Carruth had perhaps the most difficult assignment of 
all agents in the Southern Superintendency. His agency included many 
different tribes or fragments of tribes with diverse backgrounds. These 
Indians were probably the least educated and least civilized of all the 
Indian Territory tribes. His agency included the Wichita» Caddo~ Dela-
ware, Absentee Shawnee, Anadarko, Tonkawa, Tawakoni, Kichai (Keechi), 
Hainai (Ioni), Waco, and Penateka Comanche tribes. The movement of 
these Indians into Kansas in 1861 and 1862 has earlier been described~ 
but unlike the other refugees, many of the Wichita Agency Indians con-
tinued to move about freely in Kansas and even back and forth between 
Kansas and Indian Territory during the Civil War. Thus, it .is much more 
difficult to pinpoint their precise location at any given time during 
the Civil War. 
Their frequent movement can best be understood by analyzing their 
nomadic natures. The Wichitas and affiliated tribes, as they were 
usually referred to, were Plains Indians accustomed to roving hundreds 
of miles in search of buffalo and other game. Their exile from Indian 
Territory was mainly self-imposed» as they had principally moved north 
to get further away from the Confederate Texans whom they hated. The 
Texans had run them out of their homelands in Texas a short time before 
the Civil War. However, the Leased District of Indian Territory, where 
they had resided irmnediately before the Civil War was never firmly con-
trolled by the Federals or the Confederates. Hence, the Wichitas and 
affiliated tribes were able to move nearly at will during the Civil War» 
and were an intense source of irritation to both Federals and Confeder-
ates. 
Wichita Agent Carruth established his agency in 1862 at Belmont, 
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Kansas, in Woodson County between the Fall River and the Verdigris 
River. From there he issued supplies to the refugees who wintered along 
these rivers ten to twelve miles from Belmont. Carruth complained that 
a large number of refugees arrived from Indian Territory on December 7, 
1862, after he had already estimated the provisions for that winter and 
the following spring. In September, 1863, Carruth reported that there 
21 were 1,992 refugees receiving supplies at Belmont. He complained, as 
did other refugee Indian agents in the fall of 1863, 'that 11 the Indians .. 
of this agency are in a deplorable condition in regard to clothing. 11 
He asked that supplies be rushed innnediately, fearing that "disease must 
be the result if much longer delayed. 
22 
Winter is setting in early. 11 
The 1~992 refugees receiving supplies at Belmont did not include a 
large number of refugees affiliated with the Wichita Agency •. Most of 
the Caddoes and Penateka Comanches and portions of other tribes who 
fled from Indian Territory were located on the Arkansas River and Little 
Arkansas River in west and south central Kansas. Wichita Agent Carruth 
held a council in April, 1862, with these tribes on the Arkansas River 
near present· Wichita, Kansas. He then conceived an even more ambitious 
plan to assemble and meet with the leaders of the refugee tribes near 
Belmont, the Comanches and Caddoes_, and the wild tribes who belonged to 
,. ' 
no agency and roamed thro~gh the Leased District, Western Kansas, and 
Colorado. The latter includ,ed the Arapahoesll Lipans, and Kiowas. The 
21carruth to Coffin, June 14, 1863, September't6, 1863, Annual Re-
,E2rt .£f ~ Connnissfoner 21. Indian Affairs .E2L l&§i,· pp. 326-327 ll 304. 
' 
22carruth to Coffin, November 1, 1863, Letters Received by the Of-
fice of Indian Affairs, Southern Superintendency, Depa.rtment of the 
Interior? National Archivess 
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council was successfully initiated on June 8, 1862, and the Arapahoes, 
Lipans, Comanches, Kiowas, Sac and Foxes, Kickapoos, and Caddoes all 
agreed to "Make peace with all the tribes friendly to our government." 
Representatives of these Indians who were at the June council implied 
that they desired to return to the Little Arkansas, and their agent, 
Carruth, agreed that "it would be wise to have food and supplies brought 
to the Little Arkansas River so that it could be more easily distributed 
23 to the tribes living in that area and in western Kansas." 
The nearly 2, 000 Wichita Agency Indians located on the Fall River 
and Verdigris River near Belmont, Kansas, in Woodson County, and the 
large number of affiliated tribes located along the Arkansas River and 
Little Arkansas River, received an unexpected increase in their numbers 
when a large number of Wichita Agency Indians fled from the old Wichita 
Agency near Fort Cobb in the wake of a vicious attack by the Southern 
Kickapoo Indians on their agency buildings. On the evening of October 
23, 1862, Papequah's Kickapoo warriors raided and burned the Wichita 
Agency buildings. The next day they attacked and killed over 100 Tort-· 
kawa Indians near the agency. It had been thought for several months 
that they had also killed Confederate Wichita Agent Matthew Leeper. 
This raid scared many of the remaining Indians, and about 1,000 fled 
from the old Wichita Agency north to Carruth's agency at Belmont, 
Kansas, which accounts for his statement that "refugees connected with 
this agency received a large ascention to their number December 7, 
23 " Carruth to Coffin, June 14, 1863, Annual Report of the Connnis-
sioner of Indian Affairs !2£ .!.§&l, pp. 326-327, 
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By mid-January, 1863, a group of Caddoes and other Indians from the 
Wichita Agency had moved to the Big Bend of the Arkansas River in west-
ern Kansas. Being desperate for supplies, these refugees sent a twenty-
six man delegation to Fort Larned, Kansas, eighteen miles up the 
Arkansas River, to see Samuel G. Cooley, agent for the Upper Arkansas 
Agency. The delegation asked to be allowed to peacefully settle in the 
25 
area around Fort Larned. 
Agent Colley asked for subsistence for these refugees from Connnis= 
sioner Dole, who issued Colley a requisition for $5,000 for "colonizing, 
supporting, etc., the Wichitas, and other affiliated bands. 1126 Colley 
then left for Washington with a delegation of Cheyennes and Arapahoes 9 
and on his return to the West in late June, 1862, he found his 450 
Caddoes and other Indians encamped about thirty miles south of Fort 
Larned, Kansas, in a beautiful grove. Although they were living in 
thatched huts and had dug wells, they were "destitute of both clothing 
and provisions," and had been subsisting on buffalo me•t. 27 
John w. Wright was appointed on March 14, 1863, as a special agent 
24Arrell M. Gibs~n, .~ Kickapoos: Lords of the Middle Border, 
pp. 199-200; Coffin to Dole, September 24, 1863 9 Annual Report of~ 
Connnissioner of Indian'Affairs for 1863, p. 295; Jeanne V. Harrison 9 
"Mathew Leepe-;; Confederate Ind'I'ar; Agent," Chronicles of Oklahoma 1 Vol. 
XLVII 9 No. 3 (Autumn, 1969), pp. 249-251; Muriel H. Wright, "A History 
of Fort Cobb," Chronicles of Oklahoma, Vol. XXXIV 9 No. 1 (Spring, 1956), 
pp. 53~ 71. 
25 
Colley to Dole, January 25, 1863, Annual Report of~ Connnis-
sioner of Indian Affairs for .!§.§2, pp. 253~254. 
26 Dole to Colley, March 30, 1863, ibid., p. 254. 
27 Colley to Dole, June 30, 1863 9 ibid., p. 256. 
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to purchase goods for these Gaddoes. He was instructed to.immediately 
purchase "six yoke of oxen and one wagon, two large breaking ploughs, 
four small ploughs, two harrows, two dozen spades, two dozen shovels 
... ' two dozen hoes, two dozen axes, one dozen hand rakes, one dozen 
mattocks, one set of blacksmith's tools,. and five hundred weight of iron 
and steel." Wright also was given the' authority to purchase, at his 
discretion, "two scrapers, a limited lot of carpenter's tools, and en-
gage in the States a carpenter and a blacksmith." The purpose of these 
purchases and services was "for the bu~lding of some cheap, but substan-
tial houses for the Indians, the construction of a ditch for irrigation, 
and the opening of a portion of the land for agricultural purposes. 11 
Wright, who lived in Logansport, Indiana, was to purchase the goods in 
his home area and deliver them to Agent Colley, who would then take 
28 
over. 
At the same time, Acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs Charles E. 
Mix directed Colley to select a suitable location for the Caddoes "south 
of the Arkansas River, and east of the Pergatory [sic] River, and lying 
along these rivers." Mix further specified that the area would need to 
contain at least 500 acres of arable land, which could be irrigated, 
near a source of timber. The proposed houses were ·to be "made of stone 9 
concrete, or heated earth ••• , the outside doors should be double-
battened and the inside single-battened." The.;tindow openings were to 
29 
be sash which was available at Fort Lyon. . 
Special Agent Wright visited the Gaddoes on the Big Bend of the 
28M· W · h A 14 1863 "b"d 257 258 ix to rig t, ugust , , i i • , pp. · - ·• 
29Mix to Colley, August 14, 1863, ibid., pp. 258-260. 
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Arkansas River. After consulting with Wright, the Caddoes sent two 
principal men of the tribe, and Chief Parkman, to Fort Lyon, in present 
southeast Colorado. Agent Colley, Wright, and the Indians selected a 
tract of land on the "south side of. the Arkansas River, above and im-
mediately adjoining the military reservation. 1130 The unpredictable 
whims of war thus carried this refugee delegation as far west as 
Colorado. 
After returning to Fort Larned, Wright induced the Caddoes to lo-
cate on the Pawnee River about twenty miles above Fort Larned for the 
winter of 1863-1864 instead of removing 250 miles to Fort Lyon so late 
in the fall. Another reason for not moving the Caddo refugees to Fort 
Lyon at that time was that there was "little game, and corn there cost 
about five dollars a bu$hel, and everything else [cost] in propor-
. 31 
ti.on." In the spring of 1864 the Caddoes were unable to move onto 
the land set aside for them near Fort Lyon, due to the increasing war-
fare of the Plains Indians against the whites and the retalitory action 
being taken by soldiers against them. They moved back down the Arkansas 
River between Crow and Turkey Creek, closer to the other affiliated 
"b 32 tri es. 
Agent Carruth's plans for supplying all the Wichita Agency refugees 
at the conference of the Little Arkansas River and Arkansas River did 
not bear fruit until 1864, when the refugees under his care refused to 
30 . Wright to Usher, no date; Colley to Dole, September 30, 1863~ 
ibid.~ pp. 260-261, 252~253. 
31wright to Usher, no date, ibid., pp. 260-261. 
32 Colley to Dole, April 1, 1864, September 2, 1864, October 20, 
1864~ Annual Report of the Commissioner..£!. Indian Affairs !2.E. ~, pp. 
248-254, 242-243. 
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return to Indian Territory along with the Opothleyahola refugees. They 
preferred to settle on Big Walnut Creek in Butler County, Kansas, which 
ran nearly parallel to the Arkansas River near present Wichita, Kansas. 
This put them in close proximity with the other Wichita Agency refugees 
who had been living near the mouth of the Little Arkansas River, where 
it flows into the Arkansas River. The Wichita Agency was moved from 
Belmont, Kansas, to Butler County in 1864, but the Wichita Agency 
Indians remained along the Arkansas River, the Little Arkansas River, 
Bit Walnut Creek, and near the Big Bend Country throughout the rest of 
the war. 
A serious problem on all Indian reserves was the presence of un-
authorized whites, who attempted to sell the Indians whiskey. Among 
the Creeks, according to Agent Cutler, "traffic in whiskey is the most 
serious difficulty we have to contend with," and several barrels of 
whiskey which were found on the Sac and Fox Reserve were destroyed by 
Cutler. It was difficult to keep the whites from selling whiskey to 
the Indians, because it was hard to get Indians to testify against 
33 
them. 
The removal of the Wichita Agency Indians to western Kansas, even 
further from white settlements, did not prevent unscrupulous whites 
from following them to cheat them out of their money and encourage them· 
in delinquent activities. Superintendent Coffin bitterly denounced 
these "vicious and lawless vagabonds of whites, that have followed those 
Indians for the purpose of plunder and theft." He revealed that "they 
33 
Cutler to Cutler, September 5, 1865, Annual Report 2.f ~ ~-
missioner of Indian Affairs i2£ 1863, pp. 299-301. 
162 
are selling the whiskey, stealing their ponies, and cheating and robbing 
them of everything they have worth stealing." Coffin explained the 
presence of these undesirables around the Wichita Agency: 
••• many of the Indians have been, for the U:st two years or 
more, engaged in driving up cattle from their own country, 
and ••• from the Cherokee and Creek country, and.selling them 
to Whites at very low prices. The large profits on stock 
so purchased has led a great many of these men to swarm 
around said Indians to purchase stock, and no doubt but 
what every inducement that avarice and cupidity could sug-
gest has been employed to induce them to drive up the 
stock. 
Not only were the Wichita Agency Indians stealing cattle in the Cherokee 
and Creek nations, but by 1864 they were driving them from the so~thern 
i 
part of Indian Territory and even from Texas, which Coffin found less 
b . . bl 34 o Jectiona e. 
The refugee Indians causing the most problems were the Southern 
Kickapoos who did not actually belong to any agency before or during 
the Civil War, but who mingled in 1862 and 1863 with the Wichita Agency· 
Indians living near Belmont, where they also drew their supplies. A 
fe.w of the Kickapoos who had gone north with Opothleyahola in 1861 re-
sided at the Sac and Fox Agency and were supplied there. Others moved 
to the reservation of the Northern Kickapoos near the Kansas River in-
stead of remaining in southern Kansas near Belmont. The Southern Kick-
apoos who congregated with the Wichitas and affiliated tribes near Bel~ 
mont, separately and with small bands of Absentee Shawnees and Dela~ 
wares, made raids into Indian Territory, plundering cattle and horses 
and anything else they could carry off. In addition to these raids, 
34coffin to Dole, September 24$ 1863, Annual Report of the Connnis-
sioner of Indian Affairs .!.2.!: 18641 p. 305. 
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they sorely vexed the other refugee tribes for two reasons. First, they 
were indiscriminate in whose cattle and horses they thieved. Much of 
the stock rounded up actually belonged to the exile refugee Indiansj 
especially the Five Civilized Tribes. Second, when the Indians returned 
to the Wichita Agency in Kansas they passed through other tribal do-
mains, notably the Osage. They often stole horses from these Kansas 
Indians as they passed through the southern part of the state. Agent 
Carruth and Superintendent Coffin were constantly settling disputes be-
tween the Kickapoos, Absentee Shawnees and Delawares on the one hand~ 
and the Osages and other refugee Indians on the other. The Kickapoos 
hunted buffalo and other game on the prairies, and collected large sums 
of money by selling stolen cattle and horses to unscrupulous whites who 
d1"d h h h h 35 not care were or ow t ey got t em. 
But this was not enough excitement for the restless, warlike Kick-
apoo refugees. As previously mentioned, a band of Kickapoo warriors 
under Chief Papequah raided the old Wichita Agency near Fort Cobb and 
burned all the agency buildings and massacred over 100 Tonkawa Indians 
who had aligned with the South. Soon after this, in late autumn, 1862, 
600 Southern K.ickapoos, under the leadership of Chief Machemanet, left 
southern Kansas for Mexico and arrived near Naciento, Mexico, in Coahu= 
ila in December. There they were employed by the Mexican government to 
protect the Mexican border from Comanche and Apache raids, and in re-
turn for their services they were granted sanctuary and land by the 
35coffin to Dole, September 24, 1864, Gookins to Coffin, October 
20~ 1864, ibid.; Carruth to Coffin, September 6, 1863, Coffin to Dole, 
February 7, 1863, Annual Report of the Connnissioner £! Indian Affairs 
i£E 1863, PP• 304, 312. 
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M . 36 ex1can government. 
To the Kickapoo warriors, this was an enviable situation. They 
were doing what they liked to do, fight, and they were being rewarded 
for it. The good news of the profitable situation was clandestinely 
spread to the Southern Kickapoos in Kansas, and even to the Northern 
Kickapoos. The result was that in 1864 over 100 Northern Kickapoos, 
led by Nokowhat, joined the remaining Southern Kickapoos on Big Walnut 
Creek. There in September, 1864, 600 Southern Kickapoos, under the 
leadership of Chief Papequah and Chief Pecan, joined with Nokowhat 1 s 
100 Northern Kickapoos and headed for Mexico to join Chief Machemanet's 
band. These Kickapoos remained in what must have been to them a much 
desired exile from Indian Territory throughout the remainder of; the 
37 
war. 
The Indians residing in Indian Territory, who determined to remain 
loyal to the Federal government during the Civil War, were cast about 
on the waves of military action;and before the war's end, most were 
flung upon barren and distant shores., Federal refugee Indians were 
scattered as far as Neosho, Missouri, and the Cherokee Neutral Lands on 
the east, through Kansas from the Kansas River on the north to the Big 
Bend Country along the Arkansas River, to Colorado on the west, and even 
to distant Mexico on the south. As their exile continued, their pleas 
to return to their homes, especially among the Five Civilized Tribes, 
became a deafening roar, but it was the Cherokee refugees, the last to 
36cibson, ~ Kickapoos: Lords of the Middle Border, pp. 200=201. 
37Ibid., pp. 202-207. 




RETURN OF CHEROKEE REFUGEES 
The retu~n of the Federal refugees to their home in Indian Terri-
tory was an arduous and complex series of events that occurred generally 
over, a five-year period from 1863 through 1867. One small band of 
K&ckapoos did not return to Indian Territory until 1873. Resettlement 
in Indian Territory by the Federal refugees was begun early in 1863 by 
the Cherokees, almost betore smaller tribes residing in the western 
portion of Indian Territory had completed their exodus to southern 
Kansas, and to more remote camps in western Kansas and even Mexico. 
As was true of the emigration, the return to Indian Territory by 
the Federal refugees occurred in two basic sta$es. Most of the Chero-
kees came back to their nation in 1863, and the majority of the 
Opothleyahola refugees returned in 1864. During and after these two 
major movements, smaller refugee groups drifted back to Indian Territory 
and eventually to their former ho~es. Many variables account for the 
disjointed and uncoordinated return of the Federal refugees, but the 
diverse geographic distribution of the refugee camps was the primary 
factor. 
The Cherokees were among the last Federal refugees to be forced to 
retreat from their homelands, but the close geographic proximity of the 
refugee camps in the Cherokee Neutral Land and in southwest Missouri to 
the Cherokee Nation favored their early return to Indian Territory. 
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Their migration back to the Cherokee Nation in 1863 was the first return 
of any magnitude of the Federal refugee Indians. 
The Cherokees had no sooner fled from Indian Territory than they 
began to entreat the government to reoccupy the Cherokee Nation and re-
turn them to their homes. Their criei; were vocal and unified in demand-
ing their immediate return to Indian Territory. However, the Office of 
Indian Affairs, and especially the superintendent of the Southern 
Superintendency, within whose jurisdiction the Cherokees fell, were very 
hesitant to remove the Cherokees to their homeland until they could re-
ceive some guarantees about their safety. 
By taking a more analytical and practical approach to deciding on 
an early return of the Cherokee refugees, Superintendent Coffin incurred 
the wrath of military officials, who desired an immediate return of the 
Cherokees, who vented their homesickness, frustration, and general mis-
fortune on the Indian officers in charge of them. Part of Coffin's 
aversion for the proposal removal can likely be explained by Major 
General Blunt 1 s support of it. Coffin was still indignant over Blunt's 
earlier decision to remove the Cherokee refugees from the Cherokee 
Neutral Land to Neosho, Missouri, without his consent. The move had 
cost the Office of Indian Affairs much extra money because it took the 
Cherokee refugees much further away from their base of supplies and 
necessitated the hiring of a special agent to care for them. Coffin 
viewed the act as an infringement on his authority and an affront to 
his dignity. He had good reason for suspecting Blunt 1 s motives in 
wanting to again move the Indians. 
Much stronger than his personal feelings, however, were Coffin's 
basic reasons for not favoring an immediate return of the Cherokee 
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refugees. In the fall of 1862, Coffin explained his position clearly 
and eloquently to Acting Secretary of the Interior Charles E. Mix, The 
southern superintendent felt that it would be unwise to move the Chero~ 
kees in the fall of 1862 or early the next spring because 11 it would be 
bad policy ••• for the families of these Indians, numbering as they do 
nearly 5,000 to go with the A~y." Coffin felt that for the refugees 
to follow the Union army into Indian Territory would be disastrous be-
cause of the frightening possibility of the army being "stopped and de~ 
tained for several months at one point and ••• that point might be remote 
from supplies." Coffin added that if the Indian forces were required 
to retreat by the enemy, their supplies ''would unfortunately very likely 
be lost, which would be a heavy expense in the way of damaged, to say 
nothing of the loss of life." 
Coffin understood that if the refugee Indians were successfully re= 
stored to their homes "it would require considerable military force 
there to protect them from surrounding Rebels." He questioned the 
availability of this milital;'y force which "might be very badly needed at 
other points to crush out the rebellion in Arkansas, Texas, and Mis-
souri," and pleaded that rvhumanity 9 safety9 and economy dictate that a 
restoration of the families of Southern Refugee Indians should not be 
attempted until the rebellion in the Indian Territory is put down and 
1 
peace and quiet restored." 
To Secretary of the Interior Smith, Coffin brilliantly rebutted 
other views on the advisability of returning the refugees at an early 
1coffin to Mix, August 30, 1862 9 Letters Received by the Office of 
Indian Affairs, Southern Superintendency, Department of the Interiorj 
National Archives. 
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date to Indian Territory. He pointed out that Indian Territory was 
"subject to predatory excursions, and under the sway of roving bands of 
Rangers, Guerrillas, and Cut Throats, which gathering their strength in 
Arkansas and Texas, will not be slow to exercise it, in the most cruel 
manner upon the weak and defenseless Indians, whose sympathies are known 
to be with the legitimate Government." 
Coffin pointed out that the refugees to be returned were, in most 
cases, "the old and feeble, the infirm, the helpless women and childrenll 
who deprived of the_ir natural protection by our own stern necessities, 
will be left to the barbarities of a heartless foe, who will be but too 
glad to wreak his vengeance upon the families, relatives, and friends of 
the Indian warriors who are arrayed against him." 
Coffin observed that "Indian Territory from its geographic position 9 
vast extent, and fertility, [was] a prize of great value to the ••• Con= 
federacy and one for which they will make a desperate struggle, so long 
as there is a glimmer of hope for succ;ess." He concluded that he was 
"as anxious as ••• any other man for the early restoration of the Southern 
Refugee Indians to their homes in the Indian Country, but ••• to attempt 
to restore them until the Rebellion is crushed in the Indian Territory 9 
in Arkansas and Texas, ••• and peace restored, would be but little short 
f . . ,,2 o 1.nsan1.ty. 
Coffin based his opinions of conditions in Indian Territory on 
firsthand knowledge from Indian participants and from the military. One 
such person was Major A.G. Ellithorpe, who was in the First Indian 
Regiment. Coffin inquired of him~ "Would it be safe in the present 
2Coffin to Mix, September 13 9 1862, ibid. 
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condition of the [Indian] country to restore the Southern Refugee 
Indians now in southern Kansas, the women and children, the old, feeble 
and infirm, to their homes in the Indian Country?" Major Ellithorpe' s 
reply was just as brief and pointed: "It would not be safe to take the 
women and children to the Creek or Cherokee countries this fall for the 
following reasons. First the corn and vegetable crops north of the 
Arkansas River will not afford them subsistence for a single month •••• 
The amount of military force necessary to restore and safely protect 
these people in their homes, would far exceed what is at present at the 
3 
disposal of the Department of Kansas." 
Indian Agent H. W. Martin, who had been assigned by Coffin to help 
supervise the Cherokee Indians around Neosho, accompanied Colonel 
Phillips on a scouting expedition to Indian Territory in December, 1862. 
His report to Superintendent Coffin was nearly as unfavorable as that of 
Major Ellithorpe's!. Ma~tin said that "there is not enough provisions in 
the Cherokee Nation to subsist the few scattered women and children left 
in that country," and implied that there would not be nearly enough pro= 
4 
visions available to subsist the loyal Cherokee refugees. 
Coffin's hesitancy to return the refugee Cherokees to Indian Terri-
.' tory in the fall of 1862 and spring of 1863 was based on firsthand ac= 
counts of military men and Indian officers in Indian Territory, and not 
on personal feelings of animosity toward Major General Blunt or the 
military. His opinions, repeatedly expressed to Commissioner of Indian 
3Ellithorpe to Coffin, Sep~ember 12, 1862, ibid. 
4Martin to Coffin, December 20, 1862, Letters Received by the Of-
fice of Indian Affairs, Cherokee Agency, Department of the Interior, 
National Archi.ves. 
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Affairs Dole, Secretary of the lnterior Smith, and military officials, 
were well reasoned and adequately documented. 
The Cherokee refugees, however, found strong support for an early 
return to the Cherokee Nation among military officials in Kansas and 
Indian Territory. Among their most avid supporters were Major General 
Blunt and Colonel Phillips. Also, strong vocal support for the return 
of the Cherokee refugees came from the officers of the Indian Home 
Guard regiments, especially from the officers and men of the Third 
Indian Home Guard Regiment, composed almost entir..ely of Cherokees. 
In addition to the emotional appeals of the Federal Cherokee sol-
diers and the humanitarian sympathy expressed by officers of the Indian 
Home Guard regiments, there were practical reasons fo;r.Jhe military's 
support of an early return of the Cherokees to their homeland. Once 
restored to their homes, the Cherokees could help hold Indian Territory 
north of the Arkansas River by planting crops that would also help sup-
ply Federal troops. It was connnon practice during the Civil War for 
military forces to requisition needed foodstuffs and supplies from ci-
vilians when nonnal means of supply were not available. The difficulty 
. 
of supplying Indian Territory was evident throughout the war, and the 
prospect of growing crops within its borders was alluring to Union of-
ficers. Another practical effect of having Cherokee refugees and other 
displaced Indians back in Indian Territory was that they could help with 
hay-gathering operations that would provide forage for Union mounts. 
In addition, horses and livestock could be maintained by the refugees 
for likely use by the Union forces. Also, in the minds of the Union .. of-
ficers was the fact that a loyal civilian population in Indian Territory 
could help keep Federal forces infonned of enemy troop movements. 
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Proof that the Indian officers realized the military importance of 
returning the refugees to Indian Territory is documented in correspon= 
dence between Union officers. Major General Blunt told Colonel Phillips 
that "the raising of a crop in the Indian country the coming season.i~ 
of great importance, not only to sustain the refugees, but forage must. 
5 
be had for the use of the government." Colonel Phillips was even more 
frank in a communication to Major General Samuel R. Curtis several 
months later: "March is the planting month in the Indian Territory, and 
no crops are secure planted after that time. Not only as a question of 
justice to them, but policy as to holding and occupying the country, 
makes the restoration and raising of a c~op desirable. Absent refugees 
will not give us the Indian country •••• The gate to Texas may be opened 
6 
through the Indian country." 
Blunt 9 in explaining to Secretary of the Interior Smith why he had 
removed the refugee Cherokees to Neosho, Missouri, without the consent 
of the Office of Indian Affairs, indicated that he felt that "the inter~ 
est of the Refugee Indians were so intimately blended with the military 
affairs of the Indian Territory that I deemed it my duty to act in the 
premisesa 117 It appears that Blunt 1 s statement and those of Phillips 
that, at least, these two officers felt that the affairs of the refugee 
5 Blunt to Phillips, February 23 9 1863, Official Records, Ser. i 9 
Vol. XXII, Pt. 2, pp. 121-122. 
6Phillips to Curtis, March 20, 1863, ibid., pp. 165-167. 
7 
Blunt to Smith, November 21 9 1862, Letters Received by the Office 
of Indian Affairs, Southern Superintendency, Department of the Interior, 
National Archives; Danziger, Jr., "The Office of Indian Affairs and the 
Problem of Civil War Indian Refugees in Kansas," Kansas Historical 
Quarterly9 Vol. XXXV, p. 268. 
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Indians and the military were so closely interwoven that they could not 
be separated and that they should be directed according to military 
interests. 
Other military reasons for the immediate occupation of the Chero-
kee Nation, and as much of Indian Territory as possible, were the posi-
tive effects that it would.have on the morale of Union soldiers in 
Indian Territory and the adverse effect that it would have on Confeder-
ate Indian troops. Phillips felt confident that he would be able to 
organize a Creek and Choctaw regiment from dissatisfied Confederate 
Indians. In fact, he contended that "Its success to a great extent de-
pends on our clothing them neatly, feeding them, and to some extent 
their starving families. After all, a little [food and clothing] goes 
a great way. It is cheap recruiting." Phillips's inference was that 
refugee Indians returned to Indian Territory would be able to raise 
crops to feed the families of Creek and Choctaw soldiers to induce them 
8 
to defect to the North. 
Officers of the Indian Home Guard regiments feared that many of 
their soldiers would become unmanageable and mutinous if commanded to 
leave their families and relatives unprotected in southwest Missouri for 
extended periods of time while they were on military operations. Major 
General Blunt must have had this fact uppermost in his mind in the 
spring of 1863 1 for on November 21 1 1862 1 he told Secretary of the In-
terior Smith that in 1862 during the second Federal invasion of Indian 
Territory "the Indians mustered into the Federal service were not 
8Phillips to Blunt, March 3, 1863, Official Records, Ser. i, Vol. 
XXII 1 Pt. 2, pp. 139-140. 
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willing to make a second expedition south, unless assurances were given 
them that their families should be taken to their homes as soon as we 
9 
obtained occupation of the country." 
Blunt's fear was well-founded that the Cherokee troops would be 
difficult to manage unless they were given assurances that their fami-
lies would be removed to their homeland. Military dispatches document 
the growing concern of the Federal Indian soldiers in the spring of 
1863. Phillips informed Major General Curtis on March 19, 1863, that 
"Indians [soldiers] are greatly distressed about returning the refugees 
to their homes. The interest of the Government as well as these people, 
suffers by the delay." On the same day Phillips told Blunt that the 
"Indians are very impatient to have the refugees home, and go into the 
Nation. Colonel Ross writes me an imploring letter from Neosho." Two 
days later Phillips informed Blunt that the "refugees at Neosho send 
heartrendering appeals to me. Twice the Indian officers have signed an 
earnest appeal •••• The truth is something has got to be done promptly, 
or ••• the interest of the Government in the Indian Nation will suffer •••• 
Hours are precious." Loring wrote Phillips on March 19, 1863, that 
Thomas Pegg and the officers of the Second Indian Regiment "earnestly 
petition for the immediate return of the refugee faJUilies to the Indian 
Country--consider themselves thwarted in their promises=-a few days more 
9Blunt to Smith, November 21, 1862, Letters Received by the Office 
of Indian Affairs, Southern Superintendency, Department of the Interior, 
National Archives; Danziger, Jr., "The Office of Indian Affairs and 
the Problem of Civil War Indian Refugees in Kansas;" Kansas Historical 
Quarterly, Vol. XXXV, p. 268. 
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delay will plunge them into ruin. 1110 
There was also fear by Indian connnanders that if the Indian troops 
agreed to leave their families that the refugees might try to follow, 
especially if the troops were located in Indian Territory, with dis-
astrous results to both civilians and troops, if the troops were re-
quired to move rapidly. Fear of interference with military movements 
by refugee Indian families was indicated by Colonel Phillips in a letter 
to Special Cherokee Agent A. G. Proctor. Phillips argued that a rvhumane 
effort on the part of the Department of the Interior to return them at 
an early day will ••• put in proper shape an innnigration of these people 
to their country which is sure to occur--perhaps disastrously, if proper 
11 steps are neglected." 
Thus Federal officers had specific military reasons for wanting to 
return the refugees to Indian Territory as quickly as possible. The 
refugee Indians' impatience with the Office of Indian Affairs over their 
lack of alacrity was unfair, and the military's reasons for desiring an 
exodus of the exiles back to Indian Territory could certainly be ques~ 
tioned for other than purely humanitarian interests. However, the com-
bined weight of the emotional appeals of the refugees and the incessant 
prodding of the military officers finally helped persuade Superintendent 
lOPhillips to Curtis, March 19, 1863, Phillips to Blunt, March 19 
and 21, 1863, Official Records, Ser. i, Vol. XXII, Pt. 2, pp. 162-163, 
168-169; Thomas Pegg and Cherokee Officers of the Indian Regiment to 
Phillips, March 19, 1863, in Loring to Phillips, March 19, 1863, Letters 
Received by the Office of Indian Affairs, Southern Superintendency, De~ 
partment of the Interior, National Archives. 
11Phillips to Proctor, February 17, 1863, Annual Report.££.~ 
Connnissioner of Indian Affairs!..£!. 1863, pp. 314-315. 
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Coffin to return the Cherokee refugees to their homes in the spring of 
1863. 
Major General Blunt knew that unlike his earlier removal of the 
Cherokee refugees from the Cherokee Neutral Land to Neosho, Missouri, 
he would have to have Superintendent Coffin's support in order to have 
the refugee Indians removed to Indian Territory. Furthermore, Blunt 
did not want to risk Superintendent Coffin's ire or the wrath of the 
Office of Indian Affairs. Even though Blunt did at first bypass Coffin 
by writing to Secretary of the Interior Smith, he followed this up with 
a personal meeting with Coffin to secure his cooperation. The January~ 
1863, interview between Blunt and Coffin must have been cordial, for 
when Colonel Phillips contacted Proctor on February 17, 1863, requesting 
the return of the Cherokee refugee families to Indian Territory, he 
f d h . d' 12 oun a muc more receptive au ience. 
A week later Superintendent Coffin told Dole that he had "directed 
the removal of all the Cherokee·Indi,•ns at Ft. Scott and at Neosho to 
their homes in the Cherokee nation," but he prophetically conceded that 
it was "not without some misgivings as to the safety of the movement." 
Coffin concluded that the decision was made partially "in pursuance of 
the suggestions made by Colonel Phillips ••• and an earnest appeal from 
Agent Harlan, made verbally by Agent Proctor." It appears that although 
Coffin was still doubtful of the outcome, he yielded to the unrelenting 
pressure being applied to him by military officers, the Indians, and 
12Ibid.; Danziger, Jr., "The Office of Indian Affairs and the Prob-
lem of Civil War Refugees in Kansas," Kansas Historical Quarterly~ Volo 
xxxv, p. 268. 
13 even his own Cherokee agents, Harlan and Proctor. 
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Superintendent Coffin was faced with the herculean task of supply-
ing the refugees and preparing for their return to the Cherokee Nation. 
His first concern was over the transportation that would have to be 
provided the refugees for their removal. Agent Harlan suggested that 
100 wagons would be needed to remove the Neosho Cherokees to their homes 
in Indian Territory, but, instead Coffin organized fifty teams which 
were to proceed from Fort Scott, the point of origin, to Neosho. From 
there they would make two trips to carry all the refugees into the 
Cherokee Nation. Coffin's thoughts were on making the removal as 
economically as possible by using fifty teams for two trips. 14 
In addition to carrying refugees, the trains were loaded with 
seeds, implements, and other tools necessary for planting gardens once 
the refugees reached their destination. Coffin decided that there would 
be no beef, cornmeal, or flour sent with the train on its first trip. 
He was later criticized by the Indians and their officers for this 
frugality, but he contended that it "is supposed by Colonel Phillips 
that a supply of meat for said Indians can be procured at their homesll 
for awhile at least, and M~. Proctor is of the opinion that a sufficient 
quantity of corn, meal, and flour can be purchased at the mills near 
Neoshoo" For the removal, Coffin decided to use forty ox teams and tenll 
two~horse teams. He promised Dole that he would "try to get the teams 
••• ready to leave with the next train, which is intended to start from 
13coffin to Dole, February 24, 1863, Annual Report of the Commis-
sioner of Indian Affairs .f2!. lill.ll pp. 313-314. 
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Fort Scott on the 10th of next month [March, 1863]. 1115 
The exact departure date of the wagon train organized by Superin-
tendent Coffin from Fort Scott is uncertain, but it is unlikely that it 
met his scheduled deadline of March 10, 1863, as military dispatches 
indicate that the refugee train had not yet reached Neosho, a six day 
drive from Fort Scott, as late as March 21. Special Agent Proctor ac-
companied the wagon train from Fort Scott to Neosho, where he joined 
Cherokee Agent Harlan who had been readying the Cherokees for departure 
from that place. 
The excitement and anticipation of the refugee Cherokee Indians 
concerning their return to Indian Territory had been building throughout 
the winter of 1862-1863, and each rumor and piece of news that reached 
them must have encouraged their hopes or plunged them into despair. All 
the agony of uncertainty was wiped out when Proctor and his wagon train 
rolled into Neosho in late March, 1863. Spontaneous exultation must 
have spread quickly through the refugees in a chain of smiles, exuber-
ance, and glee. Days of painstaking effort under the direction of Agent 
Harlan had enabled the Cherokee refugees to be ready for immediate load-
ing and removal to their homeland. 
In spite of the poverty and suffering endured the previous winter, 
t~e Cherokee refugees must have been a lighthearted group as they pre-
pared to return to their homes. The departure of the refugee train 
from Neosho was certainly a joyous if not harmonious chorus of noise and 
human voices. The creaking of leather, the straining of horses in their 
harnesses~ the rattling of chains and traces, the yelping of dogss and 
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the din of human voices signaled the beginning of the return from exile. 
The refugee twenty-six wagon train, composed of ox teams and two-horse 
teams, and in addition included buggies, Indian ponies, people on foot, 
and all kinds of domestic animals, presented a strange pageant as it 
wound its way southward. 
Not only did beautiful weather greet the refugees, hut also a more 
favorable terrain as they plac~dly traveled south, escorted by 300 
Cherokee soldiers commanded by Captain Alexander c. Spillman. The 
rugged, broken mountains and hills in southwest Missouri and northwest 
Arkansas gradually gave way to the grassy rolling hills of Indian Ter-
ritory as the Cherokees continued their ten~day journey. The new fol= 
iage of the forest was refreshing and the fragrance of the wild flowers 
along the route perfumed the air. 
The mile-long train wound its way into sight of Park Hill on 
April 9, 1863, at about 10:00 a.m., the "air soft and balmy and every-
thing looked gay and cheerful." The refugee train was met just outside 
the settlement by a battalion of Cherokee soldiers who were drawn up in 
line as an honor guard. However, some Cherokee soldiers, unable to re-
strain their eager anticipation, rode out several miles to greet their 
families. 
The scene of soldiers and their families being reunited was one of 
mixed emotions. For most it was an occasion of great joy and thanks-
giving. Agonizing uncertainty about loved ones, frustratiori of forced 
exile, and bitterness towards the harsh war circumstances thrust upon 
them, were momentarily washed away by tears of happiness and the flood 
of human emotions displayed by the usually stoic Indians. However, for 
many, their worst fears were realized, and it was an occasion of 
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unrestrained grief. It had been nearly a year since some of the sol~ 
diers had seen their families, and there had been little connnunication: 
"At the greeting of parents, reference was soon made to a child or mem-
her of the family who had fallen victim to a disease and had been left 
behind" in the Cherokee Neutral Land or in Missouri, often in unmarked 
16 
graves. 
The Cherokee refugee families arriving at Park Hill did not all 
return to Indian Territory on April 9, 1863. An unidentified group of 
refugees reached a point near Park Hill on March 31. On April 2 9 
Colonel Phillips indicated that the "refugees arrived here two days 
ago. 11 This must have been a fairly large group, for Phillips "appointed 
a connnittee to allot land districts," so that the available land could 
17 
be fairly distributed and work begun on planting a crop. 
These refugees could have been a portion of the Neosho Cherokees 
who had left earlier than the main group from Neosho, Missouri. How-
ever, this is unlikely even though Coffin had announced his intention 
to move the Neosho refugees in two groups~ using the same wagon train 
on successive trJ.ps. If the same train was used by both refugee groups, 
this would have required the train that arrived at Park Hill on March 
31 to unload, return to Neosho, reload, and return to Park Hill by 
April 9. That it did was highly unlikely, if not nearly impossible. 
16Britton, Memoirs of the Re-beUion on the Border, 1863, p. 204; 
Britton, ~ Union India;-Briga~ in~ CivUWar, pp. 201, 206=207; 
Britton, The Civil War on the Border, Vol. II, pp. 34-37; Britton, nsome 
Reminisce~s of theCherokee People Returning to their Homes: The 
Exiles of a Nation," Chronicles £!. Oklahoma, Vol. V, pp. 174=177. 
17Phillips to Blunt, April 2, 1863, Official Records, Ser. i, Vol. 
XXII, Pt. 2, pp. 190-191. 
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These refugees were probably the Cherokees who had spent the winter of 
1862-1863 close to the Indian regiments which wintered near Maysville, 
Arkansas. When the Indian regiments reoccupied the Cherokee Nation in 
mid-March, 1863, these refugees moved back, refusing to wait any lon&er 
on the Neosho refugees. 
Not all of the refugees who left Neosho remained with the wagon 
train until it reached Park Hill. A large number of refugee families 
left the train as it crossed into Indian Territory, near Maysville, 
Arkansas, and as it continued southward other families dropped out of 
the train when it passed close to their homes. Perhaps they intended 
to move later to fortified positions for protection and supplies, but 
at the time they were unable to constrain their desire to see their 
homes and determine the condition of their land. 18 
This dispersal of refugees along the return route was exasperating 
to the military leaders, but especially to the Indian agents. Harlan 
disgustedly commented to Coffin that the refugees "Scattered themselves 
over the entire territory." Harlan, accompanying the Neosho refugees 
to Indian Territory, was under the assumption that he would be allowed 
to pick sites accessible to supplies and military support where the 
refugee Indians would settle. Harlan explained to Superintendent Coffin 
that while at Neosho he was "fre~uently asked where I thought, for this 
quarter or longer if necessary, they ought to be settled." Harlan de-
cided they ought to settle east of the Grand River and near Tahlequah 
and Fort Gibson, t.:o enable the milit~ry to protect them, but he 
18Britton, ~ Union Indian Brigade.!:.!!!!!.!, Civil!:!!!,, p. 207; 
Britton, "Some Reminiscences of the Cherokee People Returning to Their 
Homes: The Exiles of a Nation," Chronicles of Oklahoma, Vol. VI, PP• 
176al77. --
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complained that "this did not suite the selfish views of a few." After 
one day's march into the Cherokee Nation, Harlan learned of Colonel 
Phillips's order "establishing six different places where he should es-
tablish posts for their protection, where the Indians might in safety 
go. I did not know that he would not or could not protect them. No 
advice of mine could restrain them from scattering, and they scat~ 
19 
tered." 
Four of the six sites selected by Colonel Phillips had already 
been determined by Blunt and Phillips in early March, for on March 9, 
1863, Blunt advised Phillips that the "refugees locate ••• for the present 
season at least, in colonies and at such places as may be selected as 
depots or military posts." Blunt suggested "Tahlequah, Park Hill, Ft. 
Gibson and Lewis Ross's place as among the points suitable for occupan-
cy." If Agent Harlan had l;>een asked by military officials what he 
thought would be the best places to locate the Indians, then very little 
attention was paid to his desires. 20 
The arrival of the Cherokee refugees in Indian Territory also 
brought charges by the military against the Office of Indian Affairs 
and its agents. Colonel Phillips contended that the "steps taken for 
the relief of Cherokee children are entirely inadequate. When the 
people were brought in from Neosho only 26 wagons ••• of indifferent 
quality were employed to transport some 1200 or 1300 people, seeds, etc. 
etc. 11 The refugees "reached the nation destitute of bread," Phillips 
19Harlan to Coffin, May 26, 1863, Annual Reeort £!. ~ Connnissioner 
.£!. Indian Affairs !2£ ~, pp. 320-322. 
20Blunt to Phillips, March 9, 1863, Official Records, Ser. i, Vol. 
XXIIj Pt~ 2i PP• 147-148. 
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continued, and "had to receive of my supplies." Phillips implied that 
this was the cause of a "frightful number having died on the way" to 
the Cherokee Nation. Phillips's statement that a "frightful number" of 
refugees died enroute must be viewed as an exaggeration, and likely he 
was referring to the lack of adequate supplies as a minor contributing 
cause of the diseases that had been prevalent among the refugees at 
Neosho, Missouri, throughout the winter and spring of 1862-1863. No-
where else in official records and correspondence or in eyewitness ac-
counts is there mention of a large number dying during the return of 
21 the Cherokee refugees to Indian Territory. 
Most of the Cherokees on reaching their destinations in the Chero-
kee Nation began irmnediate preparations for raising crops, and Colonel 
Phillips appointed a cormnittee to allot land districts around Park Hill 
and Tahlequah. Colonel Phillips turned over some of his military sup-
plies to the Indians at Park Hill until the Office of Indian Affairs 
could get supplies to the refugees. The twenty-six wagons which had 
carried the refugees from Neosho to Indian Territory drove on from Park 
Hill to Fort Gibson. Proctor accompanied the train on its return to 
Kansas on April 23, 1863, by way of Eureka, Pleasant Grove, and Emporia, 
. f" 1 d ' . 22 Kansas, its 1na est1nat1on. 
Superintendent Coffin irmnediately loaded twenty-five of the wagons 
with 500 pounds of flour and with other supplies and headed it back to 
Indian Territory accompanied by the fifty man escort that had followed 
21Phillips to Smith, May 15, 1863, Letters Received by the Office 
of Indian Affairs, Cherokee Agency, Department of the Interior, National 
Archives. 
22 Coffin to Dole, May 2, 1863, Annual Report £1 the Cormnissioner of 
Indian Affairs for~, p. 317. 
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the original train up from Indian Territory. The train left for the 
Cherokee Nation sometime after May 2, bound for Tahlequah, which had 
been designated as the central distribution point for refugee supplies 
in the Cherokee Nation. When the train was only ten miles from Tahle-
quah, Colonel Phillips ordered the escort to take the train to Fort 
Gibson, where the supplies were stored. This was contrary to the fact 
that Coffin had specifically directed the train to Tahlequah. Thus 
Cherokee Agent Harlan was unexpectedly left without supplies at the 
Cherokee Agency, which had been reestablished in old agency buildings 
23 
at Tahlequah. 
Due to the fact that Harlan's supplies were now at Fort Gibson and 
because Colonel Phillips had ordered all of his troops there, Harlan 
was compelled to reside and work at the fort. From there he was unable 
to issue supplies as effectively as he had intended in the more geo-
graphically favorable Tahlequah-Park Hill area. Harlan was even more 
angered when he found that he could not procure from Phillips as small 
an escort as four men to protect supply wagons to distribute seeds and 
supplies to the refugees scattered beyond the protective perimeter of 
Fort Gibson~ The undefended Cherokees, just returned to their home-
land, were attacked ruthlessly and without mercy by Confederate raiding 
units. The refugees were prevented from raising crops, and they were 
· 24 
robbed, and their possessions burned and plundered. 
Colonel Phillips was forced to retire to Fort Gibson late in the 
23 
Coffin to Dole, May 2 and 26, 1863~ Harlan to Coffin, May 26, 
1863, Official Records, Ser. i, Volo XXII, Pt. 2, pp. 317-322. 
24 
Harlan to Coffin, May 26, 1863, ibid., pp. 321-322. 
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spring of 1863 after it became apparent that logistical and military 
support for his forces in Indian Territory would not be forthcoming. 
Phillips realized that there was now enough grass on the prairies to 
feed the mounts of Confederate raiders, and he hoped that by keeping 
his forces massed he could enjoy numerical superiority against Confed-
erate raiders by quickly dispatching a large number of men to counter 
Confederate troop movements across the Arkansas River. This could be 
done while insuring the safety of the remaining forces left at Fort 
Gibson. 
Phillips' military strategy was necessary, but the consequences 
were ruinous to the defenseless Cherokees who had recently returned to 
their homes. Once military support was withdrawn from the agricultural 
settlements, the Indians became easy prey for the Confederate raiders 
and guerrillas who thirsted for revenge. Foremost among those seeking 
revenge were Southern Cherokee soldiers under Colonel Stand Watie. The 
bitter hatred of the Southern Cherokees was invoked against the Ross 
Cherokees who had broken the Cherokee treaty with the Confederacy and 
joined the Federal army. 
In early June, 1863, Watie crossed the Arkansas River near Green-
leaf Prairie, rode into Tahlequah and Park Hill under the cover of dark-
ness, and pillaged and burned buildings in the area. Watie and his 
Confederate Cherokees hounded the returned Federal Cherokee refugees 
throughout the summer of 1863. On October 29, 1863, Watie rode into 
Tahlequah and disrupted a council meeting and killed several Federal 
Cherokees. He next moved to Park Hill and burned Rose Cottage, John 
Ross' elegant home. Black Federal soldiers were killed, and several of 
Ross' slaves were drug from their houses, which were then set on fire, 
25 
and carried out of the Cherokee Nation with the raiding party. 
The incessant guerrilla warfare forced a large majority of the 
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Cherokee refugees back to the protection of Fort Gibson or up to Fort 
Scott, Kansas. The Southern raiders' scorched earth policy was es-
pecially cruel to the loyal Cherokees who were making valiant attempts 
to plant gardens and crops to sustain them for the coming year. In 
spite of this harassment and constant danger, many of the Cherokee refu-
gees remained near their once prosperous homes or banded together in 
other areas within the Cherokee Nation. 
For those Cherokee refugees who were unprotected, loss of life was 
the most serious threat. Their leaders stated that the "conditions of 
the country rendered it extremely hazardous for that portion of our men 
not in the army to attend to agricultural pursuits, In attempting to 
do so, several very valuable citizens have fallen victims to the murder= 
ous bands who have infested the land." In assessing the conditions of 
the women, the Cherokee leaders concluded that the women were 
••• constantly in fear of being robbed, not only of the 
animals with which they were tilling the soil, but also 
of their scant supplies of every kind. The fact that 
many were robbed of all they possessed, and others saw 
their homes burnt to ashes by heartless ruffians abun-
dantly show that their fears were by no means groundless 
~ •• and many of the women have lost even the small crops 
they did produce; while others have been compelled to 
seek protection under the ••• army26 
25Fischer and Gill, '~onfederate Indian Forces Outside of Indian 
Territory, 11 Chronicles of Oklahoma, Vol. XLVI, p. 269; Rampp, 11Twilight 
of the Confederacy in I~ian Territory," p. 52; Hathaway, "Brigadier 
General Stand Watie, Confederate Guerrilla," p. 63, 
26cherokee chiefs to Phillips, January 8, 1864, Cherokee Civil 
War Folder, Grant Foreman Collection, Oklahoma Historical Society. 
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A participant in the events of Indian Territory in 1863 was Mrs. 
Mary Jane Ross, who concluded that it was in ''vain for me to endeavor 
to picture to you the terrors and trials we have passed through., •• I 
have kept a daily account of what was passing and then a new alarm 
would cause me to burn what might fall into the hands of our enemy." 
Mrs. Ross described one particular event to illustrate the brutality 
that occurred daily within the Cherokee Nation. A group of loyal Chero-
kee Indians were "making their way up to Fort Gibson. A party of Watie 1 s 
men followed on a couple of horses behind, found a [Colonel John] Drew 
man sitting by the road, killed him, then placing a rope around his 
neck, hauled him about as children would a sleigh." Mrs. Ross concluded 
that 11 there was scarcely a day that we did not have some new fear to 
encounter. Just now we are in such danger. The Secesh have crossed at 
Webbers Falls and [are] robbing at a terrible rate ••• the people are 
27 
starving--and the smallpox has brc;,ken out." 
Cherokee Agent Harlan confirmed the trials and tribulations of the 
refugee Cherokees remaining in Indian Territory in many of his reports 
and letters to Superintendent Coffin. Harlan complained that Confeder~ 
ate guerrillas seemed to 
••• remain in the nation, some stealing and others carrying 
away. They have killed more lately than has been connnon 
perhaps going in smaller bands. They have a better chance 
to hide and waylay persons passing. These robberies have 
not been quite so frequent because they have ••• robbed so 
27Mary Jane Ross to Sarah [No late name given], March 22, 1863, 
Ibid. 
many they are now only 
overlooked. Hundreds 
article of bedclothing 
picking up what has heretofore been 
of families are witho~§ a single 
and winter upon them. 
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Harlan communicated to Dole that bushwhackers robbed Cherokee families 
of "wearing apparel, except what they had on their backs," and that 
children were often "shook out of their clothes, and left utterly 
29 
naked." 
The refugees who fled to Fort Gibson and the outlying camps were 
no better off. A Union soldier stationed at Fort Gibson in 1863 noted 
that cholera had broken out among the troops at Fort Gibson and that 
many had died from the disease. At one time even Major General Blunt 
himself was sick with the disease. The soldier complained of short 
rations and chronicled the fact that from June 22 to July 4, 1863, 
"nearly all the white men belonging to the garrison force at Fort Gibson 
lost from one to several pounds of flesh ••• at the end of our fast, 
nearly every one had sustained a loss of energy and buoyancy.n The 
soldier also indicated that smallpox had broken out in Fort Gibson and 
that "we have .lost a great many Indian soldiers by.it. But the greatest 
mortality caused by it has been among the refugee Indian familes. 1130 
As had been the case since the outbreak of war in Indian Territoryj 
the refugee Indians paid the heaviest price. Henry Smith, Superinten-
dent Coffin's clerk, was detached to Fort Gibson along with a supply 
train in July of 1863. Smith's eyewitness account of the desperate 
28Harlan to [Coffin?], December 7, 1863, Letters Received by the 
Office of Indian Affairs, Cherokee Agency, Department of the Interior, 
National Archives. 
29 
Harlan to Dole, September 30, 1864, ibid. 
30Britton, Memoirs £! ili Rebellion ~ ~ Border, ~, pp. 366-
367. 
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condition of the refugee Indians at the fort grimly documented the re-
sults of the Union army's inability to protect the newly returned refu-
gees in their homes: 
I entered Ft. Gibson ••• and soon satisfied myself of the 
terrible condition to which the unfortunate refugees had 
been subjected ever since Colonel Phillips has been be-
sieged. The ground held by the latter at that time did 
not exceed one and one-half miles square. In this little 
space I found about 3,000 soldiers and ••• nearly 6,000 
refugees, consisting of Cherokees, Euchees, Creeks and 
Seminoles •••• The Indians, in part, were lying under 
trees and on the wayside, exposed to the hot sun, half-
starved and naked and a great many of them sick with 
dysentery and diarrhea. Besides, the smallpox and 
varioloid are prevailing as an epidemic in and around 
Ft. Gibson, which have caused great mortality amongst 
them •••• Agent Harlan too has had the smallpox. 31 
The Cherokees were not alone in their misery and exile. Hundreds 
of Creeks came north and encamped in the bottom along the Grand River 
near Fort Gibson. Many of these were Creek families who had been left 
behind or who had been unable to follow Opothleyahola's band north 
1 . . h 32 ear ier int e war. 
In June, 1863, Harlan estimated that there were over 6,000 Chero-
kee refugee Indians at Fort Gibson, and approximately 1,000 Creek and 
Seminole refugees, totaling 7,000 destitute refugees, to be fed in and 
33 
around the Fort Gibson area. 
31Smith to Coffin, July 16, 1863, Annual Report of ~ Commissioner 
of Indian Affairs for 1863, pp. 328-330. - ~~
32Coffin to Dole, $eptember 24, 1863, Proctor to Coffin, November 
28, 1863, Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs !..2£ 1863, 
pp. 294, 340, 341; Harlan t;-['Coffin?], December 7, 1863, Letters Re-
ceived by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Cherokee Agency, Depart• 
ment of the Interior, ~ational Archives. 
33Ibid.; Harlan to Coffin, September 2 and May 26, 1863, Annual 
Report .2.f ~ Commissioner .2.£. .!.!!gl!.!! Affairs ~ ..ll!§l, pp. 297-299, 
320-3~2. 
190 
The siege of Fort Gibson was raised in July, 1863, when Major 
General Blunt moved with his brigade from Kansas to the aid of Colonel 
Phillips and the Union forces in Indian Territory. All regular Con• 
federate forces were driven to southern Indian Territory following the 
complete rout of the Confederates at the Battle of Honey Springs about 
twenty miles south of Fort Gibson on July 17, 1863. Soon after this 
mission was accomplished, Blunt removed his forces to Kansas, and the 
Indian regiments protected the territory north and some distance south 
of the Arkansas River from large Confederate demonstrations, but they 
were unable to secure the property and lives of the refugee families 
within Indian Territory from the merciless and incessant Confederate 
guerrilla raids for the remainder of 1863. This, coupled with the fact 
that it was too late for the Indian refugees to return to their homes 
and plant crops, compelled many of the refugees to remain near Fort 
Gibson in order to receive supplies. 
Because of the lack of military protection at the agricultural 
outposts, supplies were issued during the summer and early fall of 1863 
to refugees who could make their way to Fort Gibson. Supplies for the 
refugees were sent down from Fort Scott, Kansas, whenever possible. In 
addition to the supply wagon train carrying 500 sacks of flour which had 
been sent down in May, 1863, Superintendent Coffin oversaw the organi-
zation and dispatching of several other supply wagon trains through the 
early fall of 1863. He attached a number of wagons to a much larger 
military train sent down by Major General Blunt to Fort Gibson. He en-
trusted the arrival of the supplies to his clerk, Henry Smith, from whom 
he wanted to obtain a firsthand account of conditions at Fort Gibson. 
The train consisted of over 300 wagons and had an escort of 200 men and 
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five pieces of artillery. The train left Fort Scott on June 26, 1863, 
and arrived at Fort Gibson in early July, but not before it was unsuc-
cessfully besieged by Stand Watie and other Confederates at Cabin Creek, 
34 
north of Fort Gibson. 
Superintendent Coffin made ambitious attempts to supply the Chero-
kee refugees• needs, but he struggled again~t many nearly insurmount-
able logistical problems. A supply wagon train, which left Emporia, 
Kansas, sometime before July 11, encountered numerous setbacks before 
it finally arrived at Fort Gibson on July 24. The train started off 
with 720 sacks of flour, 12\ bushels of shelled corn, 6,400 pounds of 
groceries, and 1,100 pounds of bacon. However, the train was compelled 
to leave 250 sacks of desperately needed flour at Emporia because Coffin 
and his purchasers were not able to get enough teams together, even 
though they diligently searched the Humboldt, Vermont, Burlington, and 
Emporia areas of Kansas. Inability to obtain adequate escorts and 
military protection for supply wagon trains was a serious handicap in 
outfitting refugee supply trains, and this train proved no exception. 
Superintendent Coffin could obtain from Major General Blunt the services 
of only forty men, a~d he had to "make up the requisite number ••• with 
125 refugee Indians whose service ••• was not worth anything at all, inso-
much as they refused to accompany the train any further, [when] danger 
was apprehended of encountering a small Rebel force, and actually re-
35 
turned to Kansas." 
34Coffin to Dole, July 11, 1863, Smith to Coffin, July 16, 1863, 
ibid., pp. 327-330. 
35coffin to Dole, July 11, 1863, Coffin to Mix, August 31, 1863, 
ibid., pp. 327, 328, 333-335. 
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Agent Harlan accompanied this supply train on July 27 from Fort 
Gibson to Tahlequah, where he helped unload the train. He then accom-
panied it back to Kansas. Special Cherokee Agent Proctor, who had ac-
companied the train to Fort Gibson, and then to Tahlequah, remained at 
Tahlequah, where he reestablished the Cherokee Agency. He was able to 
do so because Blunt's resounding victory at the Battle. of Honey Springs 
had cleared the Cherokee Nation of Confederate raiders. 
Superintendent Coffin attempted to send another supply train to the 
refugees in August, 1863, but was unable to do so for lack of military 
support. When Coffin received word that a military train was leaving 
Fort Scott for Fort Gibson about September 10, he had eighty wagons 
ready in time to accompany the military train, which reached Fort Gibson 
in late September, 1863. A sixth supply wagon train was also sent down 
36 
in late October. 
In spite of Coffin's vigorous efforts to supply the refugee Chero-
kee Indians, his results were less than satisfactory, due to the long 
distance involved and the lack of support from the military in providing 
escorts for supply wagon trains. At least his efforts helped ameliorate 
to some degree the conditions of the refugee Indians who were forced to 
subsist near Fort Gibson during the winter of 1863-1864. 
Many Indian officials and military officers began questioning the 
wisdom of trying to feed so many refugee Indians through the winter of 
1863-1864. Some suggested the possibility of returning the refugees to 
Kansas for that winter, or at least a portion of them, especially the 
36 Proctor to Coffin, July 31 and August 9, 1863, Coffin to Dole, 
October 23, 1863, ibid., pp. 335-338. 
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old men, women, and children. Colonel Phillips, one of the strongest 
advocates of returning the Cherokee refugees to Indian Territory in the 
fall of 1862 and again in the spring of 1863, suggested to Superinten-
dent Coffin's clerk, Henry Smith, that upon Smith's return to Kansas in 
late July, 1863, he should take with him "about 1,200 refugees, consist-
ing principally of women and children, and ••• furnish them with rations 
on their way up." Agent Harlan concurred with Phillips, and in August, 
1863, reconnnended to Superintendent Coffin that the refugee Indians at 
Fort Gibson should "return nearer to provisions ••• to the head of the 
Verdigris, LeRoy, or Fort Scott." He concluded that the order to re-
move them should be made soon, "in good time to prepare them before cold 
37 
weather." 
On August 31, 1863, Superintendent Coffin conveyed Harlan's senti-
ments to Connnissioner Dole and included his own appeal for the removal 
of the Indians. His reasons for removal were well-founded. He explained 
that 
••• nothing [had] been raised to feed the refugee Indians 
within the Cherokee nation •••• The transportation now, when 
teams can subsist on grass, cost more than subsistence; and 
when grass is gone I don't think it can be hauled at all 
overland, or if it can, it will be at enormous and ruinous 
prices. There are now (and the number will increase) not 
less than 7,000 destitute Indians in the Cherokee nation 
requiring full rations. 
He concluded that "Colonel Phillips now strongly reconnnends, as also 
agents Harlan and Proctor, and all those knowing the difficulties and 
uncertainties of getting supplies to the Indians, and as prudence, com-
mon sense, economy and safety imperiously demand, all the refugees ••• be 
37 
Smith to Coffin, July 16, 1863, Harlan to Coffin, August 8, 1863, 
ibid., pp. 327-329, 331-333. 
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removed to southern Kansas, where they can be well, regularly, surely, 
38 
and cheaply fed." 
Coffin's and Harlan's pleas to Commissioner of Indian Affairs Dole 
to remove the Indians, or at least a portion of them, back to southern 
Kansas for the winter of 1863-1864 fell on deaf ears. Although Indian 
officials could at times be accused of inept administration, they could 
not be accused of being false prophets, for the very dangers came true 
they warned of if the Indian refugees should spend another winter around 
Fort Gibson. 
In the winter of 1863-1864, George N. Ross, son of John Ross and a 
private in the Federal Indian Brigade, noted that 
••• great scarcity, want, and suffering among all classes has 
not been decreased but rather augmented. The refugees get 
no supply at all now from any quarter. The supply to the -
troops is confined to what they can get themselves. We send 
our infantry with skeleton teams to ••• Arkansas •••• The 
Indian Brigade is not being fairly dealt by--and the soldiers 
feel it and see it--the principal that 'anything will suffice 
for the damned Indians' is acted upon. 
Ross revealed that when Major General Curtis inspected Fort Gibson in 
February, 1864, he examined the commissary and found that "it was re-
duced to a single barrel of flour." Curtis al$o "heard of the Indian 
women being obliged to pick up the scattered corn from where horses and 
39 
mules had been fed.'' 
The scarcity of food and other necessities at Fort Gibson during 
the winter of 1863-1864 was aggravated by the large number of refugees 
being subsisted. Agent Harlan kept a census of those Indians who were 
38coffin to Mix,;August 31, 1863, ibid,, pp. 333-335. 
39George N. Ross to John-Ross, February 7, 1864, Cherokee Civil 
War Folder, Grant· Foreman Collection, Oklahoma Historical Society. 
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being supplied at .the post. He noted that "almost every day some person 
applies for provisions who have never drawn and are unregistered •••• 
Those registered, entitled to provisions ••• are 7280 Cherokees. At the 
last issue day, there were 600 Creeks and 122 Seminoles in all 8002. 1140 
Superintendent Coffin, in describing the desperate need of the refugee 
Indians under his charge, explained to Commissioner of Indian Affairs 
Dole that the supplies provided for the refugees in Indian Territory 
that were to last until the first of March had been exhausted by January 
19, 1864. 41 
The high hopes which had climaxed in the reunion of the Cherokee 
refugee families with the~r relatives and friends at Park Hill were 
shattered. Cherokee refugees were probably in worse condition in the 
winter of 1863-1864 than they had been the previous winter in exile in 
Missouri. In addition to inadequate provisions, they were subject to 
inadequate housing and attacks by Confederate guerrilla raids. 
The reasons for the failure of the Cherokee exiles to successfully 
repossess their homeland were manifold. Perhaps the overriding cause 
can be attributed to the unpredictable tides of war which are often un-
controllable. However, the reason~ which were contributive can be 
identified. The inability of the Indian officials and military of-
ficers to agree on a set policy for protection, provisio9ing, 
and return of refugee families was a major problem. Neither side can be 
40Harlan to [Coffin?], December 7, 1863, Letters Received by the 
Commissioner of Indiari. Affairs, Cherokee Agency, Department of the In-
terior, National Archives. 
41 . Coffin to Dole, January 19, 1864, Letters Received by the Commis-
sioner of Indian Affairs, Southern Superintendency, Department of the 
Interior, National Archives. 
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blamed, for both military and Indian officials had valid reasons for 
desiring the return of the refugees or for wanting to retain them in 
Kansas and Missouri for another year. Neither position would have been 
nearly as disastrous for the Cherokee refugees had a course of action 
been decided on and planned for early in the winter of 1862-1863. 
Instead, Commissioner of Indian Affairs Dole, Secretary of the 
Interior Smith, Superintendent Coffin, Major General Blunt, and Colonel 
Phillips argued their cases until finally the decision to move the 
Cherokee refugees from southeast Kansas and southwest Missouri back to 
their homes in the Cherokee Nation was not made until the spring of 
1863. By then, plans were hastily conceived, haphazardly initiated, 
slowly executed, and time ran short. By the time the refugees returned 
and some crops were planted, not enough of the growing season remained 
to produce an ample harvest. 
Still, much might have been accomplished had military guarantees 
for protecting the refugees and their crops been carried out. Instead 
of most of the Indians remaining in colonies, protected by the military, 
they scattered to their homes. Phillips's command was unable to ade-
quately protect large areas of the Cherokee Nation, and military events 
prevented Blunt and other officers from aiding Phillips, Thus, when 
the Confederates made their lightning-quick raids across the Arkansas 
River, Phillips had no choice but to withdraw from the many scattered 
outposts and consolidate his command in and around Fort Gibson. 
From this position, Phillips was unable to provide adequate pro-
tection for the refugees and their crops. Even more fateful to the 
hopes of the refugee Cherokees was the inability of the Federal govern-
ment to insure the arrival of adequate supplies and food from Kansas to 
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provide for their basic needs. 
Colonel Phillips cannot be blamed for the deployment of the scanty 
troops at his disposal in Indian Territory, but both Phillips and Major 
General Blunt were grossly over optimistic in the spring of 1863 about 
their ability to successfully occupy and hold Indian Territory north of 
the Arkansas River. Perhaps they were encouraged in their thinking by 
the emotional appeals of the Cherokee refugees in Kansas and Missouri 
to return to their homeland in Indian Territory. Major General Blunt 
and Colonel Phillips, however, should have more critically evaluated 
the situation. 
Perhaps the decision to return the Cherokee refugees was not a re-
action to the emotional appeals of the refugees, but was based on sound 
military reasons. However, if history is a fair judge of the correct-
ness of an opinion, then Superintendent Coffin was vindicated by the 
events of 1863, for he predicted the result of the removal of the Chero-
kee refugees to Indian Territory in 1863 and warned against it. In 
fact, only very reluctantly did he agree to the removal. 
At the same time that the Cherokee refugees were suffering from 
the tragic results of premature removal and lack of military protection 
in Indian Territory, plans were being formulated to remove the Opothley-
ahola refugees to Indian Territory the following spring. This was in 
spite of the fact that Federal troops had proven their inability to hold 
Indian Territory secure from Confederate raids except for the area im~ 
mediately surrounding Fort Gibson. Nor had they been able to adequately 
protect wagon trains carrying badly needed supplies to Fort Gibson. 
CHAPTER VII 
RETURN OF OTHER FEDERAL REFUGEES 
The return of the Opothleyahola refugees, which had been eagerly 
anticipated by them, but which first had been denied them and then de-
layed several times, was finally initiated in the spring of 1864. 
Authorization for the removal of the Opothleyahola refugees came~ un-
like the Cherokee return, from Washington officials and from Congresso 
Cherokee Agent Harlan and Southern Superintendent Coffin, bitterly 
disappointed over the results of the Cherokee return, were very hesitant 
to remove the Opothleyahola refugees in 1864 because of the conditions 
in Indian Territory. Even though Coffin was opposed to moving the 
Opothleyahola refugees to Indian Territory until their military pro-
tection could be assured, he quizzed Indian agents and military officers 
in Indian Territory about the situation and the possibility of return= 
ing the refugees in the spring of 1864. On November 10, 1863 9 Coffin 
asked Cherokee Agent Harlan what "seed and farming implements should be 
furnished" the Opothleyahola refugees if they were returned the follow-
ing spring. 
Harlan bluntly retorted, "do not remove themo 11 His reply was a 
scathing denunciation of military and refugee affairs at Fort Gibson 
and in Indian Territory. He complained that since Major General Blunt 
had left Fort Gibson, "Stand Watie and his thieves and murderers have 
not received a check.¥V Harlan urged that 11 the Indians now safely out 
1QA 
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of the Indian country had better stay out, and those now here had better 
1 
be sent out. 11 There can be little wonder that Coffin expressed serious 
reservations about returning the Opothleyahola refugees to Indian Ter-
ritory after reports such as this from his agents in the field and his 
own personal knowledge of the less-than-successful return of the Chero-
kee refugees in 1863. That migration had included only 3,000 refugees 
and a much shorter distance was involved than the return of the 5,000 
Opothleyahola refugees would require. 
Throughout the fall and winter of 1863-1864, pressure on Indian 
agents and government officials to remove the Opothleyahola refugees 
increased. This pressure came from the lobbying influence in Washington 
of Cherokee Chief John Ross on behalf of the Cherokees at the Sac and 
Fox Agency, from military officials in charge of Indian troops, from 
Indian soldiers, and from the refugees themselves. 
This combined pressure was felt mainly by Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs Dole, who ultimately was responsible for the Indianso He re= 
ceived word in the fall of 1863 from Billy Bowlegs, Chief of the Semi-
noles and a major in the Indian Home Guard Regiment, that had been for~ 
warded to him by the Seminole refugees. The appeal was heartrending. 
Chief Bowlegs recounted that "we had a promise, •• last summer [1862] 
that we should be in our homes by last fall. When fall came they prom-
ised that we should be home by spring, [1863] and when spring came the 
promise was made that we should be home this summer, but now Gen. Blunt 
wants it put off until next springo vi Chief Bowlegs pleaded that 110ur 
1Harlan to Coffin, December 7, 1863, Letters Received by the Office 
of Indian Affairs, Cherokee Agency, Department of the Interior, National 
Archives. 
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Cherokee Brothers have their women and children here [Fort Gibson] with 
2 
them and we think we might have our families with us as well." 
The Opothleyahola refugee leaders who forwarded Bowleg's message 
to Dole also included their own appeal. They explained that in order 
to get a crop raised in the spring of 1864 they needed to move to their 
homes in the fall of 1863, because before a crop could be planted, 
11 fences must be built, housea repaired, farms improved." The refugees 
explained that if the "Government will furnish us transportation, we 
will go home this fall, and run the risk of getting subsistence down 
there without the government." 
The Opothleyahola refugees felt that anything would be better than 
spending another winter in Kansas, and cried out to Dole, 11we wish you 
could •• ~come down and see the women and children in camp and see for 
yourself how we live." Emphasizing their great desire to leave their 
place of misery at once, the refugees threatened that "if you can't help 
us then we will try what we can to move ourselves." This stirring ap-
peal was concluded with an urgent request: "We have written several 
letters to you and have waited a long time for an answer, but they 
3 
never come. Now we ask you to answer this at once.vv 
Widely divergent circumstances and influences early in 1864 favored 
the Opothleyahola refugee petitions to return to Indian Territory. 
Perhaps most influential was the desire of the Federal government to 
2 
Bowlegs to Dole, May 13, 1863, Letters Received by the Office of 
Indian Affairs, Seminole Agency, Department of the Interior)) National 
Archives. 
3 
Pascofa and Refugees to Dole, September 14, 1863, Letters Received 
by the Office of Indian Affairs, Southern Superintendency, Department of 
the Interior, National Archives. 
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reduce the cost of subsisting the destitute refugees in exile. In 1862 
and 1863, the government had appropriated special funds for the support 
of refugee Indians in addition to their money accruing from tribal 
funds. If the Indian exiles could be successfully returned to Indian 
Territory, they could nearly support themselves through farming and 
ranching, and likely eliminate the necessity for further costly special 
appropriations. 
Members of the Indian committees in both houses of Congress were 
aware that the Kansas Indians were now demanding that the refugees 
living on their reserves be removed. The Ottawas were especially de-
sirous that the Quapaws, Senecas, and mixed Senecas and Shawnees be re-
moved from their reserve. As Indian travels on the western frontier 
increased, the Sac and Fox Indians were desirous of confining themselves 
to their reserve. For this reason, the location of nearly 5 9 000 Opoth-
leyahola refugees on the Sac and Fox Reserve became a problem. The 
Osages also favored removing refugees, especially the Wichitas and af-
4 
filiated tribes, further from their reserve. 
In addition to Kansas Indians' desires and requests for removal of 
the refugees, there were the vocal protests of Kansas farmers living 
along the Neosho River over alleged depredations by the Seminoles. They 
claimed that the refugees had cut young timber and denuded the land they 
occupied. Concerned white citizens also decried the uncivilizing in-
fluence of the Indians who settled near them, and who often rode into 
4Elder to Coffin, September 20, 1863, Annual Report.£!. the Commis~ 
sioner of Indian Affairs for 1863 9 pp. 305-306; Elder to Coffin, Sep-
tember Ts, 1864, Annual R~rt of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs 
for ~ 9 pp. 315-317. 
5 
their settlements to sell and trade horses. 
The protests of the Kansas Indians, and especially the Kansas 
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citizens, probably did more to initiate Congressional action than the 
humanitarian pleas of the refugees. The Senate Committee on Indian Af-
fairs, understandably sensitive to the pleas of both the refugee and 
Kansas Indians, began inquiries about the possibilities of returning 
the homeless exiled Indians of the Southern Superintendency to Indian 
Territory •. On January 27, 1864, Senator James R. Doolittle, Chairman 
of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, asked Secretary of the In-
terior Usher, at the request of his committee, if conditions in Indian 
Territory would permit a return of the Federal refugee Indians to Indian 
6 
Territory early in the spring of 1864. 
Secretary Usher must have conveyed this request for information to 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs Dole, for on February 5, 1864, Dole asked 
Major General Blunt, who was in Washington, about the advisability of 
returning the refugees to Indian Territory in the spring of 18640 Blunt, 
never slow to voice his thinking, emphasized that he was "clearly of the 
opinion that the best interests of the Indians as well as the govern-
ment" demanded the return of the refugees at "as early a day as practi-
calo 11 Blunt added that to insure protection and security of the Indians 
on their arrival, Indian Territory and the two western tiers of counties 
of Arkansas needed to be added to the Department of Kansas, and their 
5Turner to Dole, February 15, 1862, Official Records, Ser. ii, Volo 
IV,. PPo 7-9; Abel, ~ American Indian~ Participant ,!E. ~ Civil !i!!,, 
p. 860 . 
6Annie H. Abel, The American Indian Under Reconstruction {Cleve-
land~ The Arthur H. Clark Co., 1925), p. 48; Danziger, "The Office of 
Indian Affairs and the Problem of Civil War Indian Refugees in Kansa,s," 
Kansas Historical Quart.erly, Vol. XXXV, p. 270. 
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forces augmented by the addition of 15,000 to 20,000 soldiers re-
cruited in northwest Texas. Blunt contended that if this were done, 
Indian Territory "could be securely protected, and the refugees returned 
to their homes without risk. 117 
The Senator next queried the War Department and received reassur-
ances from the Secretary of War that it would be safe for the refugees 
to return to Indian Territory. 8 Doolittle's promptings added the mili-
tary's weight to the refugee cause for removal. The reasons of the 
military for desiring a return of the refugees to their homes has al-
ready been documented. Major General Blunt 1 s close association with 
Senator Lane of Kansas brought another factor into play favoring the 
return of the refugees. Senator Lane and Major General Blunt were bitter 
political enemies of Kansas Governor Thomas Carney. There was an al-
leged close tie-in between Governor Carney and contractors at Leaven-
worth, Kansas, who were supplying the Indian refugees. Thus, Senator 
Lane championed the refugees' cause for two reasons in addition to hu-
manitarian interests. One was his intense hatred of Carney 1 and this 
was a means of thwarting Carney and his alleged connections with con= 
tractors. Second, removal was a cause that his close political ally and 
friend, Major General Blunt, strongly urged for two years, and Lane thus 
championed the cause. 
This was an opportune time for the favorable passage of legislation 
favoring removal. The military desired it (especially Secretary of War 
Edwin M. Stanton and Major General. Blunt), and they convinced the Senate 
7 Blunt to Dole, February 5, 1864, Annual Report .2f the Commissioner 
of Indian Affairs for~' PP• 322-323. 
8 
Abel,~ American Indian Under Reconstruction, PP• 50-55. 
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committee on Indian Affairs, as well as Dole and Usher, of the safety 
of removal. Arrayed in favor of removal by the spring of 1864 were 
Secretary of War Stanton, Secretary of the Interior Usher, Commissioner 
of Indian Affairs Dole, and Chairman of the Senate Committee on Indian 
Affairs Qoolittle. In the Senate, Lane and Doolittle both successfully 
guided an appropriation bill for the removal of the refugees through 
Congress. 
On March 3, 1864, Senator Lane introduced a joint resolution ca11-
ing for the removal ot the refugee Indians to Indian Territory, After 
the resolution was read, Senator Lane commented that the n1nterior De-
partment and the War Department differ as to the safety of the Indians 
after they shall return, and it is important to get an expressing of 
opinion from Congress on the subject.u9 Senator Lane's commentary 
clearly indicated that the differences of opinion between the military 
officer and the Indian agents over the removal of the refugees would be 
settled on a higher governmental level, removed from personal involve-
ment, and also removed from firsthand knowledge of events in Indian 
Territory and Kansas. 
Senator Lane's resolution on March 3, 1864, was referred to the 
Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, and on March 25, 1864, Indian Com-
mittee Chairman Doolittle introduced Senate Bill Number 198, offering 
aid to the Kansas refugees to return home. It was debated and then re-
turned to the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs for finalization. 10 
9congressional Globe, March 3 9 1864, p. 921; Abel, The American 
Indian Under Reconstruction, p. 49. 
10congressional Globe, March 25, 1864, p. 1274; Abel, The American 
Indian Under Reconstruction, pp. 49-50, n. 920 
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Senator Lane on March 22, 1864, sent to Conunissioner Dole a paper 
signed by members of the House and Senate Indian conunittees, urging an 
inunediate return of the refugees to Indian Territory in time to plant 
11 
crops. 
On May 2, 1864, the House of Representatives passed Senate Bill 
Number 198, and on the next day, the Speaker of the House and the Presi-
dent pro tempore of the Senate, signed the bilL 12 The bill authorized 
the expenditure of $ 223, 000 "for the removal and telllporary re lief of 
the refugee and destitute Indians in the southern superintendency. 11 
Indian officials were held strictly accountable for monies spent from 
this fund. The sum of $52,000 was to go for transportation, while 
$153,000 was earmarked for "temporary subsistence in the Indian country 
of refugee and destitute Indians.'' The remaining $18,000 was directed 
13 
to be used for seeds, plows, and agricultural implements. 
Reflecting on events culminating in the return of the Opothleyahola 
refugees, Conunissioner Dole explained to the Secretary of Interior that 
nafter careful consideration, and obtaining information from every 
available source as to the probable results of military operations, and 
upon consultation with yourself, and several members of the House and 
111bid., p. 49; Lane to Dole, March 22, 1864, Letters Received by 
the Office of Indian Affairs 9 Southern Superintendency, Department of 
the Interior, National Archives. 
12congressional Globe, May 2 and 3, 1864, pp. 2016, 2050; Abel,~ 
American Indian Under R(;lconstruction, p. 50; Danziger, "The Office of 
Indian Affairs and the Problem of Civil War Indian Refugees in Kansas,vi 
Kansas Historical Quarter],_y, Vol.- XXXV, p. 271. 
13united States, Statutes~ Large, Vol. XIII, p. 62; Danzigl;lr, 
"The Office of Indian Affairs and the Problem of Civil War Indian Refu-
gees in Kansas," Kansas Historical guarterly, Vol. XXXV, p. 271. 
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Senate committees on Indian Affairs, it was thought advisable that the 
refugees should be returned in the early spring [1864 ]. '' Evidently the 
advice of Superintendent Coffin and his agents was not solicited nor 
h . d . k · id · ,14 were t eir esires ta en into cons eration.• 
Commissioner Dole told Coffin on April 13, 1864, that "I feel that 
it is important that the Southern refugee Indians, now in Kansas, be at 
once removed to their homes, and you will take immediate steps to ac-
complish that object," and he admonished Coffin Vito proceed at once to 
15 
carry out these instructions." Coffin must have foreseen the turn of 
events, for he had earlier, on February 22, 1864, submitted to Dole "an 
estimate of expense of moving and subsisting of the Southern Refugee 
Indians, now in Kansas, to their homes in Indian Territory.n Even as 
early as November 10, 1863, Coffin had written Cherokee Agent Harlan 
that he intended to remove the refugee Indians in Kansas to their homes. 
This was probably not because he desired their early removal, but that 
he would be required to do so. 
His true feelings were expressed the day before he left Leaven~ 
worth, Kansas, for the Sac and Fox Agency to begin preparation for the 
removal of the refugees to Indian Territory., He would leave with 
nserious misgivings as to the safety and economy of the move, 11 but re-
signed himself to the removal "as it seems to be the wish of the Indian 
committees of the Senate and·Houseo" Bitterness was clearly evidenced 
14nole to Smith, November 15, 1864, Annual Report .£f ~ Commis-
sioner Ef Indian Affairs .£2E. 1864, pp. 30-31. 
15nole to Coffin, April 13, 1864, Letters Received by the Office 
of Indian Affairs, Southern Superintendency, Department of the Interior, 
National Archives. 
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in his protest that "no funds can be used for subsistence in Kansas [and 
thus] this virtually reduces the alternatives to moving or starving.nl6 
Exasperatingly slow as Congress had been in getting the money appro-
priatedj there was another delay before Coffin was given the right to 
' 
use the money. Dole requisitioned $45,000 to Coffin to be used for the 
removal of the refugees: $15,000 for transportation, $25,000 for tern-
porary subsistence for the refugees in Indian Territory, and $5,000 for 
seeds, plows, and agricultural implements. Dole apologetically ex-
plained that he had "intended to send a much larger sum for this ser-
vice," but that unfavorable military circumstances in Arkansas and its 
western border near Indian Territory left a great deal of doubt about 
the feasibility of moving the refugees anytime soon. He continued that 
"these adverse conditions had induced the Secretary of the Interior to 
17 
hesitate at signing the requisition for the amount I proposed." 
The Congressional Appropriations Bill clearly stated that the al-
located funds were to be expended solely for removing the refugees to 
Indian Territory and not for subsisting them in Kansas. For this reason, 
Secretary of the Interior Usher was afraid to release any more of this 
money than he absolutely needed to until he could get some reassurances 
that military conditions along the border would allow the removal of 
the refugees. Dole warned Coffin that they could not "be justified in 
the opinion of the Secretary in expending it to any extent in Kansas," 
and suggested that when 11Everything shall appear auspicious for the 
undertaking, you shall have made the necessary and proper arrangements 
for the transportation, you will telegraph the fact, and measures will 
16coffin to Dole, February 12 and May 14, 1864, Annual Report of 
the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for 1864, pp. 323, 337-338. 
17oole to Coffin, May 7, 1864 9 ibid., pp. 336-337. 
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be taken innnediately for a further supply of funds necessary for your 
purpose." However, this contriving was not necessary, as Secretary 
Usher evidently became convinced of the certainty of removal of the 
refugees, and he transferred all $223,000 of the appropriated refugee 
money to the Office of Indian Affairs. 18 
The control of the refugees in Kansas and Indian Territory had re-
moved to Washington. It was Coffin who had made the decision earlier 
to remove the Cherokees, but Dole made the decision to move the Opoth-
leyahola refugees. The exact date of removing the refugees was left to 
Coffin's discretion by Dole, but the time was generally determined by 
Congress and Secretary of the Interior Usher. Neither Coffin nor Dole 
could do much ·for the refugees until they had the money, which early in 
1864 was tied up in legislative procedure and then by Usher for ninety 
more days. 
This delay was costly for the refugees trying to get to Indian 
Territory in time to plant crops. It was unfortunate that decisions af-
fecting the welfare of the refugees in 1864 were made at Washington by 
high-ranking government officials and legislators instead of in Kansas 
and in Indian Territory by military officers and civilian officials on 
the scene. Washington bureaucrats, far removed from Indian Territory, 
were ill informed of the events there. Congress, for example, allocated 
only $223,000 for the moving~ feeding, clothing, and supplying of thou-
sands of Indian refugees, in spite of the fact that this was less than 
half of what had been requested by Coffin, who had estimated that 
$473,470.30 would be the absolute minimum needed. Coffin himself 
209 
admitted that the "estimate is based on the belief that a sufficiency 
of meat can be had in the Indian country ••• should this supposition prove 
to be incorrect, the expense will be necessarily largely increased. 1119 
Congress also proved its lack of knowledge of refugee affairs when 
it delayed in passing the refugee appropriations bill, which virtually 
ended any hope the refugees had for reaching their homes in time to 
plant crops. Then immediately after passing the appropriation, the 
Senate approved a resolution asking President Lincoln the "reason, if 
any exists, why the refugee Indians in the State of Kansas are not re-
20 turned to their homes." The fact that the Senate had to inquire about 
the situation of the refugees in Kansas, and why they pad been unable to 
return sooner to Indian Territory, proved its lack of understanding of 
events concerning the refugees and their problems. By its own admission, 
the Senate proved themselves incapable of making accurate decisions af~ 
fecting the lives of thousands of refugee Indians. 
Having resigned himself to the inevitability of removing the Opoth= 
leyahola refugees, Coffin began immediately to prepare for 'the return of 
the refugees after his direct order from Commissioner Dole on April 13, 
1864. Eleven days later, Coffin met with Major General Samuel R. Curtis, 
commander of the Department of Kansas, regarding the furnishing of mili-
tary escorts for the refugee wagon train to Indian Territory. Major 
General Curtis told him that it would be impossible for him to furnish 
troops outside his departmento Curtis was referring to the fact that on 
19coffin to Dole, February 22, 1864, ibid., pp. 323-324. 
20congressional Globe, April 14, 1864, p. 1609; Dole to Usher, May 
11, 1864, Annual Reeort of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for 1864, 
pp. 335-336; Abel, The American Indian Under Reconstruction, p~ 55 •. 
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April 17, 1864, Indian Territory had been transferred from the Depart-
ment of Kansas to the jurisdiction of the Department of Arkansas, which 
was conu:nanded by Major General Frederick Steele. Coffin was faced with 
having an escort only as far south as the Kansas border, and his pros-
pects for getting an escort there from Major General Steele were very 
uncertain. In the spring of 1864, Steele was with his troops in south-
ern Arkansas and northern Louisiana trying to regain control of the Red 
River from the Confederates. Steele had left behind only the Union 
. 21 
Indian Brigade at Fort Gibson and a token force at Fort Smitho 
After conferring again with Major General Curtis, and receiving 
his promise of a military escort, and after having carefully studied 
with Curtis the military reports concerning enemy troop movements and 
the activities of guerrilla forces, particularly those of William Co 
Quantrell, Coffin decided to fully conu:nit himself to inu:nediate removal 
even without the certainty of a military escort south of the Kansas 
border. Coffin wired Dole on May 10, 1864, that he was "Ready to 
startGoe• Curtis furnishes escort to the border[.] will you have es-
22 
cart ordered from Arkansas Department to meet us there? 11 
The task of preparing the Opothleyahola refugees for removal was 
formidable. There were hundreds of decisions to be madeo Coffin's 
clerk, Henry Smith, related to Dole that "Every nerve of the 
21coffin to Dole, April 26, 1864, Letters Received by the Office 
of Indian Affairs, Southern Superintendency:1 Department of the Interior, 
National Archives; George H. Shirk, "The Place of Indian Territory in 
the Conu:nand Structure of the Civil War," Chronicles of Oklahoma, Volo 
XLV, No~ 4 (Winter, 1967-1968), pp. 464-471. --
22smith to Dole, May 28, 1864, and Coffin to Dole, May 11, 1864, 
Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs, Southern Superinten-
dency, Department of the Interior, National Archives. 
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Superintendent as well as his employees was exerted to facilitate the 
movement with all possible energy." Coffin himself later recalled that 
the "removal of so large a body of Indians ••• was attended with a vast 
23 
unit of perplexity, difficulty, and embarrassment." Coffin complained 
that preparing the refugees to move "had been attended, thus far, with 
24 
more difficulty than any job I ever undertook.'' 
Coffin's problems up to that point had been to secure a military 
escortg to assemble the large number of wagons and teams for removing 
the refugees, and the actual loading of the refugees and their posses-
sions. A sufficient number of wagons and teams were secured only after 
a prodigious effort. Nearly 300 teams were required to make the move-
ment, and they had to be "secured and gathered up through the country 
wherever we could get them," explained Coffin. 25 Creek Agent Cutler 
explained that ''We found teams extremely difficult to obtain, 11 and 
added that "the greatest portion of the farmers, on whom we had to de-
pend entirely, were busy with their own crops, and could not leave at 
that time." Cutler also stated that it was only after "encountering and 
overcoming many and tedious obstacles!I" that the refugee train has 
26 
started south. 
One of the "tedious obstacles" that proved embarrassing to Coffin 
was his underestimation of the number of teams required to return the 
23s . h mit 
1864, Annual 
303-307. 
to Dole, May 25, 1864, ibid.; Coffin to Dole, September 24, 
Report £! ~ Connnissioner of Indian Affairs for 1864, PPo 
24 
Coffin to Dole, May 22, 1864, ibid., pp. 338-339. 
25coffin to Dole, September 24, 1864, ibid., pp. 303-307. 
26 Cutler to Coffin, September 1, 1864, ibid., pp. 311-312. 
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refugees to their homes. The refugees, according to Coffin, had "ac-
cumulated a large amount of clothing, blankets, and articles of prime 
necessity ••• which they will not consent to leave, and will need" when 
they get to Indian Territory. For this reason and others, Coffin's 
original estimate of three teams per 100 refugees had to be readjusted 
to five teams for every 100 refugees. The deficiency had to be made up 
on short notice, and this delayed for a week the departure of the refu-
gee train from the Sac and Fox Agency. The additional expense of pay-
ing the original teamster for waiting added greatly to the cost of 
i h f d . 27 transport ng t ere ugees to In ian Terrltory. 
The actual loading of the 5,000 Opothleyahola refugees and their 
possessions was accomplished in a little over a week and required nearly 
300 teams. The refugees who returned were the Cherokees, Chickasaws, 
Creeks, and Euchees located at the Sac and Fox Agency. Included were a 
small number of Seminoles from the Neosho Falls encampment, but most of 
the Seminoles were forced to remain at Neosho Falls because of a small~ 
'd . h . 28 pox ep1 em1c at tat time. This must have been sorely disappointing 
to them, for they had been the most vocal of all the refugees in de-
manding a return to their homes. In fact, their many letters to Com-
missioner Dole in 1863 probably was a factor in the strong stand he 
took in the spring of 1864 on removal of the refugees to their homes. 
When it became apparent that the Federal refugees would be removed 
27coffin to Dole, May 22, 1864, ibido; Smith to Dole, May 28, 1864, 
Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs, Southern Superinten-
dency, Department of the Interio~, National Archives. 
28nole to Usher, November 15, 1864, Coffin to Dole, September 24, 
1864, Coffin to Dole, June 3, 1864, Annual Report£!.~ Commissioner 
£!._ Indian Affairs f2!. 1864, pp. 32, 304, 340-341. 
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to Indian Territory, the Quapaws, Senecas, and mixed Seneca and Shawnee 
refugees asked Conunissioner Coffin for permission to remain on the 
Ottawa Reserve. These homes along the Miss9uri-Kansas-Arkansas border 
were still unsafe because of lawless bands operating in that vicinity. 
To go to Fort Gibson would have put them nearly as far away from their 
29 
homes as they were on the Ottawa Reserve. 
The Wichitas and affiliated tribes also declined the government 1,s 
offer to return to Indian Territory. Instead, they asked to be allowed 
to move from near Belmont to the Big Walnut River in Butler County 
Kansas in central Kansas. They claimed this would allow them to chase 
buffalo and other wild game and put them closer to the old Wichita 
Agency when the war ended. The Indian agents, fearful of negative in-
fluence on the other refugees if they were placed close together, 
d ·1 d h . 30 rea i y agree tot eir request. 
Among those refugees not returning to Indian Territory was the 
revered Creek leader Opothleyahola. He had died the previous year in 
late March, 1863, apparently of old age. He was in his mid=sixtiesj 
and had served his people well for over forty years. He died on the 
Sac and Fox Reserve, and was buried there in an unmarked grave, but his 
undying passion for his beloved people followed them back to their 
homes~ and his memory still lives in their hearts wherever Creek council 
fires are rekindled. 31 
29nole to Usher, November 15, 1864, and Coffin to Dole, September 
24, 1864, ibid., pp. 32, 304. 
30 
Coffin to Dole, September 24 and June 3, 1864, ibid., pp. 305, 
340-341. 
3lcutler to Coffin, September 5, 1863, Coffin to Dole, March 22, 
1863, Annual Report £1~ Conunissioner 21, Indian Affairs for 1863, PP• 
305, 299-301. 
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On May 22, 1864, Coffin announced that he had all the wagons "in 
line but twenty-two loads," and was optimistic that he would be &ble to 
leave the next day. Coffin was probably as eager to get started as the 
l 
refugees, for by that time he had been delayed nearly a week when he had 
32 
had to wait on the additional wagons. The refugee wagon train must 
have presented a unique sight to others traveling along the route:taken 
by the refugees. The wagon train when in motion was strung dut over 
six miles, and those Indians able to walk fanned out ahead of the train, 
strayed along side, or followed as far as two or three miles behindo 
The wagon train was accompanied by approximately 5,000 gaunt, slow-
moving, but happy refugees. 
Intermingled among these Indians were over 3,000 yelping, barking 
dogs. Their noisy chorus accompanied the squalls and laughter of the 
Indian children who flitted around the wagons. In addition to these 
sounds, was the bawling of over thirty head of cattle, and the snorts 
and snickers of the hundreds of horses as they strained at their heavy 
harness against horse flesh, and the rattling of traces and singletrees 
added to the dino In addition to the noisy parade of people and animals, 
was the incredible sight presented by the wagons. They were loaded with 
"every imaginable article of clothing, bedding, cooking utensils," and 
personal items. Adding noise and color to the procession were the 
33 
chickens, ducks, and puppies carried in the wagons with the refugeesQ 
The mood of the Opothleyahola refugees must have been festive, and 
for the first 4ime in nearly three years, this group of Federal refugees, 
32 
Coffin to Dole, May 22, 1863, Annual Report of the Connnissioner 
of Indian Affairs!£.!.~, pp. 338-339. 
33 4 4 4 Coffin to Dole, June 7, 186, ibid., pp. 3 1-3 2. 
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who had probably suffered more than any other group of Federal refugees, 
had good reason to be happy, for they were going home. The trek was a 
joyful epic in the tragic Civil War history of these people. 
As the refugee wagon train wound southward, it was joined at Hum-
boldt, Kansas,, by a few of the refugees from around Belmont, Kansas, who 
34 
had not moved west with the Wichitas.and affiliated tribes. Averaging 
about eight to twelve miles a day, the wagon train arrived on June 1, 
1864, at the Osage Catholic Mission, along the Neosho River in Neosho 
County, Kansas. At this place Coffin was supposed to join his wagon 
train and a full military escort from Fort Scott, Kansas. 
When he reached this rendezvous point, he found that the Fort 
Scott contingent had not yet arrived, and he was impatient at the cost-
ly delay, as he was paying his teamsters on a daily basis. When Coffin 
attempted to move on without an escort the next day, June 2, 1864, the 
refugees refused to move. On June 3, a portion of the military escort 
arrived and announced that the government wagon train would be along 
that night or the next day. In spite of orders from the connnander of 
the government supply wagon train and military escort not to move until 
the military wagon train reached him, Coffin proceeded on from the 
Osage Catholic Mission on June 4, 1864, when the awaited wagon train 
failed to show up. Three days and forty miles later, the refugee train 
was encamped at Camp Salett. Enroute to Camp Salett, the refugees lost 
35 
their cattle to a small band of Osages. 
The connnander of the government supply wagon train and military 
34coffin to Dole, June 3, 1864, ibid., pp. 340~341. 
35coffin to Dole, June 7, 1864, ibid., pp. 341-342. 
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escort again ordered Coffin not to move until the wagon train and mili-
tary escort had caught up with him. The connnander was certainly justi-
fied in wanting to join up the two wagon trains in order to offer both 
close military support, as they were approaching the guerrilla-infested 
border along southeast Kansas and southwest Missouri. However, Coffin 
wanting to move as quickly as possible, asked if he could move ten miles 
on June 7, 1864, since he had been waiting nearly a day at Camp Salett. 
His request was granted, and the wagon trains joined on June 8 1 1864~ 
about fifty miles south of the Osage Catholic Mission. Thirty of the 
supply wagons with the government train belonged to the McDonald and 
Fuller Company that had.been contracted to supply the needs of the trip 
south. Perry Fuller accompanied the refugee train from the Sac and Fox 
Agency. When one of his supply wagons was emptied by issuing food to 
the refugees, old and sick refugees who were having difficulty walking 
were loaded aboard and hauled the rest of the way. 
As the combined 600 wagon supply and refugee train entered Indian 
Territory and neared Fort Gibson the spirits of the refugees were not 
dampened by the large amount of rain encountered enroute. It had rained 
nearly every day since they left f{umboldt, and indirectly accounted for 
two deaths during the trip. One man, struck by lightning, was killed 
instantly. In the freak accident, the electrical charge fired every 
round in his revolver and shot his ankle and foot to pieces. Another 
man was drowned while fording the Grand River. Four other deaths also 
were recordedo Illness and death were probably minimized by the pres-
ence of Dr. Ketchum, physician to the Sac and Fox refugees since 1863. 
Three children, ranging in age from eight to twelve, had legs broken 
when they were caught under the wheels of heavily loaded wagons. The 
217 
refugees were well supplied on their trip south, and reached Fort Gibson 
on June 15, 1864, in good condition. 36 
The reception received by the refugees was probably not as tumul"' 
tuous as <hat received by the returning Cherokee refugees a year earlier, 
but there were many heart-warming reunions of refugee families with 
their men in the military, many of whom they had not seen in nearly 
three years. Among those at Fort Gibson to greet them when they ar-
rived were many of their former friends and relatives who had migrated 
up from the Creek and Seminole nations in 1862 and 1863 and were resid-
ing as refugees in the Cherokee Nation near Fort Gibson. It i~ uncertain 
why the loyal Creeks and Seminoles did not migrate north with Opothleya-
hola and his followers in 1861, but there were probably several factors 
that prevented them from leaving at that time. Many were likely intimi-
dated by Confederate sympathizers living near them and were afraid to 
openly espouse the Federal cause. Perhaps others were unable to leave 
because of serious illness in their immediate families or because an ex-
pectant mother was in the late stages of pregnancy. Many, or perhaps 
even most, moved north to the perimeters of Fort Gibson as the tide of 
37 
battle in Indian Territory turned irt favor of the Union forces~ 
As early as June, 1863, there were reported to be 1,000 Creek refu-
gees residing near Fort Gibson. This number included Seminoles and 
probably some Chickasaws, for on December 7, 1863, Cherokee Agent Harlan 
reported that at his last issuance of supplies he had distributed items 
36coffin to Dole, June 16, 1864, ibid., pp. 342-343. 
37Gookins to Coffin, October 17, 1863, Proctor to Coffin, November 
28, 1864, Annual Report£.!. the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for~, 
pp. 338-341. 
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to 600 Chickasaws and 122 Seminoles. However, the number actually re-
siding there was estimated bys. w. Perryman, a Creek ~efugee living 
just across the Grand River from Fort Gibson to be "nearly 1100." This 
number had increased to 1,400 on the eve of the Opothleyahola refugees' 
38 
return to Indian Territory. 
Special Agent Milo Gookins was assigned by Superintendent Coffin 
late in 1863 to accompany the Indian Brigade and inquire into its con-
dition. He was also to report on the condition of the refugee Indians 
he came in contact with, and specifically to take a census of the loyal 
Creeks and Seminoles living around Fort Gibson$ Since there was no 
agent to provide for them, Gookins assumed the role of their acting 
agent. He reported that early in the spring of 18649 many of these 
refugees crossed the Verdigris River and moved up the Arkansas River 
and attempted to plant crops in the Creek Nation. Their promised mili-
tary support never materialized, and they were forced to abandon their 
farming efforts after eight Creeks were killed 9 some of whom were very 
prominent members of the tribeo 39 
During the six months previous to May, 1864 9 the mortality rate of 
the Creek, Euchee, and Seminole refugees around Fort Gibson was very 
high. Gookins claimed that this was because they were so closely massed 
38Harlan to [Coffin1] 9 December 7, 1863, Letters Received by the 
Office of Indian Affairs, Cherokee Agency, Department of the Interior, 
National Archives; s. w. Perryman to Mr. and Mrs. Robertson, December 
20, 1863, Cherokee Civil War Folder, Grant Foreman Collection, Oklahoma 
Historical Society; Gookins to Cutler, May 9, 1864, Letters Received by 
the Office of Indian Affairs, Southern Superintendency, Department of 
the Interior, National Arc:hives. 
39rbid.; Joe Perryman to A~E.W~ Robertson, February 17, 1865, 
Creek Civil War Folder, Grant Foreman Collection, Oklahoma Historical 
Society. 
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together. The Creek, Euchee, and Seminole refugees were camped on 
Cherokee land on the west bank qf the Grand River oppos:i.te F'ort Gibson. 
The terrain there was low and swampy, which probably had much to do 
40 
with the high mortality rate that Special Agent Gookins reported. 
The Creek refugees who arrived from Kansas in June joined their 
kinsmen along the Grand River, and together they built more pe;t:'tnanent 
cabins along the river, and in the process, cut down nearly all the 
timber near the area. Much of the timber was undoubtedly sawed at 
George Ross I s ste.am mill located on the Grand River near the ferry 
landing. It seemed to William P. Ross that in December, 1864, "the 
41 
bottom across Grand River is full of Creeks • 11 
!he newly arrived refugees were extremely frustrated because they 
were not permitted to return to their homes as they had been promised. 
After having spent two and one-half years in exile several hundred 
miles away, the Creek refugees' homes agonizingly beckoned them nearbyo 
Creek Agent Cutler was not even able to journey to the Creek Agency, 
which was located only eight miles from Fort Gibson. 
When the Opothleyahola refugees arrived at Fort Gibson, they found 
that the refugee Indians nearby were being subsisted on one-fourth 
rations, as they had been for most of the previous winter and early 
spring of 1864. This lack of supplies was highlighted on the very day 
40cookins to Cutler, May 9, 1864, Letters Received by the Office 
of Indian Affairs, Department of the Interior, National Archives; Creek 
Chiefs to Dole, January 11, 1864, Letters Received by the Office of 
Indian Affairs, Creek Agency, Department of the Interior 9 National Ar-
chives. 
41wQ P. Ross to [his son?], December 27, 1864, Cherokee Civil War 
Folder, Grant Foreman Collection, Oklahoma Historical Society. 
220 
of their arrival at Fort Gibson by the daring and successful capture on 
the Arkansas River of the Union supply ship, the l• !• Williams, by 
Brigadier General Stand Watie. Many of the captured supplies had been 
intended for the refugees. It seemed to the newly arrived refugees that 
the Confederacy was waging a war of attrition in Indian Territory, and 
that they might die of starvation within a few miles of their homes 
42 
after having endured so much to return. The refugee Creek chiefs, 
appalled and frightene~, appe•led frantically to Dole: 
To whom must a suffering child call for help except to its 
father.9 •• We can see nothing but starvation before us. 
Already we have had a taste of what is to come this winter 
•••• Months intervene between the arrival of each train, 
and the supplies they bring are barely sufficient to keep 
us alive from day to day ••• when the trains must necessarily 
have to stop, our sufferings will be terrible in the ex-
treme •••• We only ask that steps be taken to keep us from 
perishing until we can raise a crop next season943 
When Choctaw and Chickasaw Agent Coleman reached Fort Gibson with 
the refugee train, he turned over his Cherokee charges to Cherokee 
Agent Harlan's permanent care and temporarily left his Chickasaw refu= 
gees with Harlan also. He continued on to Fort Smith, Arkansas, to in-
quire into conditions there. Coleman's plan was to subsist his Choctaw 
and Chickasaw refugees at Fort Smith, which was nearer to a base of 
supplies, and nearer to the Chickasaw homelands When Coleman arrived at 
Fort Smith, he found 300 Choctaw refugees who were the first large group 
42coffin to Dole, June 16, 1864, Annual Report of ~ Cotmnissioner 
of Indian Affairs for 1864; James D. Morrison, "Capture of J. R. 
Williams," Chronicles ofaklahoma, Vol. XLIII, No. 2 (Sununer, 1964), 
ppa 107=108; Rampp, VVThe Twilight of the Confederacy in Indian Terri-
tory, 1863~1865, 11 pp. 89-94. 
43creek Chiefs to [Dole?], July 16, 1864, Annual 'Report of the · 
Commissioner .£!'. Indian Affairs for. 't'864,' ·p·p·. 343-344. - -
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of Choctaws to have defected from the Choctaw Nation, which had hereto-
fore remained solidly Confederate. These refugees were taken care of 
by Coleman, who innnediately issued them flour, beef, salt, and tobacco. 
Coleman was informed by Jeremiah Ward and other influential Choctaws 
that many more Choctaws would have left the Southern fold had it not 
been for the South's spectacular success against Union forces during 
44 
the Red River campaign earlier that year. 
The Opothleyahola refugees who had arrived in Indian Territory in 
1864 had to be completely subsisted by the Federal government, and the 
prospects of the government doing an adequate job were uncertain~ There 
was not as much foodstuff or cattle as was originally thought available 
in Indian Territory, and the certainty of being regularly supplied was 
questionable. Supply trains were constantly harassed and two large 
shipments of goods intended for refugees and soldiers at Fort Gibson 
d 1 64 h f 1 d 1 . 45 were intercepte in 8 byte resource u Briga ier Genera Wat1eg 
Even more disturbing and damaging to the refugees' condition was 
the lack of adequate beef that had been counted on by Superintendent 
Coffin. He had not provided for much beef in his estimate for supplies 
needed for the Opothleyahola refugees because he felt that more than 
enough could be had from cattle running unfettered in the Cherokee and 
Creek nations. However, cattle rustling on a large scale had nearly 
44 
Coleman to Coffin, September 1, 1864, ibid., PPo 313-315. 
45watie to Cooper, September 21 and 23, 1864, Watie to Heiston, 
October 3, 1864, Gano to Cooper, September 23 and 24, 1864, Official 
Records, Ser. i, Volo XLI, Pt. 1, PP• 783-791; Marvin Jo Han~ock, nrhe 
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depleted the large herds belonging to the refugees that had been grazing 
on the open range unattended. 
Hundreds of thousands of cattle and horses were run off to Kansas 
during the war by Indians from the Wichita Agency or other wild tribes 
formerly residing in the Leased Distrct of Indian Territory. Since 
these tribes were now living in southern and western Kansas, it was 
easy for small groups of these tribes to slip into the abandoned por-
tions of the Cherokee and Creek nations and run off whatever cattle or 
horses they could find. They would drive them up to Kansas near their 
camps, w~ere scores of unscrupulous white men waited to buy themo 
Joining these Indians were dishonest white army officers and other 
whites who plundered at will toward the end of the war. It was esti-
mated that the Cherokee losses in stock alone during the Civil War came 
to $2,000,000. All stock losses of the Five Civilized Tribes during 
. 46 
the war came to over $4,500,000. 
The refugees in 1864 were more seriously concerned with the im-
mediate loss of beef as a source of food than they were with the money~ 
for in the fall of 1864.and the following winter, the Cherokee 1 Chick-
asaw, Euchee, and Creek refugees living around Fort Gibson were on the 
verge of starvation. Cherokee Agent Cutler wired Dole on October 71 
1864, that the nindians at [Fort] Gibson [are] suffering greatly. Must 
have supplies immediately to keep from starving. 11 Choctaw and Chickasaw 
Agent Coleman indicated how conditions had grown even worse in the 
winter of 1864-1865 and in the early spring of 1865. On March 31, 1865~ 
46sells to Cooley; October 16, 1865, Reynolds to Sells, in Sells 
to Cooley, August 4, 1865, Annual Report of~ Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs f2L 1.§i2., pp~ 252-253, 263-265. 
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Coleman implored Brigadier General Cyrus Bussey, commanding at Fort 
Smith, to order that rations at Fort Gibson, belonging to the military, 
be issued to the "Creeks, Seminoles, Choctaws, and Chickasaws, who are 
absolutely on the verge of starvation, no supplies having been furnished 
47 
within the last three weeks." 
The material condition of the Cherokees in 1864 had changed little 
from 1863. Of the approximately 8,000 loyal Cherokees in the Cherokee 
Nation, most were still refugees from their homeso Approximately 3,000 
Cherokees still resided around Fort Gibson, and others were scattered 
throughout the nation, some on their own farms, but most on the aban-
doned farms of others. 
In March of 1864, the Cherokees petitioned President Lincoln, in 
behalf of the loyal Cherokee people, asking that they be allowed to 
gather in three or more groups in the vicinity of Tahlequah, Colonel 
William P. Adair's home near Fort Smith, and on the Grand Saline Rivero 
The Cherokees wanted to be furnished with seeds and farming implements 
at these points so they could raise crops. They also asked that they 
be supplied until they could subsist off of their own crops. This idea 
was similar to the idea of the defensible colonies that had been pro-
posed and only partially initiated in 1863. 
A variation of this concept was the Cherokees' request that Chero-
kee soldiers be used for the protection of these communities. They 
asked that Captain Smith Christie, Acting Chief of the Cherokees in 
\' 
Chief Ross I absence, and h\t'e Cherokee soldiers of Company A of the Third 
47 
Coleman to Bussey, March 31, J.865, Official Records, Ser. i, 
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Regiment of the Union Indian Brigade, be detached from the regiment and 
that Captain Christie be ''authorized to enroll the :Loyal citizens of the 
[Cherokee] nation into militia, to be under the command of the national 
council and the acting chief ••• to protect the country against the 
48 
enemy." The petition was forwarded by Indian Commissioner Dole to 
Secretary of the Interior Usher for his consideration and consultation 
with the Secretary of War. However, no action was taken on the matter 
before the end of the war, like so many other refugee appeals before ito 
The Cherokee refugees living around Fort Gibson were unable to 
raise a crop in 1864, and many of the Cherokees scattered across the 
Cherokee Nation refused to plant. Their agent, Harlan, explained why: 
YYLast year, the Union officers would take what they wanted, teamsters, 
army hangers-on, and rebels would take the balance." Cutler agreed that 
he "could not deny the premises, and the conclusion seemed to follow." 
Another reason many Cherokees could not plant corn or potatoes in the 
spring of 1864 was that they had been "compelled to use for food what 
corn and potatoes they had hid away for seed11 in the winter of 1863-
1864D49 
In spite of these discouraging obstacles, most of the Cherokees 
who were able to plant, did so, and Harlan estimated that what they 
raised would probably be enough to feed nearly one~half of the Cherokee 
refugees during the winter of 1864-1865, if it could be protectedD 
48Dole to Usher, March 7, 1864, Annual Report .2.f ~ Commissioner 
of Indian Affairs for 1864, pp. 325-326; Cherokee Chiefs and Headmen to 
Phillips, January S:-1864, Cherokee Civil War Folder, Grant Foreman 
Collection, Oklahoma Historical Society. 
49ttarlan to Coffin, September 30, 1864, Annual Report£!. .£.h!. ~-
miss~£!. Indian Affairs!.£!.. 1864, pp. 309-311D 
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Harlan explained that "most families raised more 'Corn [in 1864] than 
last year, but not in such large quantities," and. noted that there would 
be "considerable corn raised in small patches .. -say from one to ten 
acres." The undaunted willpower of the unprotect~d refugees was clearly 
l 
recognizable. Admiring their courage, Harlan felt that it was "aston-
ishing to see with what zeal and industry the women and children culti-
vated their corn and gardens, laboring under all the disadvantages that 
50 they haveQn 
Harlan greatly feared that the Cherokee refugees would be swindled 
out of their precious supply of foodstuffs in 1864 as they had been in 
1863. In the winter of 1863-1864 no provisions for the government mounts 
and teams had be.en set aside du~ to the lack of supplies reaching Fort . . 
Gibsono When a military situation arose that required the use of the 
gaunt and weakened horses, they had to be fed. When a supply wagon 
train reached Fort Gibson, its teams needed to be fedo The Indians' 
corn was the easiest to obtain, and it was often seized and appropriated 
for government use. Harlan contended that this was fair when the ap~ 
propriated corn was used for military necessities. However, he ex~ 
plained that this was often not the case and that 
Indian settlers' trains, army followers, speculators gener-
ally, and others having no such autho~ity or excuse availed 
themselves of the opportunity, went whe.n and where they 
pleaseo.$in many instances pretending to be in the government 
employment, and took what they wanted. The Indians were ig~ 
norant of who was and who was not authorized to appropriate 
their property, and made no resistance.51 
50Ibid.; Harlan to Coffin, July 30, 1865, Annual Report .2£ ~ 
Connnissioner of Indian Affairs for 1864, Po 346. ------ - ' - ___..... 
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In viewing the conditions of the 8,000 Cherokee Indians residing 
in the Cherokee Nation in 1864, and their prospects for the coming win-
ter, Harlan felt that only about 600 to 800 would be able to feed and 
clothe themselves without assistance from the Federal government. Harlan 
believed that about half of the remaining Cherokees would be able to 
feed themselves but would need clothing. The remainder, to make it 
through the winter, would have to be provided with food, clothing, and 
shelter. All would need heavy clothing and blankets. 52 
In the fall of 1864, the Cherokee refugees were scattered through-
out their nation. Some were no longer exiles from their homes, but 
most were living as refugees clos~ to the protection of Fort Smith and 
Fort Gibson, or were hiding on the abandoned farms of others. Many of 
the prominent Cherokee families who had homes near Park Hill and 
Tahlequah had again left the nation in 1864, and were living a not-too-
d · 1 S d h 1 · 53 ar uous exi eat Fort cott, Kansas, an ot er Kansas ocations. 
Most detrimental to the welfare of the Federal refugees in Indian 
Territory was the chaotic state of affairs existing among military of-
ficers and government officials who were responsible for the refugees' 
protection and subsistence. Conditions in the Trans-Mississippi West 
in 1864 had deteriorated so much that the possibility of effective ad-
ministration by either branch was a myth. The continued realigning of 
52Ibid. 
53Proctor to Coffin, November 28, 1863, Annual Report .2f ~ Com-
missioner of Indian Affairs for 1863, pp. 340-341; Legus Perryman to 
[A.] Ru w."""iobertson, March ~1863, unsigned tow. s. Robertson, May 
16~ 1863, w. P. Ross to [his son?], December 27, 1864, Cherokee Civil 
War Folder, Grant Foreman Collection, Oklahoma Historical Society. 
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Federal military districts in 1864 and 1865, coupled with the frequent 
shifting of commanding officers, had a demoralizing effect on Union 
troop morale. Evidence of an appalling lack of military discipline was 
evident in the conduct of Union soldiers escorting supply wagon trains 
and in their involvement in cattle rustling in Kansas and Indian Terri-
tory. 
Military discipline had degenerated so completely by 1864 that the 
supplies of government contractors and sutlers on wagon trains were 
stolen by their own escorts. Creek Agent Cutler complained to Superin-
tendent Coffin that on a supply wagon train he had accompanied in No-
vember, 1864, "sutlers were robbed" by their military escort and "Fuller 
[contractor for the Indians], lost heavily, [and] they went through me." 
Cutler "lost six thousand dollars worth of tobacco," and Fuller lost 
54 
six hundred dollars worth of goods. 
Contributing to the ineffective military administration that did 
little to ameloriate the conditions of refugee Indians who were still 
forced to live near the confine~ of Fort Gibson, was the rapid succes-
sion of commanding officers. Major General Blunt, who understood the 
needs of the refugees and their agents, was replaced as Commander of the 
Department of the Kansas partially through manipulation by his old de-
tractor, Major General Schofield. Politics also accounted for the re-
moval of Colonel Phillips from command of the Union Indian Brigade in 
the summer of 1864. He was reptaced by a subordinate officer, Colonel 
Wattles. However, in December of 1864, Phillips was reinstated as 
54cutler to Coffin, November 24, 1864, Letters Received by the Of-
fice of Indian Affairs, Southern Superintendency, Department of the 
Interior, National Archives. 
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commanding officer of the Union Indian Brigade 9 a position he held until 
. 55 
the end of the war. 
Not only was there dissension and politicizing among military of~ 
ficers, but also between military officers and Indian agents. Acrimo-
nious relations which had been building throughout the war burst forth 
in a torrent of charges, countercharges, and allegations of misconduct 
and graft, Colonel Phillips charged that the Indian agents had profited 
from govermnent contracts with the refugees, that they supplied these 
refugees with inferior goods, and that they had been buying corn from 
the Indians at far below its market value. 
Superintendent Coffin and his agents refuted these accusations, 
and countered with charges of their own. They accused Phillips of play-
ing politics, inept administration, being tied in with contractors who 
wanted the refugee Indians' trade, and allowing men under his command 
to harass and steal supplies from wagon trains, and seize refugees' 
. h . b 56 crops wit out proper re1m ursement. 
These passions and accusations were in a larger sense the result 
of frustration from four years of bitter border warfare. The guerrilla 
warfare common to the border had increased manyfold the difficulty of 
the Indian agents in caring for their charges. Lack of adequate 
55 
Harlan to Coffin, December 21, 1864, ibid. 
56Phillips to Usher, January 17, 1865, Usher to Dole, February 10, 
1865 9 Coleman to Coffin, May 1, 1865, Cutler to Coffin, April 16, 1865, 
Harlan to Coffin, April 21, 1865, Annual Report 2f E.h!:. Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs for 1865, ppG 271-279, Harlan to Coffin, July 30, 1864, 
!!!,~ual Report of th~mmissioner of Indian Affairs for 1864? Po 346; 
Cherokee and Creek Indians to Usher, February 15, 1864, Coffin to Dole, 
March 13, 1865, Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs, 
Southern Superintendency, Department of the Interior, National Archives. 
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supplies, and at times the seeming unconcern of Washington, had ex-
hausted the resources and patience of Federal military connnanders in 
Missouri, Arkansas, Kansas, and Indian Territory.· By the end of 1864, 
both the Union and Confederate armies in the Trans•Mississippi West had 
expended themselves in their last great offensives, the Red River Cam-
paign in the spring of 1864 and Price Raid into Arkansas and Missouri 
in the fall of 1864. 
The sound and fury of military activity, and the loud reverberation 
of accusations, at times nearly drowned out the anguished pleas of the 
refugee Indians in 1864 and early 1865. Despairing of effective protec-
tion and support from the Federal government, the Creek and Seminole 
refugees living around Fort Gibson in the spring of 1865 again renewed 
efforts to move into the Creek Nation and plant crops. The Creek chiefs 
contacted Connnissioner Dole on January 11, 1865, complaining that they 
had been "waiting for our agents to effect our removal onto our own 
1 d b d d d d d . .h ii57 an, ut waite in vain an we are tire epen ing on t emo 
After the Creeks received no reply from Dole, they began moving on 
their own accord to Creek land in February and March of 1865 for the 
purpose of planting crops for the coming year. Joe Perryman, a Creek 
refugee living near Fort Gibson, confirmed that in mid-February of 1865 
a iigreat many [Creeks were] talking of crossing the Verdigris to plant 
58 
corn this year. 11 Thompson Perryman, also living near Fort Gibson, 
57creek Chiefs to Dole, January 11, 1865, Letters Received by the 
Office of Indian Affairs, Creek Agency, Department of the Interior, 
National Archives0 
58Joe Perryman to A .. E.W. Robertson, February 17, 1865~ Creek Civil 
War Folder, Grant Foreman Collection, Oklahoma Historical Society. 
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verified these observations: "Our Creek people are now making prepara-
tions to farm this year •••• Some are going on the western side of the 
Verdigris near the mouth, and others are on the other side of the Arkan-
sas River about as far as the old Creek Agency, while some are remaining 
on this side of the Verdigris. They are going to locate as far as 
Tallahassee [sic] Mission."59 
The Creeks' attempts at farming in the spring of 1865 were more 
successful than in the previous spring. This was probably due to the 
exhausted condition of the Confederates in the Cree~ Nation, but its 
success was also due to military protection given the loyal Creeks and 
Seminoles. In February, 1865, Colonel Phillips established a military 
outpost at the Tullahassee Mission to protect the crops of the loyal 
Indians. Phillips aLso allowed a large number of soldiers to assist 
the women and children in fencing and putting in corn. By April 9ii 
1865, Phillips felt that "enough corn has been planted to secure the 
60 
loyal Indian Regiments from starvation" for the coming year. 
The corn Phillips' men had helped plant was never consumed by 
them, for on May 31, 1865, the Union Indian Brigade was mustered out of 
service following the end of the Civil War. At that time many Union 
Indians were still refugees from their homesll although they were re-
siding in Indian Territory. Others were exiled further away, outside of 
Indian Territory. For some refugeesii it would be two or three more 
59Thompson Perryman to W. S. Robertson, March 8, 1865, Creek Civil 
War Folderii Grant Foreman Collection, Oklahoma Historical Society. 
60Phillips to Dole, February 27, 1865, Letters Received by the Of-
fice of Indian Affairs, Creek Agency, Department of the Interiorii 
National Archives; Phillips to Reynolds, April 19, 1865, Official 
Records, Ser. i, Vol. XLVIII, Pt. 2, P• 136. 
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years before they would be able to repossess their homes. 
The loyal Cherokees had the least problems of any of the returning 
refugees, for most were already living inside the Cherokee Nation at 
the end of the Civil War. By the end of 1865, following the Fort Smith 
Council, most of the loyal Cherokees had settled once again in their 
homes. An exception was a group of loyal Cherokee refugees who had 
been living in the Cherokee Neutral Land at the end of the Civil War, 
Their poverty and destitute condition prevented them from returning 
without government assistance. It was not until 1867 that this group 
returned to their homes. 61 
A few weeks before the end of the Civil War, some of the loyal 
Creek refugees around Fort Gibson had moved inside the Creek Nation 
along the Arkansas River and the Verdigris River, near the old Creek 
Agency and the Tullahassee Mission. J. w. Dunn, appointed Creek Agent 
on June 19, 1865, arrived at Fort Gibson, where he temporarily es-
tablished the Creek Agency in July, 1865. He found the loyal Creeks 
"living in and near Fort Gibson, some on Cherokee lands, most of them 
on their own lands nearby." Not only did the loyal Creeks refuse to 
have social intercourse with the former Confederate Creeks, but Agent 
Dunn also found them feuding among themselves over political leader-
h . 62 s 1.po 
One self-styled Creek leader was Spokokogeeyoholo, who claimed to 
have been chosen by Opothleyahola as his successor before his death. 
61 
Harlan to Dole, December 20, 1864, [Wortham?] to Cooley, Decem-
ber 26, 1865, Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs, Cherokee 
Agency, Department of the Interior, National Archives. 
62 Dunn to Sells, September 20, 1864, Annual Report of~ Commis-
sioner of Indian Affairs for~, PPo 290-292. 
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Spokokogeeyoholo and his followers remained in the Cherokee Nation un-
til their forceful expulsion by Indian agents in 1868. However, most 
Creeks had drifted back to their own homes by the end of 18669 and by 
1867 were living peacefully with each other, including the Mcintosh 
. 63 
Creeks. 
The loyal Seminoles were split into two groups at the war's endo 
One group was living around Fort Gibson, and the other group was still 
located in their refugee camp at Neosho Falls, Kansaso The refugee 
Seminoles around Fort Gibson remained there through 1865 and most of 
1866. In 1866, they were joined on the west bank of the Arkansas River 
near Fort Gibson by the Seminoles from Neosho Falls. The Seminoles 
were given thei:t;" own national tribal domain by a treaty signed on March 
21, 1866. Before that time, it had been uncertain whether they would 
be given their own tribal domain or be incorporated into the Creek 
Nationo Jubilant over the treaty, the Seminoles moved onto their land 
64 
in October, 1868, and were no longer homeless refugees. 
The small number of loyal Chickasaws and loyal Choctaws living 
around Fort Gibson and Fort Smith at the close of the war were easily 
assimilated with their tribes after the Fort Smith Council in the fall 
of 18650 
Due to increasing pressure from the Ottawas to move, the Quapaws, 
63Ibido, Wortham to Taylor~ Octobel;" 21 9 1867, Annual ~port tl EE!, 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs for 1867, p. 318; Dunn to Sells, October, 
1866~ Annual Report £! ~ Comm"fs"s'i~ tl Indian Affairs !£!. .!ill., 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1867), pp, 319-320. 
64Reynolds to Wortham, August 28, 1867, Annual Report tl ~ ~-
missioner of Indian Affairs !2!:. l§.§1. (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1868), ppo 327-329. 
233 
Senecas, and mixed Senecas and Shawnees were forced to leave the Ottawa 
Reserve in the spring of 1865. Former Seminole Agent Shaw, who had be-
come their agent in March of 1865, secured a wagon train and moved the 
670 Neosho Agency Indians to Big Creek, located about half way between 
the Ottawa Reserve and their old reserve in the northeast portion of 
the Cherokee Nation. It was unfortunate for these refugees that they 
65 
arrived at Big Creek too late to plant a crop. By 1866, they were 
located in Indian Territory on or near their old reserveo However 1 
they had to be largely subsisted by the government in 1866, because 
floods ravished most of the crops they had planted. By 1867, these 
66 former refugee Indians were nearly self-supporting. 
At the end of the war, the Wichitas and affiliated tribes residing 
as refugees along the Arkansas River and its tributaries were living 
in destitution. From April through October, 1864, they received no 
supplies, and very little assistance during 1865. Milo Gookins, their 
agent, explained in September of 1865 that he was "compelled, in order 
to keep them alive or prevent extreme suffering, to restrict my distri-
67 
bution to about 1200 of the most destitute" of his 1,900 chargeso 
Henry Shanklin, who replaced Gookins as Wichita Agent, reported 
that when he assumed his duties in 1866 he found his Indians viin a 
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Snow to Sells, September 25, 1865, Annual Report£!.~ Connnis-
sioner £!. Indian Affairs .£2!. ~, ppo 292-294. 
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missioner of Indian Affairs for 1866, pp. 55-56; Snow to Wortham, Sep-
tember 5, 1867, Annual Report £!. the Connnissioner £!. Indian Affairs for 
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Gookins to Sells, September 18, 1865, Annual Report£!. the~-
missioner of Indian Affairs for 1865, pp. 288-290. -------- - . , -....... -
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deplorable condition, poorly fed, naked, sick, and in utter despondency 
as to their future prospects." The heavy rains and subsequent floods 
destroyed nearly all of their crops in 1866, and even though they were 
better supplied by the government, they were still living in poverty as 
exiles from their old agency in Indian Territory. The scarcity of wild 
game and buffalo inhibited their efforts to ameliorate their own con-
68 
dition, as they had been able to do until about two years before. 
In 1867, Southern Superintendent James Wortham was directed by the 
Office of Indian Affairs to remove the Wichitas and affiliated tribes 
to Indian Territory, near Fort Cobb. Wortham appointed J. J. Choller 
as special agent to implement the removal of these refugees. Choller 
only succeeded in removing 450 Delaware, Shawnee, and Caddo Indianso 
One thousand and two hundred Wichitas refused to move because they had 
earlier planted crops that were growing, and they wanted to remain to 
reap the advantages of their labor. However, they agreed to move later 
in the year, which they did in the fall of 1867, under the direction of 
Special Agent Charles Garrett. A cholera epidemic also hindered the 
efforts of agents to move the Wichitas and affiliated tribes, but by 
the end of 1867 their lengthy exile was over. 69 
Most of the Kickapoos who had migrated to Mexico remained there 
for several years following the close of the Civil War. One hundred 
Northern Kickapoos of Chief Nokowhat's band returned to their agency in 
Kansas in 1867. Later, 317 Southern Kickapoos arrived at Fort Sill in 
68shanklin to Sells, September 18; 1866, Annual _Repo.£.S of ~ :££.!!-
missioner .2f Indian Affairs !2E. ~, pp. 322-323. 
69 
Wortham to Taylor., October 21, 1867, Annual Report .2f ~ £2!!-
missioner of Indian Affairs!£!:. 1867, pp. 321-323. 
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Indian Territory on December 20, 1873. 70 
The return of the Federal refugees to Indian Territory occurred 
over an eleven year period from 1863 to 1873, but by the end of 1867ll 
nearly all of the exiles had returned and were again living in or close 
to their homes. The exile of these people was unique in the number of 
refugees involved and the intensity of their suffering. Their unwaver-
ing devotion to the Union cause was unexcelled by any other people in 
the Civil War. 
70Pickering to Smith, [no d~te], Annual Report of~ Connnissioner 
of Indian Affairs for 1874 (Washington: Government Printing Office, · 
1875) ll pp. 230-232;c°ibson, ~ Kickapoos: Lords ~~Middle Border 9 
PPo 236-253. 
CHAPTER VIII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Noncombatants suffered needlessly in many instances during the 
Civil War, but nowhere was its effects on civilian populations more 
tragic and pronounced than on the Indian Territory tribes and portions 
of tribes who remained loyal to the United States government. The loyal 
refugees realized this, and their representatives related to the Fort 
Smith Council, held at the close of·the war in 1865, that "It would 
take volumes to relate minutely the suffering which we have endured •••• 
The remains of our people are as milestones to mark the way through the 
country which we have travelled." Emphasizing their loyalty and de-
votion to the Federal government, they challenged the Fort Smith Council 
to "show us one single instance in which more suffering has been en-
dured or greater sacrifice made for the cause of the Union. 111 The Fort 
Smith Council could not, nor can history. 
Of approximately 10,500 loyal Indians who were exiled from Indian 
Territory, nearly 8,000 were members of the Five Civilized Tribes (the 
Cherokee, Choctaw, Chickasaw, Creek, and Seminole Indians). For these 
refugees, the exodus and exile were the most severe, because they were 
not inured to the hardships and exposures of camp life. Many members 
1creek Delegation of the Fort Smith Connnission, September 12, 1865, 
Annual Report .2.f ~ Connnissioner .2i, Indian Affairs i2!. ~, p. 329. 
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of the Five Civilized Tribes were reasonably well educated, lived ~n 
comfortable homes, and enjoyed a standard of living equal to or higher 
than that of most whites living on the frontier. They were frequently 
prosperous farmers and ranchers, and in some instan~es they owned hun-
dreds of cattle and horses, and even slaves. 
The consequences of large numbers of these tribes remaining loyal 
to the Federal government were unfortunate and even disastrous to the 
Indians themselves and to the future prospects of their tribeso Most 
exemplary of the dire consequences suffered by Indian participants in 
the Civil War were the Federal refugees who fled from Indian Territory--
especially the Opothleyahola Indians. Hundreds of these refugees suf-
fered and died from communicable diseases, exposure to inclement 
weather, and gastric illnesses. These afflictions were brought on by 
unsanitary living conditions in the refugee camps, by lack of adequate 
clothing and shelter, and by improper diet. Added to the physical de-
privations 9f the refugees were extreme mental fatigue, emotional strain 
I 
brought on ~y the death of loved ones, the loss of nearly all of their 
possessions, and the inability or lack of desire on the part of the 
Federal government to return the homeless exiles to their abandoned 
farms. 
The long.range consequences of the breakup and impoverishment of 
these tribes was to reduce them from powerful, prosperous lndian nationsp 
mainly independent of government support, and to retard their cultural, 
political, and social development. At the end of the Civil Warp these 
once unified, powerful, and proud Indians had become beggars and wards 
of the state l?oking to the United States for subsistence. After the 
Civil War, the Federal government recognized the dependence of these 
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Indians and acted more arbitrarily in its relations with theme The 
events of the Civil War and the total dependence of the Federal refugees 
for several years on the United States government indirectly hastened 
the assimilation of the Five Civilized Tribes with the whites. 
The flight of the Quapaws, Senecas, and mixed Senecas and Shawnees 
from the northeastern portion of the Cherokee Nation into Kansas was 
less tragic than the exodus of the Opothleyahola and Cherokee refugees, 
but it was very disruptive of the rapid progress that these smaller 
tribes were making in education, agriculture, and mechanical arts on 
the eve of the Civil War. These Neosho Agency Indians had fled from 
guerrillas along the border, with very little loss of life, and they 
lived fairly comfortably off of their tribal annuity money on the Ottawa 
Reserve, where they were tolerated through the end of the Civil Waro 
Least adversely affected by their exodus from Indian Territory were 
the Wichitas and affiliated tribes from near Fort Cobb. These plains 
tribes were more accustomed to the hardships of camp life and the 
chase. Their removal to southern Kansas was accomplished with little 
disruption~ They did, however, suffer from the lack of proper clothing 
and adequate food during the winter months, and their health conditions 
deteriorated somewhat. Their exile was not militarily forced upon them~ 
as was the case with the other refugees. Their main reasons for leaving 
the old Wichita Agency for Kansas was for the food and supplies being 
distributed by Agent Carruth at the new Wichita Agency, and for military 
protection against Texas Confederates. When Fort Cobb was abandoned by 
Federal troops in the spring of 1861, this left Texas forces free to 
enter and occupy the areao The Wichitas and affiliated tribes remem-
bered their recent banishment from Texas just before the Civil Waro 
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Texas Rangers and paramilitary forces of Texas citizens had left the 
Texas Indians no alternatives except removal or genocide. Thus, the 
uneasiness of the Wichitas and affiliated tribes can be understood. 
The consequences of the Federal refugees' e~ile can more easily be 
assessed than the causes of the exodus and the lengthy exile. Old 
factional hatred and tribal divisions were again the undoing of the 
Cherokees, Creeks, and Seminoles, as had been the case during the 
earlier removal controversy. Opothleyahola had originally hoped to get 
the Indian tribes in Indian Territory to agree to neutrality, as evi-
denced by his support of the intertribal council held in February, 1861, 
and the Antelope Hills conference the following summer. These hopes 
were dashed by the Lower Creeks and the Seminole followers of John 
Jumper who signed treaties with the Confederacy, and who represented 
minorities of both tribes. It was not Arkansas or Texas troops who made 
the full-blooded Creeks' and Seminoles' position untenable, but the 
mixed-bloods of their own tribes, who signed treaties that were con-
sidered binding by the Confederate government. The Mcintosh Creeks and 
Jumper Seminoles began raising Confederate military units in the midst 
of the loyal Creeks and Seminoles. 
Then, when the Opothleyahola refugees fled to the supposed safety 
of the Cherokee Outlet, it was the Lower mixed-blooded Creeks who warned 
of the imminence of attack and annihilation by the Federal Creeks and 
Seminoles. Chief Ross of the Cherokees urged reconciliation, Colonel 
Cooper, commanding Indian Territory forces in Erigadier General Pike's 
absence, desired a compromise, and Pike himself had earlier offered 
amnesty to the Federal Indians. However, the mixed-blooded Creeks 
wanted to destroy the power of the full-blooded Creeks while they were 
240 
in a position to do so. It was their incessant urging and finally their 
skirmishing against the Upper Creeks that brought Colonel Cooper and 
other troops into the picture and led to the battles that drove the 
Federal Creeks and Seminoles and other Opothleyahola followers out of 
Indian Territory. 
Later, in 1862, fear of reprisals by Stand Watie and the Southern 
Ridge Party Cherokees forced the Ross Cherokees to leave the Cherokee 
Nation after the failure of the first Federal invasion of Indian Terri-
tory and the subsequent withdrawal of Union forces from the Cherokee 
Nation. 
Factional mistrust and hatred, as well as fear of military reprisal 
by the Confederate Creeks, Seminoles, and Cherokees, was the most im-
portant factor causing the Opothleyahola followers and Ross Party Chero-
kees to flee Indian Territory. At this crucial point in the history of 
the Cherokee, Creek, and Seminole tribes, when they most needed to unify 
to avoid the holocaust of war, they split asunder along nearly identical 
political lines as they had during removal. This in itself dashed any 
hopes that the Five Civilized Tribes might have had of escaping the 
worst of death and destruction brought about by the Civil War. 
The Federal government must share some of the blame for the exodus 
of the Federal Indian refugees from Indian Territory, and nearly all the 
blame for the continued exile of the refugees. Contrary to its treaty 
obligations and the interests of loyal Indians, the Federal army com-
pletely abandoned Indian Territory in the spring of 1861, and Confeder-
ate forces were allowed to take Indian Territory without even firing a 
shota This action was disastrous to the Union cause among the Indians 
and imperiled the lives of the loyal Indians. This withdrawal of 
241 
United States forces from Indian Territory signaled the exodus of the 
Wichita Agency Indians and led directly to their Civil War exile. 
Even more fatal to the Opothleyahola followers were the assurances 
of military aid given to their two delegations that bad visited Kansas 
in the fall of 1861. These promises of military support emboldened the 
Opothleyahola refugees to remain in Indian Territory even after the 
Battle of Cbustalasah. They held out for Federal military support 
against the Confederate troops until their defeat and rout at the Battle 
of Chustenahlah. 
The Federal government's most glaring deficiency in caring for the 
Federal refugee Indians was its lack of adequate attention to their 
i 
needs. The government's inability to mitigate the pitiful, suffering 
conditions of the thousands of homeless men, women, and children living 
in dismal, unsanitary, and crowded encampments at times bordered on in-
humanity. These overcrowded slums were breeding places for all kinds of 
diseases, and the refugees, weakened by their ordeal, easily fell vie-
tim to smallpox and other communicable diseases. 
The Federal government's most glaring shortcoming was its failure 
to provide the refugees with adequate clothing and shelter, especially 
during the severe winters~ The government was unduly negligent about 
furnishing clothing and other supplies. After the cruel experience of 
suffering through two frigid winters, the Opothleyahola refugees and 
their agents implored Superintendent Coffin and Indian Commissioner 
Dole in August and September of 1863 that they be supplied heavy cloth-
ing, warm blankets, and tents before severe weather set in. The result 
was that the supplies which they had requested arrived in January, 
1864~ Again the refugees suffered needlessly, and many died from the 
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severe winter weather that came early in November, 1863. 
The inability of the refugees to remain healthy can also be attri~ 
buted to nutritional deficiencies in their diets. Attending physicians 
pointed out that a seven-day supply of meat would normally be consumed 
in four days because of the amount of bone and gristle in the meat, 
This left many refugees without meat for three days of every week. 
Cornmeal and flour, issued the refugees to supplement the meat supply, 
was often ground from damaged grain, and thus had little nutritional 
value. The refugees could not be induced to plant crops because of 
their hope each year of returning to their homes, and the Federal 
government would not supply them with fresh vegetables, presumably be-
cause of cost. 
It is appalling and deplorable that the Federal government did so 
little to alleviate the miserable conditions of the Federal refugees in 
Missouri, and especially Kansas. The blame must fall primarily on the 
governmental agency entrusted with the care of the Indians, the Office 
of Indian Affairs. Many of the Indian agents were indifferent to the 
needs and problems of their charges, and were merely political appoint~ 
ees who did as little work as possible. Charges were probably true 
that many of the Indian agents and higher officials in the field and in 
Washington profited from kickbacks from contractors supplying the 
Indians and from other other forms of graft which reduced the amount of 
money actually expended on the refugees. These were not isolated in-
stances, but a share of the graft which was so much a part of govern-
ment/military and civilian contracting during the Civil War. 
Lack of dedication of some agents and Office of Indian Affairs of-
ficials created a fairly high rate of employee turnover in the Southern 
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Indian Superintendency, especially among the special agents. Special 
Agent A. J. Proctor unashamedly admitted that he preferred the relative 
safety of Kansas to the perils of Indian Territory, and threatened to 
resign should he not be allowed to return to Kansas. Special Agent 
A. M. Jordan refused to accompany the Cherokee refugees from their camp 
at Dry Creek in the Cherokee Neutral Land to Neosho, Missou~i, because 
of his fear of bushwhackers and guerrillas. 
The competency of some agents could also be questioned. Cherokee 
Agent Harlan, who had formerly been a judge, was old and eantankerous~ 
jealous of his prerogatives, and pontifical. His reports to Superinten ... 
dent Coffin contained little substance, but were instead rambling dis-
courses on many irrelevant topics. He was slow in the execution of his 
duties, and Coffin once, in exasperation, admitted that he felt Harlan 
had no idea of the work required of him. 
Superintendent Coffin has been maligned for his part in caring for 
the Federal refugees, but he was actually one of the few competent ad-
ministrators who worked unceasingly for the betterment of the refugees' 
condition. However, he was encumbered by many nearly insurmountable 
obstacles. Among these were the incompetency and lack of dedication 
among his agents, but most detrimental to his efforts was the seeming 
lack of concern of Kansas citizens and officials, and even Federal 
bureaucrats, for the welfare of the Federal refugee Indians. For 
Washington officials and congressmen, events on the western border had 
low priority~ Federal military operations and situations in the Trans-
Mississippi West bear this out, with the result that the needs of the 
civilian red man occupied the attention of Washington even lesso In 
1864, when Congress decided to look into the possibility of returning 
the refugees, it inquired of thei,r condition at the Office of Indian 
Affairs. Even after the refugees had been living in Kansas and Mis-
souri for over two years, Congress knew little about their pitiful 
plight. 
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Most of the criticism directed toward Superintendent Coffin con-
cerned his unwillingness to return the Cherokee refugees, and especially 
the Opothleyahola refugees, to Indian Territory sooner. Coffin's de-
tractors claimed that he detained the refugees in Kansas so he c9uld 
profit from contracts supplying them. The charge cannot be substan~ 
tiated or denied, but events subsequent to the return of the refugees 
to Indian Territory vindicated Superintendent Coffin's contention that 
a premature ·return would not be in the best interest of the refugees. 
The deplorable conditions of the refugees living around Fort Gibson 
was not due as much to Coffin's inefficiency as to the military's in-
ability to provide reliable escorts for refugee supply trains from 
Kansas, and its inability to hold large enough portions of Indian 
Territory secul'.'e from Confederate raids so that refugees could plant 
gardens and raise crops to support themselves. 
The two pl'.'oblems that most hindered Superintendent Coffin and his 
agents were the unfulfilled promises made by the military to the refu-
gees and the Clllllbersome governmental bureaucracy. First, Senator Lane, 
then Major General Blunt, and later Colonel Phillips promised the 
Federal Indians that they would clear Indian Territory of Southern 
forces. Their promises that could not be kept caused the Indians to 
suspect the motives of their agents and increased their resentment over 
being detained in Kansas and Missouri. When military demands and pres-
sures from Washington forced Superintendent Coffin to return the 
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refugees to Indian Territory, the results were disastrous to their 
welfare, because Federal military authority in Indian Territory did not 
prove to be adequate. 
Superintendent Coffin was often a scapegoat for refugee frustra-
tion, not only because of his unwillingness to return them to their 
homes, but also because he and his agents often failed to provide basic 
necessities for the refugees in time to alleviate suffering. The best 
example·was the failure in the late fall of 1863 to provide the Indians 
with blankets, winter clothing, and tents before frigid temperatures 
arrived. This was not an isolated instance, and was caused by the 
Federal government's method of requisitioning supplies on a quarterly 
basis only. Each quarter the government let contracts to meet the 
requisitions of its agencies and officials. Hence, urgent needs often 
went unfulfilled until the beginning of the next quarter, when estimates 
of needed supplies were again considered, requisitions approved, and 
contracts let. 
Besieged, J,ele'aguered·,: and floundering in a sea of t:r:ouble, the 
Federal Indian refugees had no one to fall back on for adequate p:r:otec-
tion and no one to turn to for adequate subsistence except the United 
.States government, who owed them protection and support through treaty 
obligationsG The Office of Indian Affairs and the Union army were. con-
spicuous for their failure to adequately provide the protection and 
subsistence needs of the Federal :r:efugee Indians that treaties obligated 
them to furnish and humanity demanded. 
If truly heroic figures emerged from the Civil War in Indian Ter~ 
ritory11 they would surely be the Federal refugees, whose suffering, 
courage, and unwavering devotion to the Union cause were superseded only 
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by their will to survive and their determi~ation to return to their 
homes. The epic magnitude of their tragic exodus and exile, which in-
cluded about 10,500 Indians from many diverse tribes, far overshadowed 
military events in Indian Territory in grandeur and human drama. 
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